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ABSTRACT 
 
AARON COOLEY: Rethinking Critical Approaches to the Persistence of Inequality in 
Education 
(Under the direction of Lynda Stone) 
 
 
 In the decades since Brown v. Board of Education (1954), critical educational 
scholarship has vigorously attempted to understand why educational inequality still 
persists. These approaches have been diverse, but they all maintain a substantial and 
passionate interest in making educational resources, opportunities, and outcomes better 
for all students. This dissertation attempts to address the complications within each of the 
traditions‘ conception of and attitude towards educational inequality and its persistence. 
As an alternative perspective, this dissertation offers the application of the writing of 
political philosopher Brian Barry as a theoretical framework. His work links to elements 
from each tradition to craft a perspective that attends to values of each approach; 
however, the proffered framework extends beyond the traditional boundaries to build a 
broader coalition for social justice and greater egalitarianism. Fundamentally, the thesis 
of this project is that the language, discourse, and politics of the dominant critical 
traditions in educational scholarship must find new ideologies, new ways of thinking, and 
new approaches to social action to advance the causes of their underlying values in order 
to effectively confront the cultural, economic, and political forces that seek to increase 
inequality in education and society. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
D‘Angelo:  Ya‘ll don‘t understand man. Ya‘ll don‘t get it. You grow up in this s*** . . 
 . All my people, my father, my uncles, my cousins—it‘s just what we do. 
 You just live with s*** until you can‘t breathe no more. I swear to God, I 
 was courtside for eight months and I was freer in jail than I was at home. 
 
Pearlman:  What are you looking for? 
 
D‘Angelo:  I want it to go away. 
 
Pearlman:  I can‘t… 
 
D‘Angelo:  I want what Wallace wanted. I want to start over. That‘s what I want. I 
 don‘t care where. Anywhere. I give a f***. I just want to go somewhere 
 where I can breathe like regular folk. You give me that and I give you 
 them. 
 
         Season 1 of The Wire (2002), Episode ―Sentencing,‖ Scene ―A Way Out‖ 
 
 
Richard:  My neighborhood is mostly about drugs. For real, people out there doing 
drugs, sticking needles in their arms messing up their blood. I know I‘m 
smart. If I‘m not around stupid and dumb people. But, see, I can‘t let them 
get here [pointing to his temple]. Let them stay out there. And I don‘t want 
my brother, my baby brother anyway to grow up in no, no projects with no 
drug dealers. I don‘t want him to. But, you know, I‘m strong. I‘m a strong 
man. Like, uh, what‘s his name? Fredrick Douglass. I‘m strong just like 
him. Tell you I‘m strong. What I‘m willing to do is get away from here. I 
can‘t wait until I go to Baraka. 
 
               The Boys of Baraka (2005), ―Richard: 13 years old‖ 
 
 These are strange times. At no point in the past have the scale and scope of 
inequality in the United States been so glaringly apparent and has the information of 
inequality‘s growth and destructive elements been so widely available (Ansolabehere & 
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Snyder, 2008; Bartels, 2008; Bogle, 2005; Page & Simmons, 2000). For a relevant 
example, consider the mountains of evidence of the decline of one American city, like 
Baltimore, which has been detailed in fiction in The Wire (2002) and in the tragic 
documentary The Boys of Baraka (2005). The individuals represented in these epigraphs 
and the urban environment of Baltimore will serve as a reference point throughout this 
study. They will also provide a counter example to the idyllic educational opportunities 
offered by certain private schools such as St. Paul‘s, which are discussed later in the 
introduction. Consequently, it is necessary to further describe the conditions young 
people face growing up in these environments. 
 The Wire (2002) was a critically acclaimed HBO series that has been lauded as 
the best television program in the history of the medium. It has become the focus of 
numerous college courses and sparked academic debates germane to crime, drug policy, 
urban devastation, and education. The scene in which the first epigraph occurs is a story 
trajectory where D‘Angelo has finally been caught in a drug conspiracy that involves his 
uncle, mother, and friends. What makes the scene and series remarkable is the way it 
conveys the embedded social complexity of life opportunities and choices that are 
provided to marginalized youth. Unlike numerous fictional representations and news 
accounts of the drug war that paint such problems in overly simplistic terms, The Wire 
displays the challenges faced by these youth and relays the lack of opportunities and 
choices that they often have in their lives. Instead of blaming these marginalized youth 
for their choices to lead such lives, the scene demonstrates that their hands can be tied in 
wanting to step out of the family business. Without adequate opportunities and support 
for such students to make positive choices, they are left to fend for themselves and to 
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attempt to survive any way they can. Further, this scene from season one foreshadows the 
extended attention that educational institutions and the broader community receive in 
season four. To sum, the first epigraph is meant to illustrate the difficulty marginalized 
young people often feel in the social environments in which they grow up, which is easily 
contrasted with students who attend elite schools. 
 The second epigraph is from the documentary film The Boys of Baraka (2005), 
which follows several young men from Baltimore who were selected to attend a boarding 
school program in Kenya. The program was established to provide a radically different 
set of opportunities for students who demonstrated that they were interested in changing 
their lives and committing themselves to their education. The epigraph poignantly opens 
the film and describes the rationale for why Richard sees this as an opportunity to get out 
of the environment that he worries is going to damage his future. Later, the perceived 
successes of the program are hampered as the school‘s future becomes uncertain with a 
bombing in a nearby area and increased U.S. military actions abroad. The underlying 
point in opening this study with these statements is to relay the gravity of the educational 
opportunities in the lives of young people and the absolute need to question the common 
sense assumptions and rhetoric that demonize those affected by inequality without 
seeking answers to why such inequality still exists. 
 It is important to now continue with a discussion of how these challenges 
encapsulated by the epigraphs materialize in the lives of young people. From an 
extraordinarily high murder rate to above average levels of unemployment, the dangers 
faced by young people are substantial, and the future careers to choose from are 
increasingly few.  At the same time, there seems to be increasingly little that is even 
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attempted to be done about the growth of inequality in almost every area of social, 
economic, and political life (Ackerman, 2000; Page & Jacobs, 2009). The government 
and public endlessly read reports and watch news programs about the scourges of hunger, 
poverty, and homelessness; however, there is a continued failure to make progress on 
positively and substantively changing the equation between those who struggle and those 
who do not care that others are struggling (Allen, 2005; Salverda, Nolan, & Smeeding, 
2009). Further, it seems that many people have little to no interest in trying to change the 
dire circumstances that separate and divide the populations of individuals in the United 
States (Alperovitz & Daly, 2008).  
 What should shock society into action when confronted by the images, stories, 
and data of these inequalities is now rationalized into the status quo through half-hearted 
policy prescriptions and is unfairly justified through political rhetoric (Shor, 1986). This 
failure is compounded by the mainstream media‘s faulty and paltry coverage of 
inequality, which does little to inform and less to educate the public about the underlying 
causes of these disparities. Further, the media propagates all manner of divisions in 
society and contributes to the blaming of victims of irresponsible economic and social 
policy for a lack of personal responsibility in their own lives (Bagdikian, 2002; Baker, 
2007; Herman & Chomsky, 2002).  
 Nowhere in American life are these inequalities more apparent, abhorrent, and 
devastating to individuals‘ life outcomes than in the diverse educational institutions of 
this nation (Anyon, 2005). A simple comparison of St. Paul‘s in New Hampshire, one of 
the most elite private schools in the country that counts presidential candidates as alums 
(see also http://www.sps.edu/), with Harbor City High in Baltimore City, a public high 
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school ranked as one of Maryland‘s worst and one that D‘ Angelo or Richard could likely 
attend (see also http://www.hclc.sailorsite.net/HarborCityHS.html), demonstrates this 
concept. This comparison gives a stark picture of inequality that mirrors and helps to 
replicate the most insidious trends in our economic and political systems. It will be 
helpful to keep each of these schools, as well as D‘Angelo and Richard, the young men in 
the opening quotes, in mind throughout this dissertation. If one falters in trying to sort out 
what educational inequality looks like in America, these examples will remind the reader 
of the disparity in the education that students receive. They serve as reminders that some 
children are born into families and communities where education can be encouraged in 
bucolic settings, such as Concord where St. Paul‘s is located; other children are confined 
to forgotten zones like Baltimore, often referred to as ―Bodymore, Murdaland‖ by the 
young people who inhabit it. This comparison demonstrates that ―the accident of birth,‖ 
to use J.S. Mill‘s phrase (1873), still predominantly rules the day when it comes to social 
mobility and life outcomes (Kozol, 1992, 2005).  
 This dissertation argues that, at the most fundamental level, education and politics 
are inextricably intertwined and that political theory and educational theory must be 
connected in new ways that go beyond the existing boundaries upon which each field 
often draws. Fundamentally, the thesis of this dissertation is that the discourse of the 
dominant critical traditions in educational scholarship must find new ideologies, new 
ways of thinking, and new approaches to social action to advance the causes of their 
underlying values in order to effectively confront the cultural, economic, and political 
forces that seek to increase inequality in education and society. It is crucial to note that 
ideology is defined here as a perspective or worldview. This is in contrast to the orthodox 
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Marxist conception of ideology, which is often defined as not being able to see around 
one‘s class position and class interests. As the term is used throughout this study, the 
lighter conception of ideology is the one employed in the study. 
 Building from the sense of injustice that grows from a comparison of American 
schools, this dissertation seeks to better understand the theoretical responses that 
educational scholars and theorists have developed and used to confront and combat 
inequalities in the educational institutions. Brian Barry‘s (1961, 1966, 1981, 1990, 2002), 
the 2001 Johan Skytte Prize winning political theorist and former professor at the London 
School of Economics and Columbia University, egalitarian views of social justice are 
threaded throughout the dissertation. A brief discussion of the key elements of each of the 
chapters follows, along with the research questions and a statement about the contribution 
to the field. 
Chapter Outlines, Delimitations, Research Questions, and Contribution to Field 
Chapter Outlines 
 This introductory chapter outlines the structure of the dissertation and discusses 
each of the chapters. The chapter then lays an initial foundation for the study by 
considering the following themes: 1) the organic philosophical process of discovery that 
led to the selection of Brian Barry as the central theorist of this dissertation; 2) what is 
meant by a critical tradition in educational scholarship; 3) how Barry defines equality; 
and 4) a short historical discussion of the persistence of inequality in education. 
 The second chapter has two aims: 1) to analyze and discuss the state of 
educational inequality that presently exists in America and 2) to discuss the roots of these 
inequalities in public policy that have furthered their expansion via neoliberal ideologies. 
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Overall, the chapter draws on diverse sources to establish that inequalities in education 
have numerous negative consequences for students well beyond their school years. This 
connection is crucial to make as the following chapters discuss varying critical traditions 
that all agree that the educational system in the United States requires substantial 
reconceptualization and reconstruction to succeed in remedying these injustices. 
 The third chapter provides an introduction to the work of Brian Barry (1965/1990, 
1973, 1989, 1999, 2005) as the theoretical underpinning for the dissertation. Until his 
recent death, Barry‘s work over the last 40 years displayed a passionate commitment to 
the reduction of entrenched power and unjust inequality in all forms. From his first major 
work Political Argument (1965/1990) to his Why Social Justice Matters (2005), he 
refused to allow political philosophy to wander aimlessly into ever more abstract and 
inaccessible technical discussions that forgot the point of thinking through political 
problems—to make people‘s lives better. Vittorio Bufacchi (2008), a political theorist at 
University College Cork, Ireland, puts Barry‘s role into the context of changes in the 
field: ―analytical philosophy is done by specialists primarily for other specialists, a truth 
that leads Rorty to speculate whether Anglophone philosophy no longer has any 
relevance to anything else in the intellectual world‖ (p. 256). Buffachi sees Barry‘s 
contribution as analogous to Rorty in that he energizes the importance of putting 
philosophy to work in the real world of lived experience. This is a critical point in 
understanding the role that Barry plays in the history of political philosophy.  
 Further, what Bufacchi is driving at is that there is risk in not seeing the larger 
picture or Socratic elements of political thought that must keep a connection to the 
politics of the societies one is discussing and analyzing. This is confirmed by Bufacchi as 
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he continues this line about the overspecialization of political philosophy and Barry‘s 
contrasting view: ―The issues debated by professional political philosophers in 
specialized journals have become sophisticated to the point of alienating the non-
initiated, being written by specialists for fellow specialists...there is the risk of missing 
the forest for the trees‖ (p. 256). This theme of political philosophy needing to remain 
relevant to politics is clearly important to Bufacchi, because it was important to Barry. 
 Bufacchi (2008) provides the following description of how Barry‘s work should 
be seen as providing a critical bridge from the debating theories of politics and 
government to the next step of having these discussions be meaningful for the 
governmental programs and initiatives that affect the lives of people: ―political 
philosophy ought to strive for three main goals: to locate the nature of the social and 
political problems inflicting our societies; to set the agenda for future social policies; and 
to indicate solutions to these problems‖ (p. 262). This push for political philosophy to 
become more active and engaged with a public political conversation and discourse has 
been mirrored by a few other political philosophers such as Benjamin Barber (1984, 
1992, 2007), Walt Whitman, Professor of Political Science Emeritus, of Rutgers 
University, and Michael Sandel (1982/1998, 1996, 2009) of Harvard University. 
However, it is far from the standard view, and it is one of the keys to what makes Barry‘s 
contribution so important, as well as why his views should be considered by critical 
educational theorists and activists. For Barry, political philosophizing is a waste of time 
unless the speculation is grounded in real world politics and geared towards contributing 
to the public dialogue on political issues. This critical connection will be made in this 
study between education and critical educational scholarship. 
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 Barry‘s ideas accommodate many of the key values of the dominant critical 
traditions in educational scholarship, which will be discussed in Chapter 4 (Class), 
Chapter 5 (Autonomy), and Chapter 6 (Identity). The focus of each of those chapters will 
be on elements of critical traditions, and Barry‘s work will be threaded through each of 
them. The aim of each chapter is to discuss the goals and values that each tradition holds 
and prioritizes, as well as the language used in their attempts to improve education 
through the advancement of their agendas. Each critical tradition has something 
significant and important to contribute to the educational discourse and conversation; yet, 
there are elements that can undercut the potency of their critique. Further, their 
theoretical insularity can make them inflexible to changing conservative political 
strategies that seek to block the reduction of educational inequality (Hess & LoGerfo, 
2006; Hess & Lowe, 2007). Last, they all share a common modernist inclination and 
rhetorical structure.  
 The fourth chapter will discuss the work of individuals who appeal to the concept 
of class in seeking to understand and eliminate inequality in education and economic life. 
Of particular interest will be the reasons educational scholars began to use the work that 
drew upon classic class writers such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848/1978). 
This move towards Marx and class-based analysis of educational inequality is one of the 
most consequential trends in the critical educational literature. In particular, the work of 
Michael Apple (1979/2004), Henry Giroux (2005), and Peter McLaren (2005) will be 
discussed.  
 The fifth chapter examines critical educational scholarship that theorizes about 
reducing and eliminating educational inequality through appeals to autonomy. This work 
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is the closest to Barry‘s training in the tradition of political liberalism. The discussion 
provided will explore the work of Harry Brighouse (1996, 2000, 2006), Eamon Callan 
(1997), and Rob Reich (2002). Although these scholars are usually not seen as a ―critical‖ 
tradition, this dissertation holds them to the meaning of their texts, which all assert that 
the present educational institutions are producing far too many negative outcomes. 
Therefore, their perspectives, which seek to produce autonomy in students and allow 
them to have flourishing lives, are critical in a sense of the term—a perspective that 
critiques the status quo and offers strategies and a rationale for a better educational 
system in the future. More on this point of defining them as a critical tradition will be 
addressed in that chapter. 
 The sixth chapter analyzes the work of scholars who make appeals to identity in 
understanding and attempting to reduce educational inequality. Scholars who work in this 
area have brought to the forefront of the educational debate issues related to the biases 
inherent in American social life; these are biases that have had and continue to have 
deleterious consequences for groups and individuals on all matters of difference, 
including, but not limited to, those of gender, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, religious 
affiliation, and disability. This work has made substantial progress in highlighting the 
prejudices that have hampered equal treatment for individuals based on identity in 
education and in social life. This work is particularly important as each of the above 
mentioned groups were excluded from majority educational institutions until the near 
present. Even when educational rights were granted, educational opportunities were not 
priorities and were drastically less than equal. In the wake of the numerous legal victories 
that have led to greater access, there has been a significant backlash against these groups, 
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which are often labeled carelessly as multiculturalist; disregarded as simply identity 
politics; or, worse, designated as an example of having to be ―PC‖ or politically correct. 
Of special note in this area will be the work of Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009), Adams, 
Bell, and Griffin (2007), Goodman (2001), and Cochran-Smith (2004). 
 The final chapter briefly speculates on what may happen if inequality continues to 
grow unabated without any intervention by the government or call to action by a 
coordinated social movement. After discussing these harmful trends, Barry‘s (2005, 
2008) work will be returned to directly. The argument for his work to be seen as a needed 
platform for critical responses to the endemic social problem of educational inequality 
will be advanced as his ideas are sensitive to the three appeals made in critical 
educational scholarship. Additionally, elements of the values that underlie these trends 
will be expanded as those views advance the cause of social justice in education and 
society. 
Delimitations  
 Although the scope of this work is admittedly wide and intentionally broad to 
relay the interrelations between educational theory, political theory, and inequality, the 
study is delimited in the following ways. First, it is restricted to the traditions that are 
discussed. There are several more recent theoretical developments that will not be 
discussed directly. Second, as a conceptual work, this study does not directly move to 
policy reform. It is geared towards casting a critical eye upon where critical educational 
scholarship has come from and where it may need to head. The policy connections and 
political strategy are needed, but they must come in another work. Finally, this is only 
one view into how these traditions play out in the educational discourse. The positionality 
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of the author is that injustices of the present educational system are unjust. This assertion 
may be disagreed with or others may think the existing traditions do not require 
reassessment, but, in the author‘s view, action must be taken. The first step towards this 
type of action is understanding this underlying ethical commitment. 
Research Questions  
       The central research question that this proposed dissertation investigates is: What 
elements in the work of Brian Barry are applicable and useful to understanding the 
persistence of educational inequality that also take into account ideas from the dominant 
critical traditions in educational scholarship?  
 Each of the chapters addresses a component of the overarching research question 
alongside each chapter‘s specific questions as listed below: 
Chapter 2 – What does educational inequality look like in schools today and what are the 
     economic factors and trends that have shaped the educational system over 
      the last thirty years? 
Chapter 3 – What can Brian Barry‘s work on meritocracy, personal responsibility, and  
  equal opportunity offer educational scholarship in understanding and  
  confronting the persistence of educational inequality?  
Chapter 4 – What are the elements of critical educational scholarship that appeal to      
  class in understanding educational inequality and what aspects are at      
  play in Barry‘s work? 
Chapter 5 – What are the elements of critical educational scholarship that appeal to      
  autonomy in understanding educational inequality and what aspects are at 
      play in Barry‘s work? 
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Chapter 6 – What are the elements of critical educational scholarship that appeal to      
  identity in understanding educational inequality and what aspects are at      
  play in Barry‘s work? 
Chapter 7 – What does the future look like, given ever increasing inequality, and what  
  can Barry‘s work in summary contribute to the critical educational   
  discourse on inequality?  
Contribution to Field 
 This dissertation seeks to contribute to the body of scholarship that confronts and 
critiques inequality in American education. Further, it attempts to understand existing 
theoretical frameworks that discuss educational inequality and to offer a new perspective 
geared towards reducing inequality. As there still has not been a groundswell of political 
will to significantly revamp educational politics and structures towards equality, more 
attention to the realities of inequality both through academic circles and the larger public 
discourse must be given. The dissertation aims to add to this conversation and to renew 
the call for an educational agenda geared towards equality and social justice, even in the 
face of numerous barriers and challenges. The next section discusses the selection of 
Brian Barry as the central theorist of this study. 
Why Brian Barry? 
 Dissertations are a process of discovery that seeks to bring new knowledge to the 
foreground or to add novel perspectives and interpretations on old questions. This 
dissertation attempts to achieve this aim through philosophical investigation and analysis 
of texts and debates that surround the educational discourse of inequality. Specifically, 
the introduction and application of the work of Brian Barry can be viewed as the 
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contribution of this dissertation to a theory of politics of education. The selection of 
Barry as the primary theorist came from an organic process of exposure to and 
engagement with the writing of the dominant critical traditions in educational 
scholarship. The criteria for selection were developed in an ex post facto fashion that 
allowed for a perspective that discusses the complications of each existing tradition. It 
includes a theoretical position that accommodates the realities of economic and material 
difference (class), acknowledges the role of personal action (autonomy), and recognizes 
the power disparities and difference among populations (identity). These criteria link onto 
the selected critical traditions that are discussed in each chapter.  
 Each tradition deserves respect and appreciation. The critiques of them offered via 
Barry‘s contrasting views are in no way meant to diminish their contributions or to 
disregard the wealth of strength and empowerment that many teachers and scholars 
receive from employing them. The analysis is done in the spirit of solidarity against a 
common set of forces that increases educational inequality to which all these traditions 
respond significantly. Further, this dissertation is not an attempt to create a synthetic 
theory out of these traditions per se. In fact, the overriding point is that one can agree 
with the empirical realities they want to confront, but the discourses in which this is done 
must be rethought given the barriers that are faced in achieving justice and reducing 
educational inequality.  
 Another element that makes Barry‘s work important to turn to is its lack of 
attention by both political scientists interested in education and education scholars as a 
group. A ProQuest (http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/en-US/) search of the 
full text of dissertations provided only 64 results for ―Brian Barry‖ and ―Barry, Brian.‖ 
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When further refined to search for those combinations with education as a term in the 
abstract or keywords, the results are reduced to one dissertation that focuses on religious 
education and political authority. A significant reason for selecting Barry is his political 
drive and intellectual tenacity to argue for social justice, equality, and educational 
progress in a world that seems not to care for any of these concepts. This last rationale is 
political in the most vital sense. Barry‘s reading of Orwell‘s classic ―Why I write?‖ is 
pertinent here as it is the motivation for his work as well as my interpretation of it. Orwell 
contends that one writes for a ―political purpose—using the word ‗political‘ in the widest 
possible sense. Desire to push the world in a certain direction, to alter other people‘s idea 
of the kind of society that they should strive after‖ (Orwell, 1946/1956, p. 390). This 
impulse is echoed throughout the study. 
What Is Meant by Critical Tradition and Why Choose Class, Autonomy, and Identity? 
 A preliminary task of this chapter is to attempt to define the meaning of ―critical 
tradition,‖ to which is made reference throughout the dissertation. The term ―critical 
tradition‖ is used to describe the work of educational scholars who are dissatisfied with 
the educational processes and institutions that they discuss in their philosophical work. 
This broad interpretation of the term beyond the traditional bounds of ―critical theory‖ is 
meant to identify multiple ways and theoretical perspectives that confront hidden power 
structures, as well as to critique governmental and private institutions that limit 
educational progress and support unjust infrastructures that increase inequality across the 
social and political spectrum.  
 The connection to a ―critical tradition‖ is least obvious for Chapter 5, which deals 
with autonomy and a general sense of criticism towards present forms of education. 
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However, there is a deep connection to this meaning of critical in that many scholars in 
the liberal tradition have strongly supported the teaching of critical thinking to students. 
The use of the term autonomy and its definition in this tradition are geared towards 
cultivating a critical attitude in students about themselves, the world they inhabit, and the 
choices they make in it. Autonomy is nothing if it does not have a critical element. 
Therefore, even though many political liberals may discount being called members of a 
critical tradition, they certainly are members if for no other reasons than their direct 
Kantian ties (many of his major works were titled as Critiques) and their Enlightenment 
heritage, which uses reason to undermine mere tradition and superstition. 
 At this point, it is also necessary to establish boundaries for the scope of this 
study. The concepts and critical traditions selected for discussion might seem to have 
some omissions from other recent efforts in educational scholarship. For example, the 
contributions of so-called postmodernists, poststructuralists, and critical race theorists 
have been bracketed off from the analysis. At certain points, these works may be touched 
on, but they are not the focus of the analysis. This bracketing off is in no way a response 
that undermines the intellectual worth, creditability, and saliency of these contributions. 
Simply, the diversity of theorists, trends, and concepts used is too great to be adequately 
considered in conjunction with the concepts that are drawn out in this study.  
 The concepts of Class, Autonomy, and Identity have been pulled out for 
discussion and analysis, because there are several elements that link them together. These 
elements are their reliance on a foundational sense of epistemology, an often essentialist 
view of culture and identity, and modernist ideas about historical change. Further, the 
implementation of their educational agendas relies on a prescriptive formula of 
17 
 
            
philosophical inquiry that posits their views as a solution to educational problems. 
Additionally, they position themselves as having a vanguard status among the other 
competing critical traditions. Each tradition also presumes a particular level of 
correctness about their ideas that allows for the disregarding of evidence that conflicts 
with their positions. These common features bind them together temporally as well as 
formally through their philosophical presuppositions. 
Barry on Equality 
Having bound the study and discussed the central term of ―critical tradition,‖ it is 
important at this stage to detail Barry‘s description of equality to give a base to the 
foregoing discussions of inequality, meritocracy, personal responsibility, and equal 
opportunity. Barry‘s discussion is quoted at length, but this is vital for understanding how 
equality can be defined in the context of a strong conception and a weak one. From 
Political Argument, Barry (1965/1990) states, ―By ‗equality‘ I am referring to a 
distributive notion…in other words that some principle or other must be invoked if 
people are to be treated differently. If you like, you can say that ‗fundamental‘ equality 
underlies equality in other senses‖ (p. 119). At the outset, Barry clarifies his intention to 
understand equality on the basis of treatment. Groups are unequal when one group 
receives a different treatment from some individual, authority, or group. The follow-up is 
that this quickly becomes unjust when the inequality of treatment is based on some type 
of non-impartial judgment. 
 Barry continues describing the way that the meaning of equality gets confused. 
This is especially true in a common misunderstanding in equating equal treatment to 
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identical treatment. This is not the case, and Barry (1965/1990) attempts to clarify the 
difference between equal and identical treatment: 
Those who wish to disparage the distributive principle of equality often seek to do 
so by suggesting that its adherents are committed to holding either that men are 
‗equal‘ in their personal characteristics or that they ought to be ‗equal.‘ Then, 
since ‗equality‘ of personal characteristics does not seem to make much sense it is 
suggested that equalitarians presumably mean ‗identical‘ when they say ‗equal.‘ 
As this idea is absurd distributive equality can be conveniently dismissed as an 
unintelligible concept. The cosy conclusion can then be drawn that when people 
demand ‗equality‘ they are either confused or they are demanding ‗fundamental‘ 
equality; that is, for some group (perhaps the human race) to be treated as a 
reference group. What equality ‗really means‘ it is claimed is that some reason or 
other must be adduced to justify treating people differently. The incoherence, 
however, lies not in the concept of equality, but in the hostile formulation itself. 
To say that people should be equal is to say that their opportunities for satisfying 
whatever wants they may happen to have should be equal. Whether or not one 
agrees with the claim in any particular case it surely cannot be denied that is a 
reasonably intelligible one, and one not involving any implausible prescriptions or 
descriptions involving uniformity and identity. . . .Thus—to take what I shall call 
the ‗weak‘ sense of distributive equality—asking for racial equality between black 
and white does not entail asking that everyone should be an identical intermediate 
colour, nor does asking for equality between the sexes entail asking for universal 
hermaphrodistism. What one is demanding is that a person‘s chances of satisfying 
his wants should not be affected by his or her skin colour or sex. (p. 120) 
 
Barry‘s tongue in cheek comments here reflect a deep passion for making clear that 
equality is desirable without asking for personal conformity to some developed standard 
of individual or group habit. The gist of his position is that one can have any personal 
characteristics that are varied—including both inherited and self-selected, developed 
ones, but these characteristics should not be allowed to justify unequal treatment.   
 The sense of equality that Barry describes presents a robust picture of how 
equality and, inversely, inequality will be used throughout this study. These distinctions 
are vitally important and therefore require additional exploration to understand the 
difference between strong and weak equality and the move from wants to goods: 
19 
 
            
One use of ‗equality‘ in a distributive context is, then, to deny that a certain 
characteristic (generally one which people can‘t do anything about) should be 
taken as a basis for treating people differently. ‗Equality of x‘s‘ (where x is the 
characteristic in question) is, as I have pointed out, a common form in which 
‗equality‘ occurs here. ‗Equality of opportunity‘ refers to a subclass of cases, 
where the irrelevant characteristics are whatever characteristics that give rise to a 
background of unfairness by improperly influencing the results of context or 
authoritative determination. . . .  But equality in respect of one quality (say, colour 
or sex) is perfectly compatible with great inequalities in respect of other qualities. 
And ‗equality of opportunity‘ is sometimes expressly defined as ‗equal 
opportunities to become unequal.‘ Let us therefore distinguish this ‗weak‘ sense 
of ‗equality‘ from a ‗strong‘ sense which comes into play to describe or demand a 
state of affairs in which all the members of a group get an equal share in some 
(tangible or intangible) good, regardless of any personal characteristic. In this use, 
when the phrase ‗equality of x‘ is employed, the x refers not to a personal 
characteristic which is to be irrelevant (race, sex) but to a good which is to be 
equally shared (‗equality of income,‘ ‗parity of esteem‘). In the adjectival form of 
the phrase, instead of ‗racial equality‘ or ‗sexual equality‘ we have ‗economic 
equality‘ or ‗social equality.‘ The full implementation of the principle of equality 
in this ‗strong‘ sense would of course often conflict with the full implementation 
of other principles—not only aggregative principles but also other distributive 
principles. (p. 121-122) 
 
This clarification of the demands of equality based on context are important especially in 
considering how unequal educational resources are allocated or how unequal chances for 
students from certain marginalized groups to succeed are covered up by the rhetoric of 
―equal opportunity.‖ Further, Barry is not interested in objections to his egalitarian views 
that rely on a contradiction between this principle and others as requiring a completely 
non-contradictory set of principles would not be likely or possible. Therefore, this 
argument against strong equality would fall flat.  
 To sum, Barry‘s use of equality in this context is important in framing the overall 
discussion of inequality in education and society. Strong equality must be promoted to 
nurture the political and social attitudes necessary for lasting change and reform. This is a 
central holding of Barry‘s work and the one furthered in this dissertation is that inaction 
against inequality is fundamentally unjust, undemocratic, and unacceptable. 
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Historical Sketch on the Persistence of Inequality in American Education 
 The final section of this introductory chapter provides a historical sketch about the 
struggle for educational equality and the political trends that affect it. It serves as a 
necessary foundation against which Barry and the varied critical traditions respond in 
their attempts to theorize about better educational institutions and political attitudes than 
presently exist and to find new ways to combat and reduce educational inequality. 
 The American educational system has a long history of being viewed as a site for 
democratic training, as a set of institutions that socialize immigrants to their new country, 
and as a social arena charged with providing students with knowledge and skills for 
future employment (Au, 2009; Bankston & Cladas, 2009). These aims and the 
achievement of them have been criticized for a variety of reasons by academics, 
politicians, and business leaders throughout the twentieth century (Callahan, 1962; 
Counts, 1969; Cubberly, 1915; Darling-Hammond, 2002; Elmore, 2004; Goodlad, 1984; 
Tyack & Cuban, 1995). The pressure on the educational system has only increased in the 
new century with the passage and implementation of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) 
(Abernathy, 2007; McGuinn, 2006; Rebell &Wolff, 2008; Vinovskis, 2008). In fact, the 
one item that all educational critics and observers, from Henry Giroux (2005, 2007, 2008) 
on the left to Charles Murray (2008) and David Horowitz (2007) on the right, seem to 
agree upon is that something must be done to remedy the ills of the broken system 
(Lareau, 2003; Law, 2006). Of course, the recommendations for educational policy 
reform range widely and, here, contradictions between the extremes of the right and the 
left are the starkest.  
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 Between these two poles, centrist reformers have taken hold of the contemporary 
educational policy discourse. These centrists are plowing forward with a regime of 
increased accountability but with a less aggressive tone (Lipman, 2003)—for instance, 
promoting a light version of school choice that seeks to pressure the public schools 
without alienating teacher unions (Abernathy, 2005) and seeking involvement from the 
business sector in planning and funding reform (Cuban, 2004). For example, Secretary of 
Education Arne Duncan was picked by Baraka Obama specifically for his inclusive 
attitude towards the demands of the business community in education (Giroux, 2009).  
 What is unfortunately missing from the educational policy arena is a sustained 
and sincere effort at reducing the vast inequality of educational opportunities that frames 
the experience of many students across the country (Hart & Risley, 1995). In the late 19
th
 
and 20
th
 centuries, the main blocks to these efforts were legal barriers to educational 
equality in terms of institutionalized racism. Of particular relevance were the decisions in 
the cases of Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and Cumming v. 
Richmond County Board of Education (1899), all of which sanctioned segregation and 
ensured inequality in educational and economic life. Even breakthroughs such as Brown 
v. Board of Education (1954), which made de jure segregation illegal, had substantially 
less impact on desegregating districts around the country than reformers had hoped, and 
inequality continued to expand in many districts (Tushnet, 1995) while at the same time 
setting back successful schools that served marginalized populations (Siddle Walker, 
1996).  
 In addition to race, school funding as a criteria of educational equality has also 
been poorly served. The opportunity for the Supreme Court to take a federal stand for 
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equality in school funding was dismissed in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez (1973), leaving educational equality to the states (Sracic, 2006). State finance 
litigation has seen some success in terms of legal victories and the appropriation of 
additional funds to remedy gross inequalities in financing among the districts of a state. 
Yet, because of unequal and unjust funding, three decades after San Antonio and fifty 
years after Brown, America‘s public schools provide vastly different educational 
opportunities to the students who arrive at their doors (Johnson, 2006). This is evidenced 
by dramatically different high school graduation rates among urban and suburban 
districts, college admissions, and future employment. 
 Political responses to educational reform did occur during the middle of the 20
th
 
century—not to address the aforementioned inequality in terms of racial segregation or 
school funding, but to preserve national pride and military superiority. With the Cold 
War dominating politics, most politicians cared little for domestic policy, until the Soviet 
Union launched Sputnik. This kicked off a wave of interest in educational reform geared 
to making sure the United States was able to train enough engineers and scientists to 
compete militarily with the Soviets. Of particular note in the educational policy dialogue 
was the work of Admiral Rickover, especially his Education and Freedom (1960), which 
stressed the reorientation of American education towards greater efficiency in the training 
of students in math and science.  
 In the 1960s, progressive effort in social and domestic policy succeeded in 
passing and implementing President Lyndon Baines Johnson‘s Great Society initiatives. 
These included the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
which improved the conditions under which students could seek greater representation 
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and education. However, the barriers and foes of educational equality were resolute with 
the glaring example of James Meredith being refused admission from the University of 
Mississippi until a political deal allowed him to attend.  
 The 1970s saw an increased use of the federal courts in deciding educational 
policy. Two cases had substantial effects for educational equality. In Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), the Supreme Court allowed for busing to be 
used to integrate the public schools even in cases where segregation was based only on 
geography and not a stated policy. In contrast, Milliken v. Bradley (1974) put limitations 
on busing and prohibited plans that required inter-district busing unless there was a 
calculated policy aimed at segregation. 
 In the 1980s, several political and economic changes affected the direction of 
educational policy and further exacerbated the inequalities of the educational system. The 
election of President Ronald Reagan ushered in a new era focused on deregulation, 
supply-side economics, and deficit spending, all of which undermined a strong public 
school system (Rayack, 1987). At the same time, there was a tide of educational reform 
treatises published during that period and its aftermath. Two exemplars that had arguably 
the greatest influence on the public discourse of education were the National Commission 
on Excellence in Education‘s A Nation at Risk (1983) and Secretary of Education 
William Bennett‘s Our Children and Our Country: Improving America‟s Schools and 
Affirming the Common Culture (1988). A Nation at Risk (1983) revived the 1950s Cold 
War attitudes of national pride and fear of decline to reframe educational reform in terms 
of international economic competiveness. Its narrative asserted that this deterioration 
would lead to economic stagnation and threaten America‘s national security. Bennett‘s 
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speeches and writing often used the same devices of a crisis mentality and the threat of 
national decline, but his central themes were the eroding of traditional public school 
curriculum and the need to teach ―character‖ to students.   
 Significantly, in each publication and the debates surrounding them, the focus was 
not on steps towards educational equality. Looking back at this period, one can see that 
the reforms inspired by A Nation at Risk (1983) did not succeed in making America‘s 
schools more equal. This should not be a surprise given that equality was not the report‘s 
political aim. Bennett‘s work also did not contribute to a discussion of educational 
inequality in a positive manner. Quite to the contrary, his writing and speeches were fuel 
for the culture wars. His views on character instruction conceived of one‘s success in 
school and life as simply products of mental determination to succeed, and, conversely, 
failure in school and life was a reflection of one‘s lack of will and strong moral fiber 
(Bennett, 1988).  
 By the 1990s, the political center and right emerged as the controlling voice of the 
public discourse around education; this trend continues into the present (Kumashiro, 
2008). At every turn, the bully pulpits of education Governors, Secretaries of Education, 
and Presidents worked to frame educational issues towards centrist business inspired 
reforms. These efforts were often organized around the priorities of state business 
roundtables and, at the national level, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Further, reforms 
were usually discussed in terms that illustrated them as inevitable and necessary for 
competitive improvements in outcomes (like standards, character education, and school 
choice). In contrast, alternative recommendations were painted as naïve political fantasy 
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(like equality in funding and widespread integration of urban districts) that did not merit 
serious consideration. 
 With the passage of the bipartisan NCLB, educational inequality has become an 
issue that many observers think demands attention (Rebell & Wolff, 2009). The 
unacceptability that public schools were failing to provide students with similar levels of 
education was allegedly written into the law (Rothstein, Jacobsen, & Wilder, 2008). Yet, 
years after its implementation, the results of this legislation are mixed at best, and an 
underfunding of the mandate will continue given the recent economic recession 
(Abernathy, 2007). Inequality in education will likely continue to grow. The next chapter 
discusses the persistence of educational inequality. 
  
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PERSISTENCE OF EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 
            In 1954, the United States Supreme Court declared, ―Today, education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments‖ (Brown v. Board of 
Education, 1954, para. 9). This statement from the landmark Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954) decision still rings true and could only be updated with the possible 
addition of the federal government to the list of governments involved in education. The 
Supreme Court decision continued, asserting ―it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity…is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms‖ (para. 9). 
Over the last half-century since these statements were made, demands for equality and a 
public commitment to education‘s importance have not been lived up to by politicians 
and policymakers. At present, America‘s public schools still fail to demonstrate that 
education is a paramount governmental service and that it should be equal among all 
citizens. The failure to succeed in attaining these goals results in massive numbers of 
citizens who are not able to fully participate in social, economic, and political life. This 
state of affairs is unjust and threatens to erode the foundations of American democracy as 
mentioned in the first chapter. 
 This chapter describes inequality in the public schools and later life outcomes 
along with the economic policies and factors that contribute to it. It is helpful to frame 
this discussion of inequality against the background of critics and policymakers who do 
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not prioritize the reduction of inequality in their writings about politics and education. 
Several of these counter-perspectives are offered to begin the discussion.   
Old Political Barriers That Are New Again 
 One of the most potent problems in the persistence of educational inequality is 
that of the political roadblock of American conservatism. These elements of conservatism 
show up in the commentary from the political right that privileges responsibility over 
equality. (This is a theme that Barry critiques passionately and figures in the following 
chapters.) Several examples of the attitudes of the right both from recent months and 
historical sources are necessary to communicate the right‘s efforts to block substantial 
educational and social reform. The perspective often offered by conservatives places 
blame for inequality on individuals due to their lack of success in a meritocratic system, 
failure to take personal responsibility over their lives, and not taking advantage of having 
an equal opportunity to achieve a higher standard of living. 
 The first example comes from Thomas Sowell (2009), an economist turned op-ed 
columnist who works at the Hoover Institution. The following comments are directed to 
those citizens who fail to succeed in his eyes because of lack of will and other personal 
characteristics: ―Whether the particular issue is education, economics or medical care, the 
preferred explanation tends to be an external explanation - that is, something outside the 
control of the individuals directly involved‖ (para. 1). Sowell believes that everyone, 
including children, should take responsibility for what happens to them and that external 
factors that play a role in success should be discounted. Of course, many of the policy 
spheres he mentions are outside of any individual‘s control. To think that a person has a 
determinate role in what medical care is provided to them is often not true and the same 
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rationale applies to education as well. This form of theorizing is the legacy of Ayn Rand 
(1957); further, it would suggest that a child born with a severe disability should be as 
responsible for his or her position as someone who chooses to eat a high fat and 
cholesterol diet would for his or her health problems. As Sowell moves from this general 
rule directly to education, he expects children to take their bad education and just do 
something like work harder to succeed in a system that he admits is not doing a good job 
(this rhetoric is quite similar to President Barack Obama‘s 2009 speech on the first day of 
school): ―Education is usually discussed in terms of the money spent on it, the teaching 
methods used, class sizes or the way the whole system is organized. Students are 
discussed largely as passive recipients of good or bad education‖ (para. 2). 
 To hold the children harmed by inadequately funded schools in impoverished 
communities completely responsible for their lack of success seems to be a case of 
blaming victim. He continues in this line, stating that ―education is not something that 
can be given to anybody. It is something that students either acquire or fail to acquire. 
Personal responsibility may be ignored or downplayed in this ―non-judgmental‖ age, but 
it remains a major factor nevertheless‖ (para. 3). Clearly, Sowell is expressing a desire to 
return to the glory days when students did as they were told and they were judged by 
society for mistakes they made. This perspective, however, is the inverse of reality as 
students‘ life outcomes are much more harmed by actions and success in their youth than 
in the past. The examples here are legion (two big examples are trying children as adults 
in criminal lawsuits and having educational attainment increasingly determine economic 
success), but these are unlikely to persuade those sympathetic to Sowell line‘s of thought.  
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 Sowell continues this barrage and attack by relaying what he thinks the outcomes 
of many students‘ lives will be: 
After many students go through a dozen years in the public schools, at a total cost 
of $100,000 or more per student - and emerge semi-literate and with little 
understanding of the society in which they live, much less the larger world and its 
history - most discussions of what is wrong leave out the fact that many such 
students may have chosen to use school as a place to fool around, act up, organize 
gangs or even peddle drugs. (para. 4) 
 
This understanding of children, adolescence, and the economies of the communities he is 
discussing is insufficient. Here, it is important to see that these remarks are being directed 
towards schools like Harbor City High and not St. Paul‘s, as a circular bias is revealed in 
his statements that blames one‘s social and economic position on one‘s inability to pull 
oneself out of one‘s social and economic position. Interestingly, many schools, such as 
St. Paul‘s, have struggled with similar incidents of drug abuse, hazing, and other 
problems, but their social position and standing allow them to spin bad press when it 
manages to leak out of these private and secretive schools (Peretz, 2009).  
 In sum, Sowell‘s views are just the opinion of one man who espouses 
conservative beliefs that students should get their acts together to be successful, and, if 
they do not, they should not blame anyone else for their life outcomes. Yet, these views 
have deep roots in American conservatism. They are also vital to understanding the 
dominant public philosophy of the American political system. 
 The neo-conservative perspective that arose since the 1950s has had a dramatic 
and sustained impact on American politics. The popular faces that emerged out of the 
broader conservative movement, including Senator Barry Goldwater and President 
Ronald Reagan, will be discussed subsequently, but it is important to discuss the roots of 
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the neo-conservative movement at this point. The connections of this perspective to the 
work of Nozick come through as well. 
 In The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology, Gary 
Dorrien weaves together the lives and ideas of Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, 
among other less known writers. What is of interest to this study is how these authors 
migrated from rather leftist positions early in their lives to what one would now consider 
the standard views of the Republican Party, including a rejection of governmental 
programs aimed at redistribution and a promotion of the free market. This rise of neo-
conservatives came in the wake of the efforts of President Lyndon Johnson to expand 
opportunities through governmental intervention. These neo-conservatives were 
decidedly opposed to such efforts and began using numerous periodicals to gain 
popularity among the public and aspiring political candidates alike.  
 Since this emergence of the neo-conservatives, their effect on America politics 
has only become more acute with the growth of cable news and internet news sites. 
Although they seemed to have stumbled in their policy recommendations during the Bush 
years, they have recovered in their vehement opposition to the efforts of the Obama 
administration. 
 With this background laid out,  Sowell gives us the strain of conservatism that 
dismisses outside factors towards success in education and Barry Goldwater sets Sowell 
up by laying the rhetorical (not actual) libertarian platform to build all sorts of political 
campaigns against activist government from the local to federal levels. The political roots 
here go back to the rise of conservatism in the form of Goldwater‘s The Conscience of a 
Conservative (1960/2007). His philosophical compatriot Robert Nozick‘s (1974) 
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Anarchy, State and Utopia comes under direct attack from Barry in the next chapter. 
Goldwater puts his philosophy and (Nozick‘s as well) in easy to understand, at least 
superficially, and powerful language: 
Thus, for the American Conservative, there is no difficulty in identifying the 
day‘s overriding political challenge: it is to preserve and extend freedom. As he 
surveys the various attitudes and institutions and laws that currently prevail in 
America, many questions will occur to him, but the Conservative‘s first concern 
will always be: Are we maximizing freedom? 
(p. 6) 
 
These words are meant for the average voter, but access to this freedom may only be 
available to the privileged and elite members of society. The value to which Goldwater 
appeals is the economic freedom for the owners of stock in corporations and family 
businesses. His proclamations would be quite different if they were followed by a 
discussion of the ways in which everyday people could maximize their liberty a la FDR‘s 
Four Freedoms. In short, Goldwater‘s freedom is freedom for some and economic and 
political confinement for others. 
 The educational consequences of this focus on freedom to the exclusion of any 
other political values are substantial as this perspective adds to the fervor over school 
choice, neighborhood schools, and the overall devaluing of education as a public good. 
The high watermark of this view is illustrated by former Vice President Richard 
Cheney‘s comments (2004) in a town hall meeting. In response to a question about 
divisions in America, he responded with characteristic elitism covered up as the 
―common sense‖ of the masses: ―But the fact is that we all start, I believe, in the United 
States…with the opportunity to achieve whatever you‘re capable of achieving, that is; for 
the most part, a meritocracy‖ (para. 60). The deleterious effects of this attitude of an 
ostensibly equal playing field or even starting gate for people born into this country are a 
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huge barrier to reducing inequality in education and across American society. Each of 
these individuals—Sowell (recent), Goldwater (founding), and Cheney (implementation 
of ideology)—represents aspects of the roadblock of conservatism to achieving greater 
egalitarianism, and it is important to realize that large portions of the American populace 
agree with them. Understanding these political attitudes and their derivative policy 
positions are essential to understanding the persistence of educational inequality. One 
must remember that there are real people who are not even ambivalent to inequality‘s 
amelioration; instead, there are people who actively and ambitiously promote a social, 
political, and economic program that increases inequality under the banners of 
meritocracy, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity. The next section of this 
chapter focuses on what these inequalities look like in America‘s educational 
environments.  
Educational Inequality in the United States 
This section discusses educational inequality along several interrelated horizons 
that affect students‘ lives in and out of school as well as their long-term life prospects. 
Each is connected through the continuum of educational services students receive as they 
move or are unable to move from K-12 institutions onto higher education. After a 
discussion of the general overarching elements of educational inequality—like 
discrepancies in funding, poorly trained teachers, and lack of additional support 
resources, the next aspects discussed in this section are: 1) educational achievement and 
economic impact; 2) high school graduation rates; 3) college graduation; and 4) civic 
participation. The data and information discussed come from several recent reports and 
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books from a variety of educational researchers and think tanks. It is meant to give a 
broad picture of educational inequality from a diverse range of sources. 
 One of the main aspects of educational inequality is de facto racial segregation in 
America‘s public schools (Lowry, 2002; Stulberg, 2008). One should be shocked that the 
racial divide in America‘s public schools gets such meager attention from policymakers, 
but, given the country‘s history of racism, such perspectives are naive (Kozol, 2005). The 
inattention to the racial question is unfortunately nothing new and is made all the more 
dramatic when one contrasts schools in the country that are often not that far apart in 
terms of distance, but worlds apart in terms of opportunities and resources (Kozol, 1992, 
2005). For example, schools that Kozol visits have constant problems with teacher 
turnover, inadequate facilities, and administrators focused on test scores at the expense of 
everything else. 
 Inequality of educational experience does not stop at racial and ethnic 
segregation. The systematic environmental factors of poverty lead all too often to poor 
―choices‖ being made by students in the most under-funded schools (Orfield & 
Ashkinaze, 1991; Noguera, 2008; Tatum, 2003). For instance, students from communities 
with high unemployment often seek out jobs to contribute to the family income. Making 
due for the short term often creates barriers to long term educational success. Here, it is 
important to question the notion that much of educational inequality as measured by 
achievement tests is a direct result of bad choices and poor personal responsibility of the 
marginalized students; in fact, this inequality is the result of a host of complicated 
additional factors that inhibit success (Orfield & Kornhaber, 2001; Orfield, Losen, Wald, 
& Swanson, 2004; Noguera, 2003, 2008).  
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 Another component of educational inequality is the community in which the 
unequal schools exist. The fact that educational communities are shaped by the 
economies of their surroundings is not surprising (Rank, 2004). The extent to which this 
is true can be surprising, especially as it relates to the ways in which urban areas have 
been devastated by a lack of investment from both the public and private sectors. Cities 
across the United States have seen substantial movement of manufacturing and other 
industries from city centers to cheaper areas. Residents that are left behind after these 
jobs disappear are left to fight to maintain their standard of living often by piecing 
together several part-time jobs. One of the educational consequences of this deficit of 
sustained investment is a lack of political platforms to voice dissent about inequality and 
to call politicians to account for their lack of leadership in improving a community‘s 
public schools (Allen, 2005). To remedy this, some scholars have suggested pursuing 
larger coalitions of community involvement towards the goal of a new social movement 
(Anyon, 2005) that would tackle economic inequality on the way to tackling educational 
inequality.  
 One of the most significant recent meta-studies of the disparate impact of 
inequality in education has been David Berliner‘s study (2009), which demonstrates the 
effects that out-of-school factors (OSFs) have on educational achievement. Race, 
poverty, and community have been included as important OSFs. Early on in the report, 
Berliner raises the complication of imprecise educational policy reforms that seek a 
universal strategy to improve education. He writes: 
 Many schools have a one-size-fits-all orientation, not easily accommodating the 
 myriad differences in talents and interests among youth or helping them cope, in  
  ways that youth find nurturing or useful, with school as well as non-school factors 
 associated with family, community, society, and life‘s problems. Such non-school 
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 factors, in fact, exert a powerful influence on student behavior and school 
 learning, and those that are harmful (for example, having a mild birth defect) hurt 
 impoverished youth more frequently and with greater severity than they do youth 
 in middle-class or wealthy families. (p. 3) 
 
The critical point is that the differences between students‘ success in school is 
compounded by out of school factors. These elements of advantage and, conversely, 
disadvantage accumulating and compounding are one of the most pernicious and often 
least discussed aspects of educational policy and reform. This is also a key theme in 
Barry‘s work about the justness of governmental institutions and the societies that create 
them. A just society cannot neglect the paradox of cumulative disadvantage and maintain 
any reasonable orientation towards social justice. 
 Berliner (2009) highlights the key areas, in which external factors 
disproportionately affect students in school performance, are health problems and their 
lack of treatment. He provides the following statement: 
[C]hildren in poor families in most states are six times more likely to be in less 
than optimal health, experiencing a wide variety of illnesses and injuries, as 
compared with children in higher income families. Even in middle-income 
families, children in some states are twice as likely to be in less than optimal 
health than those in higher income families. Health and income in America are 
strongly correlated. As a result, schools that serve the poor, whether urban or 
rural, almost always have more challenges to meet because of untreated medical 
problems among students and their families. This OSF impinges on the social 
relations and academic productivity of a school. (p. 14) 
 
This should not surprise the reader that the poor have worse health outcomes, which will 
affect their ability to learn. Yet, this is rarely raised as an educational issue. In the health 
care coverage debate of 2009, there is scant mention of anything outside of the cost, let 
alone any assertion that there should be universal coverage to assist students in having a 
better chance to succeed in school.  
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 Berliner (2009) does not stop there and continues to hammer the health theme 
vigorously even on issues many on the political right want to forget in their quest for 
freedom. One significant example is lead paint. Predictably, this paint continues to 
adversely impact the poor and their educational achievement: 
The urban Northeast is home to a high percentage of housing built when 
concentrations of lead in paint were at their peak (before 1950)—and these 
buildings are now home to high concentrations of poor and minority children. Not 
surprisingly, the problem of lead poisoning is especially dramatic in these 
locations, and their schools face significant challenges related to lead-poisoning 
of the children. (p. 21) 
 
 Another factor is the air students breathe in some parts of the country compared to 
the air in other areas. Again, one can remember the previous example and think of 
Concord‘s blue skies and clean streams compared with Baltimore‘s industrial air 
pollution and polluted harbor. Berliner relays what one comes to suspect, ―There is the 
issue of air quality, which affects poor children and their families in larger numbers than 
it does wealthier children. The South Bronx…has one of the highest incidences of asthma 
hospital admissions in New York City‖ (p. 23).  
 This concern for health continues beyond strictly environmental factors to family 
and community violence. Berliner states that ―estimates are that between 3 million and 10 
million children witness family violence each year‖ (p. 25). Students who witness 
violence or who are victims of it suffer substantial physical and dramatic psychological 
consequences. These consequences often lead to cycles of violence and negative 
educational outcomes as a result of stress and trauma from the incidents.  
 Berliner‘s conclusion is that OSFs matter, and this is often understood by 
educators who have experience with students from these communities. This on-the-
ground experience is backed up with his aggregated data. Empirical evidence is available 
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and open to anyone who takes the time to visit and interact with students in their schools. 
Berliner (2009) discusses NCLB before moving to a radical conclusion: 
Inputs to schools matter. As wonderful as some teachers and schools are, most 
cannot eliminate inequalities that have their roots outside their doors and that 
influence events within them. The accountability system associated with NCLB is 
fatally flawed because it makes schools accountable for achievement without 
regard for factors over which schools have little control. In part, for this reason, 
NCLB is failing to show reductions in the achievement gaps on which it is 
focused.  A broader, bolder approach to school improvement is indeed required. It 
would begin by a reasonable level of societal accountability for children‘s 
physical and mental health and safety. At that point, maybe we can sensibly and 
productively demand that schools be accountable for comparable levels of 
academic achievement for all America‘s children. (p. 40) 
 
 The policies necessitated by a call, such as that of Berliner‘s, for accountability in 
the circumstances for disadvantaged children exceeds the arena of educational policy. 
This issue makes educational reform such an intractable problem, because policymakers 
with little knowledge of education demand that schools solve achievement gaps among 
student groups and unequal outcomes without any connections to the rest of society. This 
process of educationalization of social problems (Labaree, 2008) is one that is destructive 
and pernicious to expressing the need for a broader perspective on how to improve 
educational achievement and outcomes.   
 Unfortunately, this call for a more sweeping set of social policies to make the 
educational equation more equal (and, therefore, reduce many of the most challenging 
aspects of the educational process) is unlikely to be met by NCLB policies. The 
roadblock here, beyond the ideology expressed at the beginning of this chapter, is that of 
an increased level of ahistorical scientism in public policy circles. This perspective has 
been glaringly brought to the forefront of research debates at American Educational 
Research Association conferences and through numerous journal article exchanges 
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(Reihl, 2006). The new scientism of public policy and think tanks that have urged that 
educational research must produce results similar to agricultural and medical research is 
misguided. What is wrong with this comparison is that children are neither plants to be 
grown nor diseases to be cured, and, as such, they do not respond even in the most 
Pavlovian educational settings to interventions in the same way. The inputs as Berliner 
mentions are crucial and discounting those factors can be harmful. 
 From a radically different source than the scholarly work of Berliner, similar data 
and conclusions are found in a report issued by the McKinsey (2009) consulting group 
about the economic impact of inequality in education. Clearly, the discourse to which this 
report contributes is one that prioritizes the need for academic success as a prerequisite 
for economic success (which is a priority for Berliner in a general sense as well). They 
begin their critique of the status quo in this manner: 
 Avoidable shortfalls in academic achievement impose heavy and often tragic 
 consequences, via lower earnings, poorer health, and higher rates of incarceration. 
For many students (but by no means all), lagging achievement evidenced as early 
as fourth grade appears to be a powerful predictor of rates of high school and 
college graduation, as well as lifetime earnings. (p. 5) 
 
 Domestic concerns around inequality also relate to the global condition of 
education: ―If the United States had in recent years closed the gap between its educational 
achievement levels and those of better-performing nations…GDP in 2008 could have 
been $1.3 trillion to $2.3 trillion higher. This represents 9 to 16 percent of GDP‖ (p. 5). 
What the report does not mention here in sufficient detail is the evolution of the value of 
a college degree relative to the job opportunities that exist (see also Anyon, 2005). This 
aligning of education as economic development is a substantial weapon for calling for 
more attention to a national movement towards educational equality. Yet, this movement 
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has not been realized in any substantial form even with the economic imperative. This is 
not to mention that many progressive educators would worry that the reforms suggested 
by these sectors would be overly authoritarian and business-minded, which would not 
necessarily be in line with their views of social justice and democratic education.  
 The report then moves from the impact on the economy to the realities of 
educational inequality. Conclusions showcase the depressing state of affairs of our 
educational system at present. They relay that: 
On average, black and Latino students are roughly two to three years of learning 
behind white students of the same age. This racial gap exists regardless of how it 
is measured, including both achievement (e.g., test score) and attainment (e.g., 
graduation rate) measures. Taking the average National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) scores for math and reading across the fourth and 
eighth grades, for example, 48 percent of blacks and 43 percent of Latinos are 
―below basic,‖ while only 17 percent of whites are, and this gap exists in every 
state. A more pronounced racial achievement gap exists in most large urban 
school districts. (McKinsey, 2009, p. 9-10) 
 
As this chapter has indicated, however, inequality is not confined to race and ethnic 
background. The multiple axes of inequality also adversely impact poor students from 
their early years to college admission and graduation (these last factors are of substantial 
concern in the following sections of the chapter). The report asserts: 
The achievement gap among students of different income levels is equally severe. 
Impoverished students (a group here defined as those eligible for federally 
subsidized free lunches) are roughly two years of learning behind the average 
better-off student of the same age. The poverty gap appears early and persists over 
the lifetime of a student; only 9 percent of freshmen in the nation‘s 120 ―Tier 1‖ 
colleges (whose total freshman enrollment is 170,000) are from the bottom half of 
the income distribution (p. 12) 
 
While attending a Tier 1 college is not the only path to educational success, economic 
independence, and happiness, the McKinsey report documents a trend that closes off 
certain options for students before they even know what they will be missing. That these 
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inequalities are tied directly to race, ethnicity, and income demonstrate that present 
educational institutions all too often give the most to those who already have advantages 
by not giving adequate support to marginalized students in all the years before college 
admission.  
 The gaps are most glaring when comparing the highest achievers with those who 
struggle the most in schools. The disparities in this instance are unconscionable: 
Black child poverty rates and black achievement levels underscore the income 
achievement gap among black students as a phenomenon separate from the racial 
gap between all black students and all white students. As a result, low-income 
black students suffer from the largest achievement gap of any cohort. NAEP data 
suggests that the average non-poor white student is about three and a half years 
ahead in learning compared to the average poor black student; this gap increases 
to roughly five years when comparing top-performing New Jersey with low-
performing Washington, DC. (McKinsey, 2009, p. 13) 
 
These disparities, as has been discussed, have lasting effects and often lead to more 
difficult educational challenges in the future. If interventions are not taken at an early 
stage, the harm done to students‘ education can take years to remedy. 
 The next point the McKinsey (2009) group analyzes is related to political 
involvement: ―Education levels are also linked to civic engagement. High school 
graduates are twice as likely to vote than people with an eighth grade education or less. 
College graduates are 50 percent more likely to vote than high school graduates‖ (p. 20). 
One of the most bitter ironies of this example takes the discussion right to the heart of 
democracy. Teachers in the poverty-stricken areas of D.C. must struggle to increase the 
civic engagement of students about how they could one day redress grievances about 
their government to elected representatives. Students in these classrooms must enjoy 
retorting that this is a political luxury that they, as D.C. residents, will never be able to 
exercise. Consequently, the report‘s point about civic engagement needing to be vitalized 
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is well-taken, if only for the furthering of the interests of groups that require the most 
strident and resolute elected leadership to attack educational inequality.  
 However, there are many avenues of political and community involvement that 
are not necessarily reflected in the voting patterns of a population. The discussion as 
usually framed around this topic of differences in voting is referred to as a civic deficit. 
However, given the multitude of ways in which people can interact with each other 
civically, there could be substantial rethinking of how to measure and account for other 
forms of political and community participation.  
 That being said, these efforts can only hope to reinforce Campbell‘s insights in 
Why We Vote? (2006), which aims to understand what factors help students to become 
civically minded in a broad sense. Efforts, such as this one that look at a variety of 
criteria from volunteering to extracurricular activities, help to pose the question in terms 
that do not overly rely on a deficit metaphor, but that instead seek an alternative way of 
looking at civic involvement and participation. 
 The final part of the report explores the inequalities associated with the top 
achievers and the other groups in the United States back to international comparisons. At 
this level, the authors conclude that the satisfaction many suburban parents and 
politicians have that their schools are ―globally competitive‖ is misguided. They contend: 
A large part of the economic cost associated with America‘s educational 
achievement gap is borne by poor and minority communities whose members are 
unable to reach their potential. But the magnitude of the international gap 
suggests that the broad middle class in the United States pays a severe price for 
failing to match the performance of nations with better educational systems. In 
our observation, parents in poor neighborhoods are all too aware that their schools 
are not performing well, but middle-class parents typically do not realize that their 
schools are failing to adequately prepare their children for an age of global 
competition. Our findings suggest this middle-class complacency is unjustified 
and should be challenged. (McKinsey, 2009, p. 21) 
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 Another recent call to action for public education took place in a report (Swanson, 
2009) issued by America‘s Promise Alliance, which is backed by Former Secretary of 
State Colin Powell. Its main concerns are the abysmal high school graduation rates in the 
United States. After recounting what Berliner describes about out-of-school factors and 
what the McKinsey report relays, it is not surprising that under-resourced districts have 
lower graduation rates than their suburban counterparts. Few aspects of educational 
inequality are more glaring than the data communicated in this work. They encapsulate 
their data in the following way: 
Specifically, we examine graduation rates in the school districts serving the 
nation‘s 50 most-populous cities as well as the larger metropolitan areas in which 
they are situated. Results show that graduation rates are considerably lower in the 
nation‘s largest cities than they are in the average urban locale. Further, extreme 
disparities emerge in a number of the country‘s largest metropolitan areas, where 
students served by suburban systems may be twice as likely as their urban peers to 
graduate from high school. (Swanson, 2009, p. 1) 
 These graduation rates are meant to illustrate the intellectual, emotional, and 
physical confinement that many youth feel in their communities. It is useful to recall the 
epigraphs from The Wire (2002) and The Boys of Baraka (2005) when considering the 
following information from the report, which relays that ―in Baltimore [the] urban [rate 
is] 34.6% [and the] suburban [rate is] 81.5%‖ (p. 11). Each narrative expresses the 
incalculable pressure that kids feel and that often manifests itself in negative ways. The 
point here is twofold: the rates matter as a measure of inequality, but they also matter 
because of the real lives these statistics represent. 
 The conclusion of the report presents the massive scale of the problem. As such, 
one may assume that if the problem is this large and complex, it is likely to not be dealt 
with in any substantive way. They continue: 
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Our analysis finds that graduating from high school in America‘s largest cities 
amounts, essentially, to a coin toss. Only about one-half (52 percent) of students 
in the principal school systems of the 50 largest cities complete high school with a 
diploma. That rate is well below the national graduation rate of 70 percent, and 
even falls short of the average for urban districts across the country (60 percent). 
Only six of these 50 principal districts reach or exceed the national average. In the 
most extreme cases (Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, and Indianapolis), fewer than 
35 percent of students graduate with a diploma. . . . Further analysis demonstrates 
that the extremely low graduation rates for these large school systems contribute 
disproportionately to the nation‘s graduation crisis. The principal school districts 
of America‘s 50 largest cities collectively educate 1.7 million public high school 
students – one out of every eight in the country. However, these 50 education 
agencies account for nearly one-quarter (23 percent) of the 1.2 million students 
nationwide who fail to graduate with a diploma each year. (Swanson, 2009, p. 8) 
 
 These reports support the proposition that where one is born and to whom should 
not determine one‘s social, economic, and political position as much as it presently does. 
Of course, one cannot forget that, for many parents, politicians, and political theorists, 
this coin toss theory of achievement could be overcome if students just ―worked harder.‖ 
More cynically, one could assert that these advocates are not interested in educational 
equality as that would not be in their self-interest or in the interests of their children since 
increased educational equality would expand the competition for slots at elite colleges 
and jobs further down the line. 
 To this point, the discussion of educational inequality has dealt primarily with the 
territory of preK-12 disparities. A shift of focus is now warranted to take into account the 
fact that some type of higher education (community college, technical training, or four-
year degree) is now considered to be vital to educational and economic success. It is 
disturbing that the inequalities that exist in preK-12 education only become more acute 
when one contemplates the increasingly small circles of power and achievement that 
America‘s elite colleges and universities produce as well as the inadequate graduation 
rates at other, less selective colleges and universities. Inequality in preK-12 education 
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expands and continues in later years through the intellectual and psychological distance 
that exists among these communities even though the communities‘ physical distances 
from each other is often very small (continuing the Baltimore example, consider Johns 
Hopkins University is only a few blocks from scores of abandoned row-houses and 
struggling schools).   
 Nevertheless, students who succeed, despite dramatic odds, and beat the coin toss 
to graduate often find themselves at community colleges, colleges, and universities facing 
similar barriers to graduation and academic success at the collegiate levels that they faced 
in high school (and this is so at many of the flagship institutions of their state systems). 
As the following discussion attests, the majority of these students who attend higher 
education institutions will struggle to graduate, and these numbers are skewed against the 
backdrop of race, ethnic background (the numerous undocumented students who are 
forbidden from even attending higher education cannot be forgotten), and income.  
 A report from The American Enterprise Institute found that the likelihood for 
college freshman to actually graduate in four or six years is far lower than might be 
expected, providing that ―[a]t each point in the distribution, postsecondary institutions 
perform worse than high schools. While American high schools graduate about three-
fourths of their students in four years, American colleges graduate only about half of their 
students in six‖ (Schneider, 2008, p. 3). Graduation rates are frustratingly low. Worse are 
the effects of non-graduation as students are saddled with debt (as tuition costs have 
skyrocketed in recent decades) and often few skills that will improve their longer term 
job prospects, given that much college attrition happens before students can take the 
types of advanced courses that would allow entry into higher paying jobs (Anyon, 2005). 
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 Again, as the numbers break down for different racial and ethnic groups, the 
inequality surrounding who goes to an institution of higher education and graduates is 
now familiar: 
Black graduation rates are the lowest for each type of postsecondary institution. 
At private for-profit institutions, the median black graduation rate is less than 25 
percent. While higher at both public and private nonprofit institutions, the black 
graduation rate still hovers only around 40 percent. Hispanic, Asian, and white 
graduation rates at for-profit institutions are higher than the graduation rate of 
black students but still lower than at either public or private nonprofit institutions. 
Even more disturbing is the number of institutions that graduated not one student 
within six years . . . there were twenty-seven postsecondary institutions that had a 
zero graduation rate. But even more striking are the figures for minority students. 
There were over 140 schools in which no black student completed in six years and 
well over 150 schools in which no Hispanic or Asian student graduated in six 
years. (Schneider, 2008, p. 4) 
 
Overall, these graduation rates document the substantial disservice that is done to 
students who take several years of coursework (often complicated by the need to 
complete developmental courses which do not count towards graduation) and who cannot 
finish because they have run out of time and money or because they are unable to 
complete the required courses while maintaining the required grade point average. The 
report raises a final point, which is a substantial one and which is a question that is rarely 
discussed in educational policy circles: ―if the failure of American high schools to 
graduate no more than three-quarters of their students is enough to warrant national 
attention…is not the failure of America‘s postsecondary schools to graduate only half of 
their students worth equal attention?‖ (Schneider, 2008, p. 7). 
 Another recent perspective on these issues of higher education completion comes 
from Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson‘s (2009) Crossing the Finish Line: Completing 
College at America‟s Public Universities. They note early on that the public and personal 
emphasis on wanting to achieve higher education has succeeded in raising aspirations as 
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more and more young people across the social and economic spectrums want to go to 
college: 
One possible explanation for the surprisingly stagnant state of overall educational 
attainment in the United States can be rejected out of hand: the problem is not low 
aspirations. Students of all family backgrounds have high (and rising) educational 
aspirations. The Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 shows that in 2002, 80 
percent of 10
th
 graders expected to earn a bachelor‘s degree or higher—with 40 
percent expecting to earn a graduate or professional degree. In 1980, just half as 
many 10
th
 graders had similarly high aspirations. Especially noteworthy is the 
evidence of rising aspirations among students of low socioeconomic status (SES): 
whereas in 1980, 22 percent of these 10th-graders aspired to a bachelor‘s degree 
or higher, in 2002, three times as many (66 percent) had such aspirations. In 2002, 
77 percent of black 10
th
 graders aspired to earn a bachelor‘s degree or higher. The 
conclusion is simple: there are no longer pronounced aspiration gaps by race or 
SES. (p. 6) 
 
 This is an unequivocally positive trend. The best parts of the governmental and 
educational apparatus of the country have succeeded in continuing to break down access 
barriers to all types of students in terms of young people seeing themselves as college 
students. What is negative about this trend is how poorly the educational and economic 
systems have adapted to this change to assist students in developing the skills to be 
successful in college and in the evolution of the workplace to value the skills that higher 
education institutions attempt to teach. The effects of this disparity of implementation in 
developing sufficient support for students to achieve their aspirations are demonstrated 
by the following evidence: 
For present purposes, it will suffice to compare the national educational 
attainment rates (defined here as the percentage of eighth-graders who went on to 
earn a bachelor‘s degree by age 26) of students from the two groups just 
mentioned: 
 
1. Thirty-six percent of white women earned a bachelor‘s degree by age 26 
compared with 22 percent of black women and 13 percent of Hispanic women; 
just under 30 percent of white men earned a bachelor‘s degree compared with 11–
12 percent of black and Hispanic men.  
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2. Sixty-eight percent of students from families in the top income quartile with at 
least one parent having received a college degree earned a bachelor‘s degree by 
age 26 compared with just 9 percent of those from families in the bottom income 
quartile with neither parent having received a college degree. (p.8) 
 
 Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson (2009) have an inclination that the system of 
education is unjust because it produces such variation in outcomes. They claim that the 
―long-term health of our country depends on the existence of social mobility and a widely 
shared confidence that students from racial minorities and poor families have a real 
opportunity to move ahead‖ (p. 10). Further, these authors assert that the current 
―increasing inequalities in income and wealth . . . highlight the importance of ensuring 
that educational opportunities close rather than widen disparities in access to the most 
powerful as well as the most highly remunerated positions in society‖ (p. 10). The 
authors sum up their narrative in the following terms and lay the challenge of meeting the 
needs of students who have been marginalized in the K-12 systems: 
It is up to policy makers at state and national levels to provide both moral support 
and the tangible assistance that will allow many of these institutions to improve 
overall levels of educational attainment and reduce the stark disparities in 
outcomes related to race/ethnicity and SES that are so problematic. (p. 238) 
 
 Clearly, institutions do value improving their graduation rates because they are 
often linked to institutional prestige and service to their students (Bowen, Chingos, & 
McPherson, 2009). Yet, most efforts at retention programs at institutions are fraught with 
difficulty in demonstrating that they successfully help students succeed because the 
factors described throughout this chapter that contribute to success are so complex. It 
must also be mentioned that many educational critics are fine with students exiting from 
their institutions or not even going to higher education. For example, former George W. 
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Bush speechwriter and conservative pundit David Frum (2009) illustrates the logic used 
to justify rethinking higher education as an aspiration for many students: 
The 2006 Economic Report of the President presents a remarkable fact: Between 
2000 and 2005, the average wages of college graduates declined after adjusting 
for inflation. From an economic point of view, in other words, a college degree 
costs more and more and returns less and less. Kind of like a hot stock with a 
price-to-earnings ratio of 32, it‘s a prelude to a crash. (para. 3) 
 
Of course, those with longer memories than Frum would remember that this has been a 
constant concern of economists and educators for decades. Yet, he has identified the fact 
that a college degree is no longer a ticket to professional lifetime employment.  
 His next section hits on another aspect of the inequality inherent in the 
educational process that demonstrates that even college graduation is not what it once 
was:  
Why are the wages of the college-educated declining? A big part of the answer is 
that the pool of college graduates is rapidly expanding. It‘s not surprising that as 
college becomes more universal, the return on a college education falls. (para. 4) 
 
It is presumed that a college degree is worth substantially more than just a high school 
diploma. However, this educational policy maxim gained new currency when a figure 
was put on it by the College Board. After several years of it being a taken-for-granted 
fact, some researchers became curious of where this $800,000 figure came from and who 
had originally reported it. It turns out that, even though it had been repeated numerous 
times in numerous sources, no one could find the cite from the original report. After 
recalculating the data, several researchers asked that the figure be removed from the 
report and website because it might be closer to $280,000 reported because of factors like 
the cost of receiving the degree.  
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 Frum continues by opening another line of attack on higher education via the 
subjects that students study: 
As the number of job applicants with degrees rises, employers become more 
sophisticated in assessing the value of any particular degree. The degree itself 
matters less than the institution that granted it, the subject areas of concentration, 
and the grade point average earned. A 4.0 math degree from Cal Tech is a very 
different thing from a 2.8 communications degree from San Francisco State 
University. (para. 5) 
 
One cannot argue against this point too much, but it also demonstrates the vast inequality 
among institutions of higher education and their relative worth among employers.  
 The final comment he has continues these last points by demonstrating his bias of 
experience towards elite schools, ―Will consumers become more sophisticated too? 
Tuition, room, and board at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill cost about 
half what they cost at … Duke.  Is a Duke education really twice as valuable as one from 
UNC?‖ (para. 6). The question of choosing Duke or the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill based on price is a difficult question. The larger question of quality 
differences between those two institutions and other campuses in the UNC system or 
between them and community colleges raises the larger question of access to elite 
colleges and universities, which is not even on his radar. This exemplar of wanting to 
restrict educational access demonstrates yet another impediment to educational equality 
and the active cultivation of anti-education views that harm society‘s most vulnerable 
individuals.  
 In sum, this section of Chapter 2 has presented elements of what educational 
inequality looks like in schools and higher education institutions through a discussion of 
out-of-school factors that affect academic achievement, high school graduation rates, 
college admission, and graduation rates. Each of these areas is meant to highlight the 
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dramatic and stark contrasts that exist in the many educational institutions of the United 
States. These systems consistently produce outcomes that disproportionately harm 
students in the most challenging educational settings. Given the locations of many of 
these communities, the political power required to dramatically change them is hampered 
due to economic underdevelopment and traditional prejudices from more powerful 
constituencies of cities and states that control policymaking and resource allocation. 
Further, the final part of the section raises the conservative impulse to pull back from 
educating more people even at the college level with the not-so-hidden aim of further 
stratifying the workforce. The last section of this chapter will now be undertaken. It 
reopens the discussion initiated at the start of the chapter in linking conservative 
ideology, which is a stumbling block to educational equality and greater egalitarianism, 
to changes in economic policy and the rise of neoliberalism in the United States, which 
have undercut opportunities for substantial educational reform. 
Economic Policy and the Roots of Educational Inequality 
 
 The remainder of Chapter 2 attempts to understand and explain the economic 
changes and trends that have shaped the educational environment of the last thirty years. 
Building from the growth of wealth inequality in the United States to the expansion of 
neoliberalism, this section connects economic trends to the persistence of educational 
inequality. It concludes by summing up the chapter‘s overall aims. 
 Inequality of wealth is one of the most continual problems of the human 
predicament (Ackerman, 2000). In the recent era, things have gone from bad to worse 
(Ehrenreich, 2005). Inequality in and among social groups is rapidly growing in the 
United States and around the world (Chang, 2007; Collier, 2007; Singer, 2002, 2009). 
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The evidence supporting this claim is vast, substantial, and, at bottom, frightening 
(Brook, 2007; Collins, Di, & Williams, 2008; Ehrenreich, 2001; Frank, 2007). 
Emblematic of this in the United States, wealth is dramatically shifting upwards (Fraser 
& Gerstle, 2005; Gates & Collings, 2002; Gilbert, 2008). In describing a recent report, 
Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman (2006) states: 
 Between 1972 and 2001 the wage and salary income of Americans at the 90th 
 percentile of the income distribution rose only 34 percent, or about 1 percent per 
 year. So being in the top 10 percent of the income distribution, like being a 
 college graduate, wasn‘t a ticket to big income gains. But income at the 99th 
 percentile rose 87 percent; income at  the 99.9th percentile rose 181 percent; and 
 income at the 99.99th percentile rose 497 percent. No, that‘s not a misprint. (para. 
 7-8) 
 
This change in wealth accumulation and the benefits of economic growth going to ever 
richer elites is not just the work of a free market. In fact, specific governmental policy has 
set the United States on this course towards greater inequality. Led by business-minded 
think tanks and lobbying groups, the United States government has moved away from the 
social democratic policies of the New Deal and Great Society and towards the fulfillment 
of a neoliberal agenda during the last thirty years (Soss, Hacker, & Mettler, 2007). These 
moves in economic and social policy often also come with a political rhetoric that 
devalues the public sector and that actively works to dismantle the welfare state 
(Shulman, 2003).  
 The crucial period in which these changes occurred was the 1980s which was 
discussed in the first chapter. The Reagan Administration initiated the rise of economic 
policies that favored the rich over the poor and middle-class in extreme ways; these 
policies were implemented through tax structure, devolution, and deregulation (Baker, 
2006; 2007). One of the most substantial changes was the halving of marginal tax rates, 
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which ―between 1932 and 1980 . . . was on average equal to 80.2%‖ (Piketty, 2009, para. 
10). This policy thoroughly changed the economic climate of the United States. 
 These changes in the economic and political terrain have increasingly framed 
education as primarily a private good for economic competition in the job market and not 
as a public investment towards common prosperity. Further, Reagan era initiatives 
succeeded in pushing educational institutions into a mode of constant crisis (Berliner & 
Biddle, 1995). PreK-12 schools have been under sustained pressure to improve student 
achievement at all costs (Noddings, 2007; Cochran-Smith, 2004), and higher education 
institutions have had to scramble for research dollars while facing battles over their 
purpose and efficiency with state and federal political leaders.  
 An additional effect of the Reagan era policies is that Americans, in general, have 
increasingly felt economically stretched (Schor, 1998; Warren & Tyagi, 2003). Yet, the 
major media outlets rarely delve deeper into this fact than reporting the latest 
unemployment or stock market crises. This failure of the media to contribute to the public 
dialogue by emphasizing macro-level policy changes (Bagdikian, 2002; Chomsky, 1989; 
Edwards & Cromwell, 2006) leaves many citizens unaware of this effort to eliminate the 
public investments that favor the poor and middle class over expenditures that benefit the 
rich (Ebert, 2009; Welch, 2001). These changes in economic policy, including the 
reduction of tax rates for the highest income earners, privatization of government 
functions, and obstructionism to raising the minimum wage, have all contributed to 
rigging the economic system in favor of the wealthy (Baker, 2006). Ultimately, these 
trends undermine the economic base for an educational system that could ensure equality 
(Anyon, 2005). 
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 These emphasized changes to tilt wealth upwards were not even enough in the 
eyes of many politicians and policymakers who serve elite interests (Krugman, 2003). 
For them, the pace of growth in wealth inequality can never accelerate too quickly 
(Krugman, 2003). Yet, this rapid increase in economic disparities imperils education at 
its core. For example, in recent years, George W. Bush expanded Reagan‘s policies of 
deregulation and tax cuts to the wealthiest members of society (Brantlinger, 2003; 
Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, 2000). The long-term consequences of these economic 
policies that favor moneyed interests, especially in the tax code, will result in increased 
federal deficits and a larger national debt (Krugman, 2007). In the future, the public 
mandate to fulfill existing ―entitlement‖ obligations such as Medicare and Social Security 
(IOUSA, 2008) could come at the expense of increasing funding for public education as 
the population of the country ages and, concomitantly, as fewer middle class students 
enter the public schools (Glass, 2008). At the state level, things are even more risky as 
most states are constitutionally bound to balance their budgets. One result is that 
economic downturns can be the catalyst to de-fund educational programs and institutions 
(like research centers, the arts, or philosophy departments) that would not have been as 
easily eliminated if it were not for financial exigency (Bouquet, 2008).  
 One of the primary aspects of these macroeconomic trends that have increased 
inequality is the move to neoliberal economic policies during the last thirty years. David 
Harvey (2005) provides the following definition of neoliberalism to help frame the 
discussion: ―Neoliberalism is … a theory of political economic practices that proposes 
that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
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property rights, free markets, and free trade‖ (p. 2). In the United States, the political 
right and, now, even the majority of Democrats endorse neoliberalism through the 
rhetoric of free markets. However, the rhetoric of free markets does not match reality 
even though it is popular among Nozick, Sowell, Goldwater, Cheney, and Frum. Some 
progressive observers have called for liberal minded politicians and policymakers to drop 
their tacit support and expose the tax breaks and incentives that have benefited 
corporations over the poor and middle class (Galbraith, 2008). The underlying story is 
that so-called free markets have been systematically gamed by elites (who claim that 
there should be little or no governmental regulation or interference in the marketplace), 
which breeds greater inequality and shifts economic risk to the middle and working 
classes (Hacker, 2006; Hacker & Pierson, 2005). The discourse around the language of 
markets has been perverted as well. The ever-growing cult of Adam Smith is based like 
most cults on fiction, misrepresentation, and ideology over fact (Chomsky, 1994).  
 The hold of neoliberalism on politicians and its effects on the economy that funds 
it undercut public education. A variant of this version of neoliberalism is what social 
critic Naomi Klein (2007) has termed ―disaster capitalism.‖ The essence of her notion is 
that, under the cover of a disaster, policymakers can force through changes in policies 
without constitutional checks and balances (Alperovitz & Daly, 2008). This type of crisis 
atmosphere is often also associated with other means of hiding policy changes until they 
have been finalized under the banner of national security or a national emergency 
(Freeman & Minnow, 2009). These changes to public policy have recently occurred 
under the chaos of a catastrophic event, such as Hurricane Katrina (Verkuil, 2007), or a 
planned invasion and its chaotic aftermath, such as the Iraq War (Verkuil, 2007). Klein‘s 
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work identifies the many ways in which even the steady march towards greater economic 
inequality is not as profitable as unfettered capitalism that takes advantage of disasters or 
crises to overhaul markets and institutions to favor the rich and well-connected.  
 An example assists here. A disaster created an ―opportunity‖ for the post-Katrina 
New Orleans educational system, which has largely become a patchwork system of 
charter and innovative schools. This was considered by many conservatives to be a 
chance to remake New Orleans schools in a way that they have always wanted to try. The 
outcomes have been less than what they expected from their experiment with a more free 
market system. Unfortunately, the larger narrative is that the educational investments 
needed to revive the region and its educational system have long since been forgotten 
among the more pressing economic priorities across the country. 
 A final aspect of the neoliberal agenda is the importance of increasing the 
consumption and brand marketing of all products and services, even in education 
(Baudrillard, 1970/1998; Baumnan, 2008). Efforts to market and sell certain harmful 
products to young people are often publicly denied by their producers, as in the case of 
tobacco. Yet, many other arguably harmful products, such as junk food, are marketed 
directly and openly to children (Barber, 2007). Everything, from video games and 
sneakers to sodas and cell phones, is geared towards ever younger groups of students at 
home, on television, the internet, and, increasingly, at school itself (Barber, 2007).  
 The focus on consumption from such an early age once again is not mere chance 
or the invisible hand of a free market. Instead, it is a sustained and well-financed effort to 
have children learn the patterns of status climbing through the accumulation of objects. 
One of the many downsides of this trend is the level of debt that younger and younger 
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people acquire that further delimits their future academic and career possibilities 
(Newfield, 2008).  
 To sum, this section has briefly relayed the state of educational inequality that 
exists in the United States. Further, it has demonstrated that the economic policies of the 
Reagan Administration and the expansion of neoliberalism in the last thirty years have 
substantially changed the terrain on which an equitable educational system can be 
pursued. The unfair tax policies of this era have disproportionately harmed the poor and 
middle class and have eroded public funds for educational improvement. This chapter has 
also provided a floor for the discussion of the persistence of educational inequality in the 
United States. It has explored the ideology of conservative beliefs, the realities of 
educational inequality in terms of educational outcomes, and neoliberalism‘s effect on 
education. As such, it serves as a jumping off point for the task of discussing Barry‘s 
political philosophy and the critical traditions in educational scholarship.
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
RETHINKING MERITOCRACY, PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY: BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, AND EDUCATION 
 
 This chapter builds on Chapter 2 and turns directly to the work of Brian Barry and 
the applications of his writing on equality, political theory, and everyday political 
problems to the field of educational theory. Upon Barry‘s recent death, obituaries were 
published by a number of his colleagues—both old and new—in major British 
newspapers as well as in political science journals from around the world. These 
obituaries demonstrated that Barry made a significant contribution to the field of political 
science and that his ideas influenced other fields as well. His unwavering commitment to 
concepts like democracy, equality, and social justice came through in all of his writings 
even in an age in which these concepts are all too often disregarded or hollowed out by 
politicians and governments.  
 This chapter begins with a discussion of Barry‘s early work and then focuses on 
the implications of his ideas for critical educational scholarship. Next, the chapter 
describes how Barry fits into the canon of political theory via a discussion of his critiques 
of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. This is done to provide a sufficient level of depth in 
the discussion of Barry‘s work to make connections between his political ideas and to 
merit its use in educational studies. The exploration of Barry‘s ideas begins in this 
chapter, but it does not stop here. His ideas will continue into the following chapters, as 
each critical tradition in educational scholarship is discussed. Barry‘s work will be 
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brought to bear on the values and philosophical positions of each tradition in attempting 
to understand the persistence of educational inequality.  
Barry and Critical Educational Scholarship 
 To fully grasp Barry‘s philosophical positions and their evolution, it is vital to 
start at the beginning of his long list of books with his first book, Political Argument 
(1965/1990). This is also useful in understanding the educational implications of his 
ideas. Political Argument came out as a much reduced version of Barry‘s doctoral thesis 
completed under H.L. Hare at Oxford University. The scope of the volume is vast and, if 
Barry had reviewed his own volume, he might have called it unwieldy. Nonetheless, it 
was far-ranging in its sweep across the language and meaning of political terms including 
justice, fairness, and the public interest. It provided a foundation for the substantial turn 
towards the issues of political structure and outcomes that would become central to 
contemporary political theory. In looking back at the release of the volume 25 years 
earlier, Barry paints the following picture of the work, ―This is a study of the relation 
between principles and institutions. Its focus is analytical rather than causal. It is 
concerned mainly with the institutional (practical) implications of certain principles‖ (p. 
lxxiii). This aim of matching up of principles with the institutions that should be 
embodied in them is a key element of Barry‘s early work and a theme that carries forward 
to his last writings. It is also an important link to education as the matching of the 
principles that underlie the American educational system often are not coupled to the 
institutions that provide public education. 
In trying to sort out how and why inequality in education remains such a 
persistent problem, it is useful to apply Barry‘s critique of the present political discourse, 
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which has retreated from discussions of inequality. His way of thinking about inequality 
and justice takes into account the realities of life experience that are often neglected by 
other political theorists. Further, Barry‘s views support and can extend portions of the 
dominant critical traditions in educational scholarship. Barry‘s work can therefore be 
viewed as a theoretical perspective that attends to the importance of the touchstone 
concepts of each tradition while drawing a new path in critical educational thought.  
 Barry‘s (2005) Why Social Justice Matters directly addresses the growing 
inequality in the United States and the United Kingdom as well as the distribution of 
rights, opportunities, and resources in society. One of Barry‘s most salient contributions 
is his clarification of how to think about societal institutions. Instead of judging them in a 
Rawlsian/Nozickian fashion by their design, Barry suggests that ―we have to work back 
to the justice of institutions from their contribution to just outcomes, which are assessed 
by their contribution to a just distribution of rights, opportunities and resources‖ (Barry, 
2005, p. 17). This movement from just design to just outcome builds the essential bridge 
in Barry‘s work from his liberal brethren to the insights offered by multiculturalists, post-
structuralists, and critical theorists who have done so well to demonstrate what unjust and 
unequal educational settings look like in communities around the country.  
 Barry‘s work supports the assertion that the educational environment is the 
primary territory where young people learn the mindset that tolerates substantial 
inequality and justifies it as inevitable. Barry takes apart three key ideas in the political 
discourse that prevent the reduction of inequality in society; these ideas are meritocracy, 
personal responsibility, and equal opportunity. Further, each of these notions maps onto a 
critical tradition in educational scholarship: meritocracy with class, personal 
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responsibility with autonomy, and equal opportunity with identity. For Barry, each of 
these concepts is misguided and is used by conservative (and even centrist) politicians to 
legitimize inequality as the function of a level playing field or equal starting gate where 
some people end up better off because of working harder, being smarter, and making 
better choices. Barry see this logic as radically flawed under the current social, economic, 
and political systems, which do not remotely resemble a level playing field or equal 
starting gate. Further, these notions move public debate and media attention away from 
the unjust institutions and outcomes of policy and onto the moral failings and bad choices 
of individuals. Barry deconstructs these notions to show that they are much more 
complex than the ways they are used in the present political discourse.  
 The first area that Barry addresses is the conception of meritocracy (which was 
mentioned in the section on Vice President Cheney in the first chapter). After identifying 
the entry of meritocracy into the political discourse, Barry reminds the reader that, 
―although the term ‗meritocracy‘ caught on, its emphasis on rule by the meritorious was 
downplayed in popular usage, and its originally negative connotations forgotten‖ (p. 
109). Barry is unsatisfied with these claims and rejects the presuppositions that 
proponents of meritocracy assert. Barry attacks the notion of genetic inheritance implicit 
in the rest of the argument for meritocracy: 
 I shall seek to show that all the propositions underlying the theory of meritocracy 
 are flawed. Let me begin with the claim just discussed, that over the last century, 
 and at an accelerating pace, western societies have undergone a filtering process 
 that has concentrated those with high IQs more and more in the top jobs and those 
 with low IQs at the bottom. If the genetic assumptions of meritocracy were 
 correct and this had been happening, we should find that, in each succeeding 
 generation, there will be a bigger gap between the average IQ of the children of 
 those in the high status occupations and children with parents in low status 
 occupations. In fact, however, the gap in the USA between the average IQ of 
 children whose parents are in the top third of the occupational hierarchy and the 
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 average IQ of those parents are in the bottom third has stayed the same. It stood at 
 almost exactly ten points in 1948, 1972, and 1989. (p.120) 
 
Overall, this notion demonstrates one of the ways in which inequality is furthered by the 
reliance on outdated assumptions that seek to provide rationalizations and unwarranted 
justifications for one‘s social position and career success. In fact, the equation is much 
more complicated, and such notions simply obscure the fact that inequality exists not 
because of merit lifting up some, but because of inattention to factors that truly would 
level the playing field on which achievement is based.  
 This notion of meritocracy and Barry‘s rejection of it as presently conceived 
reveals a similarity towards the values that underlie the critical tradition in education that 
is discussed in Chapter 4 and that centers on class. This connection, however, only goes 
to the point that each rejects the idea that individual merit is the key to improving the 
educational and economic circumstances of individuals. From there, they diverge and the 
critique of their ideas emerges. 
 The second area in which Brian Barry‘s work connects to a critical education 
tradition is through a discussion of personal responsibility. This concept has become a 
political catchphrase meant to explain away the inequalities of society as justifiable 
because those who end up with less obviously did not take personal responsibility over 
their lives. Barry concludes that this conception of personal responsibility is nothing 
more than political rhetoric of the worst kind—what Orwell (1946/1956) in ―Politics and 
the English Language‖ termed, ―a defense of the indefensible,‖ meant to hide the 
structural imbalances in education that lead to inequalities later in life. Barry (2005) 
contends age matters in decision making and responsibility as, ―a child‘s ‗decision‘ not to 
go to school cannot be held to be its responsibility, whatever the cause, because this is not 
62 
 
            
the kind of choice that a child can make in a way that gives rise to responsibility‖ (p.136-
137). 
 The vital point here is that Barry takes a view of personal responsibility that 
challenges the easy step of blaming the victim of an unjust system for the consequences 
of his or her actions when the choices the individual has had to choose from are not 
substantively equal to other members of society. Barry is not interested in giving students 
who make poor choices a free pass on the bases of the fallacies of social and economic 
determinism. Instead, he suggests remedies to reduce educational and societal inequalities 
that remove the importance of choice from the equation. This translates into providing 
young people, regardless of where they grow up, with a set of choices that is compressed 
to ones that are positive and equal to those of other individuals across social strata, 
thereby limiting the possibility of making negative choices that harm themselves and 
others. 
 The third notion of equal opportunity connects to the discussion of identity. It 
requires individuals to think differently about how to judge if someone truly had an equal 
opportunity to achieve in a school or be selected for a job. Barry (2005) frames his 
discussion around equal opportunity by way of an example dealing with the pool of 
applicants for a position. He contends that ―appointing the best person constitutes equal 
opportunity only if there was an earlier time at which millions of people had an equal 
opportunity to be the best candidate‖ (p. 40). If candidates for a job cannot be reasonably 
judged to have had equal opportunities to get qualifications, one then must turn to the 
educational system that prepared some applicants well and others poorly. The 
implications for education here are particularly pertinent as numerous debates have raged 
63 
 
            
about affirmative action in college admission, but a deeper analysis demonstrates that the 
ways in which students‘ educational resources are distributed before students reach 
college age affect their future life chances and possibilities for college admission. Barry 
will be useful to argue for an expansion of the dialogue around educational rights into a 
conversation about equality of educational opportunities.  
Barry on Rawls 
It is important to place Barry into the context of political theory over the last half 
century to round out how his broader ideas of egalitarianism and justice as they relate to 
inequality in education. This is a crucial step to see how Barry‘s work contrasts with two 
of the major political philosophers that have had a dramatic effect on social and domestic 
policy and politics. In Barry‘s critique of Rawls and Nozick, his values continue to 
emerge, and they can be moved from the general discussion of politics to educational 
politics and, similarly, from justice to social justice in education. 
At the outset, it is important to recall Barry‘s description of Political Argument, 
which places the work into the context of liberal political theory and foreshadows the 
discourse that John Rawls‘ A Theory of Justice (1971) brought to the forefront of the 
field. However, Barry is not hemmed in by the often staid boundaries associated with 
liberal and analytical philosophy in America and Great Britain from the post-World War 
II era until the linguistic turn. His work is always passionate and pointed even when 
delivering brash and sophisticated critiques of other philosophers‘ views.  
It is important to understand how Barry sees Rawls‘ work; in doing so, Barry 
takes up a very progressive position towards governance and its foundational, or in this 
case, nearly anti-foundational basis. He states the importance of Rawls‘ opening of the 
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political discourse and then moves to what the point of political theorizing (and further, 
what the point of educational theorizing) should be: ―What Rawls…put before us is the 
task bequeathed us by the Enlightenment. We have to show that political principles are 
consistent with reason…but in the sense that they are worthy of the assent of reasonable 
people‖ (Barry, 1965/1990, p. lxxii). This slight embrace of Enlightenment values should 
not be viewed as a detractor as the philosophical position being asserted is remarkably 
pragmatic and sympathetic to the view that the laws that govern behavior in societies 
across the globe should be held up to a critical judgment of the people who are governed 
by them. This can be done without demanding conformity of values among diverse 
populations and, if done, could dramatically reduce the inequalities rampant in most 
societies. 
Yet, as important as the contribution of Rawls‘ work is, Barry is far from an 
unapologetic Rawlsian. Quite to the contrary, Barry‘s The Liberal Theory of Justice: A 
Critical Examination of A Theory of Justice (1973) is still one of the best analyses of 
Rawls‘ classic text. Early into the analysis, Barry describes what he sees as a coherence 
problem in Rawls‘ theory: ―The general drift of this book, as the reader will discover, is 
that Rawls‘ ‗theory of justice‘ does not work and that many of his individual arguments 
are unsound‖ (Barry, 1973, p. ix). 
Still, even as Barry acknowledges, the importance of Rawls‘ work has only grown 
over the years since its publication, and it is the starting point for most contemporary 
debates in liberal political philosophy. While there are many critiques of Rawls‘ work—
often from non-liberal philosophers who have been discounted by others because of their 
lack of membership in the field, Barry was one of the first critics from within the 
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tradition, and the critique that Barry offers is still the most salient. Much of the text of 
Barry‘s critique is written as if Barry would like to go along with Rawls‘ ideas, but he is 
too grounded in the real world and the problems incumbent in Rawls‘ hypothetical 
situations. In Barry‘s eyes, Rawls‘ massive thought experiment consistently fails to 
achieve its aims. A principal and telling insistence of Rawls‘ incoherence comes through 
in the following discussion of the vaunted original position that is the foundation of 
Rawls‘ theory. Barry draws out the following situation to demonstrate Rawls‘ error in the 
original position: 
Suppose that two people are put into an ‗original position‘ and told that one of 
them is white and the other black and that in ability and training they are identical. 
They are also told that they have a choice of being in one of two societies. In the 
first (e.g. Lesotho) both will be paid £ 4 a week for doing the same work (for 
which they are trained), while in the second (e.g. the Union of South Africa) they 
will be paid different amounts, the white £ 40 a week and the black £ 5 a week, 
for doing the same work side by side. On Rawls‘s premises about motivation in 
the original position, which include the postulate that neither will be upset by 
relativities as such (in other words that each person‘s utility depends on his own 
income alone), both parties will clearly be rational to choose to be in the second 
society rather than the first. But arrangements of the second society are not just 
because paying people different amounts for doing the same work side by side on 
account of their having different coloured skins or more generally being of 
different ‗races‘ is inherently unjust. (Barry, 1973, p. 16-17) 
 
 Here, Barry breaks from Rawls and much of liberal political philosophy in two 
respects. One is on psychological motivation and the other is on the importance of 
acknowledging structured inequality among groups as being unjust. This is especially 
important considering how relativities (in wealth, for example) among groups are often 
assumed not to affect political choices. The second point is that the choice to pick the 
second society would be unjust as it would be treating two groups differently. Yet, this 
kind of inequality has been sanctioned with laws, by tacit governmental approval, and, 
more recently, through ineffective governmental regulation to prevent such 
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discrimination. In both instances again, it is essential to reject Rawls‘ suggestion that 
picking the second society is reasonable or just because of the inequality that it would 
allow to exist and grow. It is not difficult to take this idea directly to the educational 
arena and to create a similar example that would have a society in which two schools 
receive $10,000 a year to educate each student or a society in which one group receives 
$12,500 a year and another gets $100,000. Clearly, this example‘s stark inequality 
demonstrates that absolute differences in resources and relativities among individuals and 
groups do matter to the justness of a set of institutions.  
 Barry is sympathetic to the beneficent aim of Rawls‘ theory and his principle of 
justice. Unfortunately for Rawls, a beneficent aim does little to advance the soundness of 
one‘s theory. The grounds for skepticism about this view are raised by Barry (1973) in 
the next discussion. The first point is something often overlooked in talk of equality over 
longer periods of time in Rawls‘ work as ―the maximization of income of the worst off 
section of the population might entail spending nothing on investment, and this would 
make the next generation worse off than the current one. A rule is therefore needed for 
intergenerational equity‖ (Barry, 1973, p.43). Barry thinks that Rawls falls short on this 
mark, and one can extrapolate this failure to the limited perspective Rawls is taking once 
again on the practicalities of remedying inequality even through the well-intentioned 
ideas of helping the most disadvantaged. Barry also attacks Rawls on his rather simplistic 
view of economic inequality. For Barry, inequality of incomes is but one symptom of an 
overall structure of inequality in the economic sphere. It is possible and likely that Rawls 
is aware of varied investments that further skew inequality, but not mentioning or 
sufficiently discussing them is a glaring omission as they are vital to deeply 
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understanding that wealth and economic inequality are not just based on income. Barry 
relays the problem in the following manner: ―Economic inequality is a complex matter 
since there are many ways in which people may have different claims on resources: 
private property invested in various ways to bring in dividends, capital gains or fixed 
interest…perquisites of all kinds‖ (Barry, 1973, p.43). In short, Rawls‘ lack of discussion 
of other forms of wealth demonstrates how it does not play a large role in his thinking 
and, further, how wealth inequality is generally under-theorized since he fails to address 
its complexity. 
 As unfortunate as these missteps in Rawls‘ theory are, they are not the only ones 
for Barry; the theme of Barry‘s overall critique begins to emerge even more clearly in 
discussing these additional aspects. For instance, Barry does not think that Rawls goes far 
enough on numerous fronts to reduce the possibilities of inequality and unequal outcomes 
that result in institutionalized injustice. In short, Barry does not think Rawls is 
sufficiently radical. An example of this contrast is relayed in the following passage 
regarding poverty: ―Indeed, in the absence of specially directed and vigorous efforts by 
the state, there seems to be a tendency for those hit by these sources of poverty to fall 
ever further behind as the society‘s average wealth increases‖ (Barry, 1973, p. 50-51). 
Barry‘s efforts at appraising Rawls‘ criteria demonstrate the biases in Rawls‘ 
work that would allow considerable inequality to exist and continue unabated. This 
reliance on setting the rules at the beginning of Rawls‘ experiment in justice, then letting 
the market take over, and hoping that things go well misses the lessons of history that 
suggest that people would fall significantly behind others in absolute terms. This is both 
destructive to democracy and unjust. Additionally, other critics of Rawls, ranging from 
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Michael Sandel (1982/1998) to Raymond Geuss (2008), have pointed out that people do 
not exist as unencumbered individuals nor are they likely to always act reasonably.  
 Barry‘s view of justice comes through here in his active egalitarianism towards 
social policy being geared to address inequality and the unfair slanting of resources away 
from ostensibly a market of distribution with some basic floor to minimal social service. 
This is a particularly salient point, and Barry continues ratcheting up the level of 
importance that he thinks should be placed on everyday issues of justice, like what people 
have to do to make a living. Barry forcefully asserts that working conditions should 
matter to justice: 
It is noteworthy that Rawls does not consider the question of improving the 
working conditions of the bulk of the population as one of justice…One is forced 
to conclude that he must believe market forces to have some inherent tendency to 
bring them about, which is completely contradictory to experience. (p. 164) 
 
 Rawls‘ tacit acceptance of the so-called free market to get a fair distribution of 
jobs and to better the conditions of those positions is a glaring mistake, given the 
governmental regulations needed in the developed world and the existing exploitation 
that exists in countries without such governmental safeguards. For everyone with an 
interest in improving working conditions, this would seemingly be one of the most 
important factors in a reasonable theory of justice. Barry ventures into the breach with his 
usual flair for presenting a truly just idea that stands almost no chance of becoming a 
political actuality; in simply suggesting such plans, he reveals how fundamentally unjust 
our present political apparatuses are, as well as how impoverished the aims of leading 
political theories are. In response to Rawls‘ omission, Barry lobbies: 
Since Rawls does not suggest ways of improving things, let me mention two, and 
let me say also that the question is not merely one of monotonous or routine jobs 
but jobs that are filthy, exhausting and injurious to health. The first line of attack 
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would be to spread the nastiest jobs around by requiring everyone, before entering 
higher education or entering a profession, to do, say three years of work wherever 
he or she was directed. (This would also have educational advantages.)  (p. 164) 
 
This suggestion for bad work to be required as compulsory service in a job outside one‘s 
usual aspirations could do much to improve the conditions for the workers who may end 
up in these positions, as those who would move on might actually see that individuals 
who perform such work should be paid more, get greater respect, and not be subject to 
unsafe conditions. What is remarkable about Rawls‘ massive tome is how few 
suggestions, such as Barry‘s, are presented in a similar form.  
 In Barry‘s view, Rawls has an all too rosy picture of human nature, forgets the 
lessons of history, and even neglects the conditions of the present—as his theory would 
not need to have been conceived of if people acted in the manner he ascribes to them 
throughout the work. In contrast, Barry is quick to see that the most likely pattern of 
leaving work to market conditions will be bad for those employed in the worst jobs and 
that thoughts that companies will regulate themselves without independent government 
supervision are naïve. In this instance, Barry suggests active solutions where Rawls 
defers to the caprice of the market: 
The invariable trouble with regulatory agencies is the danger of their becoming 
too sympathetic with those they are supposed to control. What is needed, I 
suggest, is the creation of a negative points system for the monotony, 
unpleasantness and danger of jobs, and legislation providing for the automatic 
deduction each year in the number of points a job can score and still be permitted 
to exist. In the advanced industrial societies few [other] lines of reform, I suggest, 
hold a great prospect for the advancement of human well-being. (p. 165) 
 
 Such a system of calculus of bad work may seem naïve in his presentation. 
However, this is precisely the type of active egalitarianism that Rawls‘ work lacks and 
what makes Barry so important. What is pointed out with this example is that societies 
70 
 
            
that do not seek to improve conditions of work for those who have the worst positions do 
not have an active interest in justice and often only want to ensure that they or their 
children do not end up in one of those positions. This example has a similar educational 
analogue; if students were forced to attend a school in the district and were not allowed to 
exit to the private sphere, one would imagine that the schools would improve or, more 
cynically, one could imagine that parts of certain schools would improve. 
 To sum, this section has explored Barry‘s work via his critique of John Rawls and 
has demonstrated Barry‘s much more active view of governmental intervention that is 
needed to succeed in creating greater egalitarianism in society. This contextual 
background demonstrates that rethinking educational institutions and the services they 
offer is vital to the social and political reform that Barry seeks. 
Barry on Nozick 
 It is now crucial to move from Barry‘s treatment of Rawls‘ work to his discussion 
of the other major pillar of political philosophy in the contemporary liberal tradition, 
Robert Nozick and his Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). This discussion is vital to 
understanding how Barry‘s later work on social justice is relevant to educational studies 
as a response to conservative views. Further, the political discourse furthered by Nozick, 
which Barry rebuts, is a discourse that must also be actively confronted and rejected in 
educational scholarship. 
 Nozick considered himself to be a libertarian, but his views place him at the 
extreme right of political liberalism due to his perspective that government should 
provide only the enforcement of contracts and minor policing functions. Barry‘s 
discussion of Nozick comes in the form of a book review that is much smaller in scope 
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than his discussion of Rawls, which took an entire book. The famous review was 
published in Political Theory. This shorter form was due to Barry‘s lack of interest in 
focusing on Nozick‘s ideas for an extended period of time. Specifically, Barry found 
Nozick‘s views to be so morally repugnant and philosophically specious that they only 
merited a few pages of rebuttal. What Barry finds unfortunate about Nozick‘s work is 
that it has provided a shell of philosophical legitimacy to what he considers to be brutish 
and unthoughtful views. What is even more unfortunate, for Barry, is how influential 
Nozick‘s ideas have been in American politics (and indirectly in educational policy) in 
the decades since the book‘s publication. Both of these issues are stressed in Barry‘s 
biting review.    
 Barry‘s first charge in the review is that Nozick‘s ideas, which include a plea for 
extremely limited government, often known as the nightwatchman theory of government, 
are rather common and unoriginal. In contrast, Barry thinks Rawls may have erred in the 
development of his theory, but that Rawls did not have a similar lack for originality. 
Barry (1975) takes Nozick to task for trying to separate himself from less sophisticated 
commentators with essentially the same ideas: 
The book‘s [Anarchy, State, and Utopia] conclusions are not in the least unusual. 
They articulate the prejudices of the average owner of a filling station in a small 
town in the Midwest who enjoys grousing about paying taxes and having to 
contribute to ―welfare scroungers‖ and who regards as wicked any attempts to 
interfere with contracts, in the interests, for example, of equal opportunity or anti-
discrimination. There will be nothing unfamiliar in the conclusions of the book to 
those who have read their William F. Buckley or their Senator Goldwater or have 
ever paid attention to the output of the more or less batty crusades and campaigns 
financed by wealthy Texans and Californians. The only thing that is new is that 
these views are being expressed by someone who is a Professor of Philosophy at 
Harvard. (p. 331) 
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These easy allusions to the work of William F. Buckley (1951), Ayn Rand (1957), and 
Barry Goldwater (1960/2007) are vital elements to understanding this strain of political 
thought and action in American politics. Importantly, these three individuals are the 
intellectual forebears of President Ronald Reagan, who was shown in Chapter 2 to have 
played a significant role in the expansion of inequality in America during the 1980s.  
 Further, Barry is offended by how Nozick makes his argument. To present his 
views in such a nonchalant manner disgusts Barry. It is as if Nozick has not even 
considered the possible negative effects if his ideas about limited government took hold. 
In this section, Barry reminds the reader about the stark inequality that could occur if 
Nozick‘s ideas were fully implemented: 
Finally the intellectual texture is of a sort of cuteness that would be wearing in a 
graduate student and seems to me quite indecent in someone who, from the lofty 
heights of a professorial chair, is proposing to starve or humiliate ten percent or so 
of his fellow citizens (if he recognizes the word) by eliminating all transfer 
payments through the state, leaving the sick, the old, the disabled, the mothers 
with young children and no breadwinner, and so on, to the tender mercies of 
private charity, given at the whim and pleasure of the donors and on any terms 
that they choose to impose. (p. 331-332) 
 
The revival of Hoover-era notions of leaving the poor out in the cold with no government 
safety net is appalling to Barry. Barry is so shocked by Nozick‘s words that he is tempted 
to think that there is a Swiftian quality to the work as someone with Nozick‘s knowledge 
and intellectual pedigree should not have been able to arrive at this perspective. However, 
there is no irony at all in the creation of Nozick‘s ideal state, despite the fact that his view 
of utopia would create certain chaos and suffering for everyone living in it, except for the 
most elite members of society. Barry relays this view that Nozick cannot actually believe 
all that he is saying, especially given the implications for social and economic policy: 
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―My own personal inclination would be to treat the book as a joke, but since it is only too 
clear that others are prepared to take it seriously, I shall do so as well‖ (p. 332).  
 This acknowledgement is powerful in understanding the appeal such a work has 
for many people, especially those of the highest economic strata. It is more difficult to 
understand how many groups who would be even more systematically disadvantaged by 
the elites accept and promote this ideology. Here, it is important to recall Rousseau‘s 
(1754/1985) warning from Discourse on Inequality that explains that the rich convince 
the poor to believe in private property (and therefore its protection as being a central 
government function), because if they do not, the poor will lose what little property they 
own. The modern media techniques that elites use for this process today have been 
detailed by Herman and Chomsky (1988/2002) for the past several decades. With these 
existent trends, the Barry and Nozick exchange only becomes more acute and powerful. 
 In the follow section, it becomes clear that the lines of conservative thought are 
quite connected regardless of Nozick‘s attempt to distance himself from others with 
similar views. Barry (1975) critiques: ―I have said that the political position of the book 
amounts to no more than the mean-spirited conventional wisdom of middle America 
pushed to its logical conclusion…If you loved Goldwater, you‘ll love Nozick‖ (p. 332). 
As reflected here, Barry‘s initial review, which is admittedly harsh, led to a response 
from a supporter of Nozick who criticized Barry for having an emotional response to 
Nozick‘s work. Barry defended himself by saying that basically any caring or reasonable 
person should have an emotional response to a political theory that ensures sweeping 
inequality and, then, insultingly suggests that it is somehow just.  
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 Barry‘s comment near the end of the review sums up his view that Nozick has not 
presented much that is new to political theory other than revive the idea that might makes 
right. Barry (1975) states, ―Justice for Nozick, as for Thrasymachus, is the interest of the 
stronger… If Nozick is discontented to find that his views put him in nasty company, he 
should... reflect on the possibility that the reason is that these are nasty views‖ (Barry, 
1975, p. 334). Barry‘s argument against Nozick here is easy to spot. Justice for Barry 
means greater equality. Justice for Nozick is whatever occurs in the market with minimal 
government intervention or protection. When one thinks of the educational implications 
of these political philosophies, we can see how important this philosophical divide is to 
educational theory and policy as some observers advocate for greater equality in funding 
and resources while others suggest that the governmental role in education should be 
reduced or outsourced to private interests.  
 The final section of note brings a turn towards the future of American politics and 
is spot-on in its description of present political trends: 
Nozick‘s vision of ―utopia‖ as a situation in which advantaged reinforce their 
advantages by moving into independent jurisdictions, leaving the poor and 
disadvantaged to fend for themselves, could be regarded as the work of a master 
satirist, since it is in fact merely the logical extension of pathologically divisive 
processes already well-established in the United States: the flight of the middle 
classes to the suburbs while the inner city decays from lack of resources, and the 
growth of ―planned communities‖ for the wealthy aged and other specially 
selected groups who are able to shed much of the usual social overhead. 
Unfortunately, there is no sign that Nozick, jokiness personified in other respects, 
sees this particular joke, but, thanks to the direction given to public policy by 
Nixon and Ford and their Supreme Court, the American people have an increasing 
opportunity to enjoy the joke personally. Robert Nozick is the thinking man‘s 
Gerald Ford, or, if you prefer, the rich man‘s John Rawls (since he could hardly 
be the poor man‘s John Rawls). (p. 336) 
 
Based on the political drift of the country since the mid-1970s, Barry‘s understanding of 
American politics is prescient. Barry might have deemed these trends to be personified in 
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the vice presidential candidacy of Sarah Palin in 2008 (see also Palin 2009), as he would 
likely claim that Palin represents the worst view of a governing public philosophy—
detached and uninformed about essential issues while at the same time unapologetically 
self-confident and misguided as to the belief that big government is evil. The educational 
and political consequences of Nozick‘s ideology that Barry rails against continue to 
present challenges to educational equality and egalitarianism and, unfortunately, these 
will likely continue into the future.  
 In conclusion, this chapter has introduced the work of Brian Barry in contrast to 
the major pillars of contemporary political philosophy and the justness of institutions and 
outcomes in society. Further, it initially explores several of the concepts that are of 
central importance to extending his ideas into the critical approaches in education. Of 
particular concern are the ways in which he questions meritocracy, personal 
responsibility, and equal opportunity—each of which play a part in the related 
educational discourses. His work will be returned to in the following chapters, which 
explore differing critical perspectives on the persistence of inequality in education.  
The next chapter turns to the discussion of class in critical educational scholarship and 
Barry‘s views of class and material inequality.
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
CRITICAL APPROACHES TO INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION: 
APPEALS TO CLASS 
 
 This chapter provides a discussion of the work of the leading proponents of a 
class based notion of critical educational scholarship. The chapter begins with a brief 
definitional exercise of how the term class is used before proceeding to discuss how class 
has become an issue in this area of scholarship. Then, texts of scholars in this area will be 
analyzed to draw out the values and positions that underlie their work and its relationship 
to education. In response, Barry‘s contrasting views on class will then be discussed. 
Interestingly, Barry‘s (1989, 2005) critique of meritocracy is complementary to the class 
based critical tradition‘s aim to undercut the notion that success in society is the exclusive 
result of the achievement of individuals over others based on merit. However, from this 
empirical agreement, Barry‘s interpretations somewhat diverge by fleshing out the 
philosophical and political complications within the class based critical tradition. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with a discussion about the differences and commonalities among 
the arguments offered, as well as their implications for education.  
 Michael Apple, Henry Giroux, and Peter McLaren, who will be discussed in this 
chapter, all rely upon notions of class in understanding material inequality in society and 
how it affects education. ―Class‖ is used throughout this chapter in this orthodox manner, 
in that it trumps other characteristics of social status, and it is used in the sense of one 
large social group being exploited by a small elite group that benefits from the larger 
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group‘s labor. Despite this study‘s definitional bounding, it is important to note that other 
scholars have adapted the meaning of the term class to encompass a diverse set of other 
characteristics and that there have been theoretical advances to expand class beyond this 
modernist conception. Such advances have come from some post-structuralist authors. 
Yet, even when the authors discussed in this chapter have attempted a similar theoretical 
move in their recent work, this effort has been somewhat muted by the traditional 
elements of class. This is especially true in the case of McLaren, whose bottom line in 
social and political critique is always to define class on material grounds and who still 
regards it as fundamental to any significant social and political progress.  
 With the establishment of this definition of the term class to this line of critical 
educational thought, this section will now look at the origins of class‘s entry into the 
discourse and will discuss why this critical educational tradition emerged at the time it 
did. The question of why these scholars turned to a focus on class and material inequality 
in educational thought has several related origins. A substantial background condition 
was the fading idealism of the 1960s, alongside the continued promotion of schools as 
great equalizers and engines of democratic and economic improvement. This rhetoric 
began to wear thin as educational and economic realities did not match what had been 
promised through traditional means of education. As these divergent circumstances 
confronted educators, links began to be made between the social reconstructionism of 
Theodore Brameld and George Counts; critical theory influenced by Karl Marx from 
Max Horkheimer, Thedore Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse; and the reconceptualist 
movement in curriculum theory initiated by William Pinar.  
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 From this convergence came a focus on schools as institutions that needed to be 
radically reformed, restructured, and rethought for them to be useful in changing society 
for the better. At this tradition‘s base was the contention that simply promoting anodyne 
versions of democracy in schools would not substantially reshape society in a progressive 
way. These scholars began to analyze schooling as much more than the venue for the 
transmission of knowledge of one generation to another. They began to view the 
curriculum, the cultural processes, and the economic positions of teachers and students in 
a much more holistic manner. To them, schools could no longer be viewed as entities that 
transmit an objective, value-free canon to students and that inculcate positive civic 
attitudes. Instead, schools were to be considered institutions worthy of critique as 
indoctrination centers that promoted capitalistic values and that prevented social 
progress.  
 Since the emergence of this tradition, it has grown substantially and spawned its 
own terms. In particular, critical pedagogy has become a discourse in which the 
connection between critical theory and the educational task of teaching students 
intertwine. However, the influence of this critical tradition in teacher education programs 
is often contested and, outside the academy, is often even less strong. There are teacher-
led, school-level efforts that exist in implementing critical pedagogy, but the overriding 
trend in educational policy towards the deprofessionalization of teachers and the use of 
centralized curriculum continues to hamper its use in the public schools. Further, many 
politicians and certain factions of the population have sought the removal of or censure of 
teachers who are too overt in employing critical pedagogy. 
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 With the provision of this background, the chapter now will discuss the work of 
Michael Apple and Henry Giroux before focusing on Peter McLaren and his 
collaborators. The extended attention given to McLaren is warranted because of his 
exemplar status within this class based critical tradition and his authorship of a popular 
social foundations text that reflects this tradition, Life in Schools: An Introduction to 
Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education (1989/2006). 
Class and Critical Educational Scholarship 
 This section briefly discusses the work of Michael Apple in Ideology and 
Curriculum (1978/2003), Henry Giroux‘s comments upon Peter McLaren‘s contributions, 
and the ideas of McLaren (2005) and his collaborative efforts with other supporters of the 
class based critical tradition. The following sections will provide a discussion and 
analysis of these key texts and their underlying ideas within the critical tradition. This 
work has been tremendously influential in understanding how education contributes to 
the indoctrination of students into capitalist culture. However, before getting to that more 
radical call for change, it is vital to take a look at how this perspective evolved and how 
the links between economics, school, and the workplace came to exist, as well as the 
symbolic value of education to class politics.  
 Here, Michael Apple (1978/2003) is invaluable in presenting how class and 
education have come to be understood in a more nuanced manner than some of his 
colleagues: 
I think we are beginning to see more clearly a number of things that were much 
more cloudy before. As we learn to understand the way education acts in the 
economic sector of a society to reproduce important aspects of inequality, so too 
are we learning to unpack a second major sphere in which schooling operates. For 
not only is there economic property there also seems to be symbolic property—
cultural capital—which schools preserve and distribute. (p. 3) 
80 
 
            
 
This finer lens in understanding education and schooling‘s role can also be traced to 
rather sound Marxist, class based thought, and the influence of Basil Bernstein. 
Specifically, Apple‘s discussion of institutional arrangements around education as having 
multiple functions that contribute to controlling society without outright repression and 
violence mirrors Louis Althusser‘s (1971) distinction between ideological state 
apparatuses and repressive state apparatuses. So, this more complex understanding of 
education is one that can be seen to have strong class and Marxist foundations.  
 There is additional evidence for this class based approach being an underlying 
motivation. Apple admits to drawing heavily on Raymond Williams, whose class based 
politics were clear in works such as Marxism and Literature (1978) (Williams will also 
appear in works of McLaren). Further, one cannot forget that Apple used the term 
―ideology‖ in his title, which cannot be missed in showing his early and ongoing 
commitment to class through the use of language and method. With this said, Apple‘s 
position has evolved to more fully appreciate the differences among populations of 
students in relation to society in a more robust manner than often comes through in the 
work of the other scholars of this class based tradition. Here, he makes sure to 
acknowledge that not everything may fit together as tightly as he would like, and, 
therefore, his use and definition of class is less closed off than McLaren‘s use. He writes, 
We say there is a one-to-one correspondence between economics and 
consciousness, economic base ―automatically‖ determining superstructure. This is 
too easy to say, unfortunately, and is much too mechanistic. For it forgets that 
there is, in fact, a dialectical relationship between culture and economics. It also 
presupposes an idea of conscious manipulation of schooling by a very small 
number of people with power. (Apple, 1978/2003, p. 3)  
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 This parsing out of the elements of difference only would become more important 
to the field of education in the decades since the work was first published. In the preface 
to the second edition, Apple shows that there are additional factors that must be taken 
into account, and these elements challenge the old rigid understandings of class: ―Class 
dynamics are of immense significance and cannot be ignored. However, I have become 
more and more convinced that gender relations—and those involving race, which in the 
United States and in so many other countries are critically important‖ (Apple, 1978/2003, 
p. xxiii). Apple is compelled here to acknowledge the changes that have occurred in 
issues of economic difference also have social components. This turn to race and gender 
marks an important change in how class and Marxist theorists can address issues of 
human diversity. This theoretical change and response to critics was vital to making the 
critique of existing educational structures relevant to emerging demographic trends in 
schools and society. Further, Apple‘s migration to this position shows his inclusivity. 
 In general, Apple comes to a view that is much less narrow in the understanding 
of class than in previous decades and much more relevant to the present political 
conditions than that of McLaren. He is even willing to admit that Marxist analysis made 
errors, which McLaren is reluctant to do. This more open attitude is on display in the 
following passage: ―Now, parts of some Marxist traditions were sometimes reductive or 
even wrong, but without the easy availability of a good deal of the material it is difficult 
to develop a rich and nuanced critical position based on these traditions‖ (Apple, 
1978/2003, p. 184). Again, this acknowledgment of the possible constrictive tendencies 
in this tradition is an important theoretical advance. 
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 Having given a glimpse of the evolution of some class based critiques, it is 
important to look briefly at Peter McLaren‘s Schooling as Ritual Performance: Towards 
a Political Economy of Symbols and Gestures (1986), as this volume and its reception 
provides insight into his views to see that they have not developed in the same way. The 
text‘s place and how it fits into this framework of class based critical educational thought 
are described by Henry Giroux (1986) in the Foreword:  
The major ideological concern that informs McLaren‘s story is one that has 
preoccupied radical educational work for the last fifteen years…the major task for 
radical educators has been one of trying to unravel how schools reproduce the 
logic of capital through the ideological and material forms of domination and 
privilege that structure the lives of students from differing class, gender and 
ethnic groupings. Needless to say, the challenges that radical educators have 
posed to traditional theories of schooling, along with their analyses of how 
schools contribute to the reproduction of capitalist societies, has opened up a new 
debate around the meaning of schooling and its place in the Western democracies. 
(p. ix-x) 
 
Giroux‘s placement of McLaren‘s work into the process of peeling back the layers of 
education in understanding the reproduction of capital connects to the way that Apple 
urged a more nuanced understanding of class and Marxist inspired educational 
scholarship. However, Giroux‘s contribution to this critical tradition goes well beyond 
commenting on McLaren‘s work. His numerous volumes have expanded the educational 
conversation around class, and he has ushered in many aspects of critical theory into the 
educational discourse. Yet, Giroux seems to have taken a somewhat similar path to Apple 
in that he now practices a more nuanced version of the class based tradition than that of 
McLaren. 
 This more nuanced version and understanding to class is relayed in the following 
statement by Henry Giroux from Border Crossings: Cultural Workers and the Politics of 
Education (1992/2005). He states, ―Is class important? Yes. Is it any more important than 
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race? No, I don‘t think so… I find myself being concerned about the inter-relationship 
among categories more than I do on the legitimate focus on single narratives such as 
class‖ (p.197). The admission form Giroux must be seen as marking a difference between 
him and McLaren. 
 It is now useful to directly focus on the work of Peter McLaren and his 
collaborators for the rest of this section. This is needed as he is the leading voice of the 
class based critical tradition, and he exemplifies it more than any other scholar. Even as 
other scholars have moved from the narrow definition to more enlightened versions of 
class that take into account other forms of diversity, McLaren holds to an orthodox notion 
of class as being the fundamental and defining feature of existing society and education. 
He does occasionally open up this narrow definition, acknowledging the importance of 
other factors, only to return to class as the fundamental unit of analysis. 
 The first work that exemplifies the critical tradition on class is McLaren and 
Ramin Farahmandpur‘s (2005) Teaching Against Global Capitalism and the New 
Imperialism: A Critical Pedagogy. It connects Marxism and critical theory into 
educational discourse via globalization. Their work provides a grand explanation to 
educational inequality against the backdrop of global capitalism. In the book, they relay 
their frustration with the absence of discussion of class in public life and political debate. 
Here is their assertion: ―Seldom do politicians, intellectuals, or the media openly discuss 
class inequality in a language that situates it within the larger problematic of global 
capitalism‖ (p. 173). They see this omission as a grave error that must be remedied to 
improve societal conditions through educational reform. 
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 McLaren and Farahmandpur continue on a related line that demonstrates that even 
when they say class is not all that matters, they retreat to that notion quickly: ―We want to 
make clear that we are not subordinating race, ethnic, and gender struggles to class 
struggle. We are simply saying that without overcoming capitalist relations of production, 
other struggles will have little chance of succeeding‖ (p. 175). Their caveat clearly 
demonstrates the primacy of class as their touchstone concept and as one that trumps 
competing concerns for diversity. 
 In moving from political struggle to education, McLaren and Farahmandpur 
(2005) view teachers as agents of change in a societal confrontation between members of 
the working and elite classes. As such, they are dismayed by the lack of discussion of 
certain political issues in teacher education programs. They state that ―teacher education 
programs have failed to engage students in dialogues about class exploitation and 
oppression. Often times class power is sanitized and its powerful effect on the life 
chances of working-class students is denuded or made invisible‖ (p. 8). McLaren and 
Farahmandpur perceive the absence of discussion of class in other academic fields as 
foreshadowing a similar void in teacher education and preparation programs. For these 
authors, the push towards non-higher education based teacher preparation programs and 
the removal of social foundations coursework from many other programs leave new 
teachers underprepared for the economic and class inequalities they will confront in their 
classrooms.  
 Similar themes of class and capitalist social relations are explored in Capitalists 
and Conquerors: A Critical Pedagogy Against Empire (2005). In this work, McLaren and 
Scatamburlo-D‘Annibale (2005) discuss why the class based perspective has struggled 
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for acceptance. In short, they pin Marxism‘s failure in educational theory and politics on 
a postmodernist and misplaced notion that scholars moved away from class in cultural 
studies. They perceive that the academy has given up on class and that this has been a 
mistake in the fight for social progress. They contend the following: 
In many respects, class has actually been hidden from analytical and political 
view by the ―postmodern‖ turn in cultural studies. While we would not dispute 
that cultural studies have made great inroads in addressing the previous dearth of 
cultural investigation into gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity, it has come at 
considerable cost and has led to an evacuation of the key concern that gave birth 
to cultural studies in the first place—namely a profound commitment to class. (p. 
118) 
 
 This sets McLaren and his supporters against many cultural studies and 
multicultural scholars who might otherwise be more sympathetic to these class based 
views about the exploitation of workers and corporatization of education. It could also be 
argued that McLaren overlooks many critical educators and scholars who rely on 
analyses of material inequality and class while accepting advances in social theory that 
might fall under the broad moniker of postmodernism. 
 McLaren and Scatamburlo-D‘Annibale (2005), having identified the omission of 
class analysis from colleges and universities, again move to revive its use in teacher 
education and educational studies. They repeat the claim that their mode of analysis is 
needed given the paucity of class based critique: ―Despite post-Marxist claims to the 
contrary, Marxist theory still has a key role to play in generating ideas that challenge 
intellectual orthodoxies and rationalizations for educational inequalities‖ (McLaren and 
Scatamburlo-D‘Annibale, 2005, p. 121). For them, education is tied to a greater struggle 
in which capital must be overcome through revolutionary means. Education and teachers 
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are to play central roles in curbing consumerist and exploitative tendencies in society, and 
they are to act as change agents and cultural workers in this process. 
 McLaren and Scatamburlo-D‘Annibale (2005) then turn back to the larger 
political struggle by relaying how education plays the key role of assisting in the defeat 
of capital: ―It requires creating the social and material conditions that can help to shape 
and educate class consciousness in the pursuit of socialist futures… resistance requires a 
democratic and centralized class struggle in order to transform state power‖ (p. 126). 
These elements of resistance have a significant educational component to pursue their 
aims. McLaren‘s means of getting towards this socialist future require intervention from 
educators to helps students reveal the commoditization and fetishizations of society. For 
McLaren and his cohort, education is not communication of the canon of knowledge, but, 
instead, it is a political act that intervenes and hopes to remedy distorted class relations.  
 They continue with a focus on teachers as being the vital connection in this 
critical tradition. They put the role teachers must play in this historical change in the 
following manner: 
The key for critical educators is not only to become involved in making the 
process of cultural commodification less invisible to those whose subjectivities 
are formed within it, but to become involved in creating the kinds of social, 
political, and educational conditions that . . . shape the development of working-
class consciousness. (McLaren and Scatamburlo-D‘Annibale, 2005, p. 131) 
 
Assessing how teachers negotiate these boundaries is difficult. Additionally, teachers 
who adhere to these ideals will face the complications of administrators and policymakers 
who may have very different ideas about the role of teachers. Further, the fact that many 
teachers come from middle-class backgrounds may provide resistance to the 
consciousness raising that McLaren and Scatamburlo-D‘Annibale desire. 
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 A second piece from Capitalists and Conquerors explores similar themes, but it 
also moves into education‘s broader social and political functions. The key ideas are 
similar to ones expressed previously, but here they are spelled out more directly. The 
following passage relays these authors‘ view of education in modern society:  
Education plays a key role in the perpetuation of the capital relation; this skeleton 
in capitalist education‘s dank basement. This is just one of the many reasons why, 
in contemporary capitalist society, education assumes a grotesque and perverted 
form. It links the chains that bind our souls to capital. That it is uncomfortable for 
educational theorists, researchers, activists, and practitioners to talk about such 
unsavory topics is not surprising. However, only by uncovering the lid on this 
issue can Marxist science hope to advance. (Allman, McLaren, and Rikowski, 
2005, p. 136) 
 
This quote demonstrates how important class is to the authors and the way they view the 
present educational system. They see educational reform as being a necessary step 
towards a socialist future. These authors assert that the capitalist interest in schools is 
well known and that most educational reform of the past several decades has been 
strongly influenced by business roundtables. Consequently, the point they are trying to 
make is that the function of schools in a capitalist society are rarely acknowledged in 
wider public debates on education. 
 This point on schools‘ capitalist nature relates to Allman, McLaren, and 
Rikowski‘s (2005) claim that, because the class based perspective is not too difficult to 
understand, it should have more power in gaining adherents. Yet, ease of understanding 
does not override resistance based on numerous other factors. Regardless, Allman et al. 
(2005) suggest: 
No one would deny that there are bits of Marx‘s oeuvre that are difficult, but his 
concept of class is not one of these. However, since it appears to be widely 
misunderstood or ignored and also because it is absolutely fundamental to all sorts 
of political—including educational—struggles, it is important to discuss this 
concept.  (Allman, McLaren, and Rikowski, 2005, p. 140) 
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Again, this concept can be useful and can have resonance within the proper context. This 
tradition‘s interest in reviving its debate is central to the overall program of educational, 
political, and economic revolution.   
 Indeed, for McLaren and his cadre, their revolution comes through education, 
which requires substantial political, economic, and social change. This revolution must be 
spurred on by a new educational strategy that reveals the many ills of capitalism. They 
label this new program as revolutionary critical education. They assert that the time is 
ripe for this movement to come to the fore of education and society, and they are 
distressed that even many of their supporters seem to have given up on class. They do 
seem to be stuck in a paradox of sorts in that the time is right for revolution, but the 
revolution will not come unless their supporters can overcome the resistance to revolution 
and the retreat from class.  
 Again, they consider the possible complication that is often given for why this 
tradition has not been more successful: 
if workers understood how capitalism actually functions—something that will 
only happen when and if revolutionary critical education becomes widespread—
they would understand both what is happening to them and why it is happening. 
And educators, one of the professions experiencing this process [exploitation], 
would also be able to better understand what is happening to those they teach—
how not only they but the labor-power of the future is being groomed for the 
needs of capital. (Allman, McLaren, and Rikowski, 2005, p. 146) 
 
Yet, this critical step in the educational process is one that remains difficult to accomplish 
given the circumstances that teachers employing critical pedagogy face from 
administrators, parents, and external mandates.  
 Allman, McLaren, and Rikowski‘s critique then switches back to capitalism as an 
economic system with less of a focus on education. There is a strong and consistent 
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movement back and forth between the educational and the political argument here. In 
doing so, they seek to deconstruct the taken for granted notion that capitalism produces 
the best outcomes of any possible economic system. Further, they explain an interesting 
point about scarcity being essential to capitalism, which speaks volumes for educational 
scarcity in present society.  
  McLaren and his comrades are convinced that schools perpetuate class and capital 
reproduction. They could urge active resistance against them as did Ivan Illich, or they 
could support private or charter schools that could serve as counterweights to 
accountability regimes that restrict the public schools. Instead, they present the case for 
resistance through public education. In their eyes, this new form of public education 
would do something to challenge capital and class relations. The difficulty of which they 
are aware is in transforming public education into a new formulation. Changes of the 
magnitude that they believe in have many barriers and the coalition behind their 
revolution knows that the changes they suggest will take time and numerous levels of 
capacity building. 
 From here, they turn again to the inability of class based critiques to overcome the 
challenges to their acceptance and the role of progressive educators: ―the lack of success 
of the educational left is not so much the result of the conflicted sensibilities of critical 
educators as it is a testament to the preening success of Western…efforts in indigenizing 
the cultural logic of capitalism‖ (Allman, McLaren, and Rikowski, 2005, p. 152-153). 
This indicates that the steps to revolutionary critical pedagogy will continue to be a hard 
sell to the masses that increasingly see all education as vocational training.   
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 Critics will ask what these challenges to capital will look like, but McLaren is 
confident that teachers who have been exposed to critical pedagogy will develop an 
activist and creative mentality to change the educational dynamics in their schools. 
Further, he would not want to superimpose a structure of resistance that would not 
accommodate the individual situations in which teachers confront these trends. So, 
McLaren concludes with a renewed call to activism in education from his class based 
views:  
 A rustle of wind stirs up memories of antiwar demonstrations on the streets of Los 
 Angeles where workers, students, socialist, anarchists, priests, ministers, and 
 antiglobalization activists found common ground in the struggle against U.S. 
 imperialism. It is this spirit of communitas at work in the picket lines, in the 
 demonstrations for peace, and in our social justice classrooms that will continue 
 to provide the spiritual fuel for the challenge ahead. It is this surfeit of liminality, 
 this excess of life that cannot be commodified or codified, controlled or captured 
 that connects us to our collective struggle. Echoing Raymond Williams, it will be 
 a long revolution. (McLaren, 2005a, p. 335-336) 
 
This final passage encapsulates the educational, political, and economic discourse of the 
class based critical tradition. By relying on the language of class as the basis for their 
analysis of educational inequality, these scholars have attempted to draw greater attention 
to the circumstances of the most disadvantaged and marginalized students. Moreover, 
their underlying critique of class and capitalist relations draws in a much broader set of 
issues to educational policy debates. Yet, to have these issues taken seriously by 
policymakers remains a challenge. 
 The next section shifts the focus to Barry‘s views of class and his related critique 
of meritocracy as it relates to educational inequality. 
Barry on Class  
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 In analyzing how Barry (2005) deals with questions of class and the work of 
Marx, the connections between his disgust with inequality and that of McLaren and his 
brethren are apparent.  The points of agreement are on the injustice of some groups and 
individuals in society having so much more than others, especially when these resources 
are gained through unjust means. Similarly, they both are clearly interested in reducing 
inequality, but their readings of Marx are quite different. McLaren is critical of 
educational institutions and capitalist relations, yet he is not so critical of Marx. Barry, on 
the other hand, is willing to accept certain premises and conclusions in Marx, but he also 
achieves a critical distance and identifies areas where Marx neglects certain vital 
philosophical concepts. In particular, Barry is quite critical about the lack of discussion of 
rights in Marx‘s work. Barry (2005) states: 
During the nineteenth century, a number of people who saw the critical 
importance of opportunities and resources denigrated negative rights altogether: 
in the ideal socialist or communist state, to insist on rights would be an expression 
of egoism and would be pernicious. Fatefully, Karl Marx was numbered among 
these who took this line. We cannot know if the course of the history of the Soviet 
Union (and after 1945 its Eastern European satellites) or China would have been 
different had Marx emphasized the permanent importance of individual rights. 
But we have only to call to mind the horrors unleashed by Stalin and Mao to 
recognize that Marx was tragically mistaken. (p. 22-23) 
 
For Barry, it would be a great step forward for proponents of the class based critical 
tradition if they were able to reconcile the disjuncture of relying on Marx and economic 
class as a method of analysis of society and education and the importance of individual 
rights. However, this is not attempted; McLaren and his supporters simply take what they 
want from Marx and leave out the missing parts—like a theory of individual rights.   
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 In Barry‘s 1989 piece, ―Is it Better to be Powerful or Lucky?‖, from Democracy, 
Power, and Justice, he relays that he understands Marx‘s main insights, especially on 
power and class. He identifies two groups, 
The ‗pluralists‘, who are really individualists, loot at a situation and point out that 
no single actor—no single banker or industrialist, say—could have made much 
difference to what happened. They conclude from this observation—in most cases 
a perfectly reasonable one—that ‗nobody has power‘. The ‗elitists‘ on the other 
hand insist that, if the whole group of bankers or industrialists wanted something 
different to happen they could make it happen, and tend to move from this to 
saying that individual members of the elite have power. Karl Marx showed a 
better grasp of the concept of power than either of these recent antagonists when 
he maintained both that the capitalist class has power and that individual 
capitalists are powerless. (p. 291) 
 
The insight from Marx that Barry takes from this quote is the difficulty in separating 
power from economics and class. It is the embedded nature of power that is relayed in 
thinking about how the members of a class collectively wield considerable power, but an 
individual would be crippled by the group if they attempted to use their power outside the 
defined boundaries of the class. 
 Further, this demonstrates a point of agreement of Barry and the class based 
critical tradition in their views of how economic class works and the bounds it puts on 
individual agency. Barry acknowledges the insights of Marx and asks how Marxist ideas 
have played out in a society that has adopted systems inspired by his work. Where Barry 
diverges from McLaren and his colleagues is in the latter‘s lack of emphasis on the 
individual. This is a critical difference between Barry and this critical tradition, because, 
when the conversation moves directly to education, McLaren is left with little room for 
developing strategies for educational reform that take into account individual rights. 
McLaren may not think these are necessary, but Barry‘s comments require that this 
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implementation be incorporated as an essential element of reducing educational 
inequality. 
 Again, it is important to reiterate that Barry stands with the class based critical 
tradition in its rejection of inequality in terms of power, resources, and opportunities that 
position some classes of individuals over others based on arbitrary, capricious, and lucky 
events. Yet, his disgust with the historical and present realities of material inequality in 
wealth and its distribution does not jibe with all aspects of the philosophical and political 
territory of this critical tradition. The main objection is that these critical scholars 
discount a theory of individual rights and, for Barry, this is a fatal flaw. McLaren and his 
brethren are so quick to do away with the present political system that they neglect to 
remember that these institutions of liberalism give them the freedom to express their 
dissenting view as individuals. These institutions are fraught with problems, but they do 
provide more protection for individual rights than the system that is advanced by 
McLaren.  
 Barry sees the connections of Marx to class and universalism in a way that retains 
a similarity to McLaren. Barry (2001) puts it this way: ―Marx shared with contemporary 
Victorian liberals the notion that there was a universally valid notion of progress. He 
believed that the key to emancipation of human beings from oppression and exploitation 
was the same everywhere‖ (p. 4). This point on universalism is important to critical 
educational scholarship as one of the main critiques of class based and Marxist inspired 
work is that it does not adequately account for diversity in persons and societies. Barry 
continues this line on the value of Marx. He writes, ―Nevertheless, Marxism, so long as it 
remained an intellectual force, provided a stiffening of universalism to the liberal cause: 
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the best response to the Marxist vision of universal emancipation was an alternative 
liberal one‖ (p. 4). This discussion is absent in the critical work of McLaren on education 
or politics.  
 Interestingly, Barry sees the collapse of Marxism in a similar way to McLaren as 
both assert that so-called postmodernists dilute the struggle for equality, but they end up 
at different points with different implications for education. McLaren wants to 
rehabilitate Marx to bring along a communist future whereas Barry seeks greater equality 
with an acknowledgement of rights. Barry describes what happened in the wake of the 
failure of Marxism: ―With some distinguished exceptions, the ex-Marxists themselves led 
the way by embracing various forms of relativism and postmodernism rather than a non-
Marxist version of universalistic egalitarianism‖ (p. 4). This is an interesting observation 
for understanding the present differences in political theory. 
 On this point of rights, Barry (2001) again contrasts his perspective with Marx 
and McLaren in ―the idea that rights are important.‖ (p. 13). For Barry, this denial can be 
connected to the intellectual roots of Marx and his class analysis. It is important to see 
how Barry thinks Marx fits into the western intellectual tradition to understand why 
rights are left out of his social, political, and economic critique. Barry (2001) asserts, 
―Marx represented the left wing of the Enlightenment. This is so in two respects. First, 
Marx did not reject the slogan ‗liberty, equality, fraternity‘; on the contrary, he claimed to 
take it more seriously than did those who originated it‖ (p. 14). This interpretation is 
quite a different view than the one McLaren represents as McLaren‘s Marx is not often 
perceived to have this type of origin.  
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 Additionally, the allegations of universalism towards McLaren and the class 
based tradition can be seen to have their origins in Marx‘s universalism. This is further 
detailed by Barry (2001): 
He [Marx] was just as much of a universalist as was any Enlightenment figure: he 
was as fully persuaded as was Condorcet that all societies would pass through the 
same stages and finish up at the same destination, though Marx‘s conception of 
the stages and the destination was different from that of Condorcet, and he 
envisaged the process as being driven by different forces. (p. 14) 
 
Again, Barry sees the break in Marx from other social theorists in this rejection of the 
rights discourse. Clearly, Marx thought it was an elite indulgence to consider rights. 
Barry delineates: ―Where Marx was distinctive was in his position on civil and political 
rights: he was not content to point out their limitations in the face of great economic 
inequalities; rather, he denounced them as suitable only to ‗egoistic man‘‖ (p. 14). Barry 
views Marx‘s next step negatively as he thinks there must be additions to the 
Enlightenment legacy. Barry contends, that for Marx, ―The solution was not to 
supplement these universal rights with others, but to abolish rights altogether. In a society 
of the future, social solidarity and spontaneous cooperativeness would obviate the need 
for ‗bourgeois rights‘‖ (p.14). Barry echoes that this attitude might make sense in a 
utopian world, but history would indicate that a rights discourse protects the most 
vulnerable and marginalized individuals and groups—a consideration of substantial 
importance to education. 
 Barry (2005) is fundamentally concerned with how inequality and differences in 
wealth affect class. He contends, 
The more materialistic a society—the more that it is generally believed that 
money is the only significant goal in life—the more that people with a lot of 
money will feel like winners and those with little will feel like losers. This feeling 
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will intensify if those who are better off than others believe that they are more 
virtuous and those who are worse off share this belief. (p. 78) 
   
Barry thinks a life dedicated to the pursuit of financial gain will be at the expense of 
others. On this element, Barry and McLaren are in seeming agreement. Barry continues, 
―Almost all everyday interactions are mediated by the parties‘ estimates of their relative 
social standing. Even those who do not acknowledge their class position are affected by 
it‖ (p. 78). 
 In relation to class, Barry is also seeking an answer to the problem of just 
governance, which has implications for the educational systems in the real world of 
politics and economics. In light of this aim, Barry (1989a), in A Treatise on Social 
Justice, Volume 1: Theories of Justice, places Marx and the derivative class analysis into 
its proper context of scarcity and distribution. He asserts, ―Since the subject matter of 
justice is the distribution of things that are in short supply (relative to the total demand) 
the concept of justice would have no application. This entails…that wants should be 
limited‖ (p. 154). This is a critical point to which McLaren is sympathetic, but to which 
Barry provides greater weight.  
 Again, in thinking about the implications for education, the allocation of 
resources remains a vital concern. Without some abatement to students and adults‘ desire 
for things, the project of this critical tradition faces yet another barrier. It is one that does 
not receive the attention it deserves given its pervasiveness and gravity in present 
consumptive society. Barry is much less inclined to think that people will give up this 
desire even though he agrees with McLaren on the underlying values. 
 With several elements of the differences of Barry and this critical tradition 
discussed, it is now important to connect this discussion of class based critical tradition to 
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the concept of meritocracy. Barry thinks that meritocracy is a destructive concept that 
inhibits a society‘s ability to reduce inequality and that it has substantially undercut class 
based analysis. The important link here is that, even though Barry is critical of this 
Marxist inspired tradition, there is a common enemy of inequality that should not be lost 
in his critique of it. So, it is important to knock down meritocracy and reveal it as a 
notion that only seeks to provide cover and justification for complicated forms of 
inequality and class distinction with simplistic political buzzwords.  
  For Barry, meritocracy, which is understood as the best rising to the top because 
of their individual talents, is mere social fiction that punishes students and communities 
that have been historically marginalized and that are less able to change economic status. 
This is not to say that there are not tremendous success stories that illustrate that 
achievement is possible, but these examples only serve to demonstrate that the 
circumstances that the spotlighted individual overcame were substantial. Conversely, 
many other individuals just stepped into the meritocratic system with ease and rose to the 
top with advantages all along the process.  
 This notion of meritocracy is tied to class and often works in the direction of 
keeping the mass of individuals from achieving their potential. Barry (2005) writes: 
The idea that countries such as Britain and the United States are ‗meritocracies‘ 
has been propagated with great effectiveness even though it is wildly contrary to 
the facts.  There is no reason why this association of money with superiority and 
inferiority should not ascend all the way up the scale: a cottage, Marx said, 
shrinks to a hovel if somebody builds a castle next to it; but the castle shrinks to a 
cottage if someone builds up an enormously larger castle next to it. (p. 78)  
 
The consideration here is that relativities and differences among groups matter. Inequality 
can be reduced by having a basic minimum income, home, or any other resource such as 
education. It is fundamental to remember that meritocracy can only have a reasonable 
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meaning when inequality among groups is very small. Since inequality is presently great, 
meritocracy must be dismissed as a pernicious concept. 
 Barry is aware of the implications of the rhetoric of meritocracy and that it is 
often used in the discussion of individuals‘ opportunities for success and college 
admission—for example, when the person is from a marginalized background. This 
deployment of meritocracy is done to justify inequality and the positions of those who 
achieved through merit and not family connections or better initial opportunities. A 
perfect example of when merit can be dismissed would be the recent economic crisis in 
which investment bank and insurance executives received their bonuses even though they 
ran their companies into the ground. This proves that merit as a basis for advancement is 
subjective and relative to where one fits in society.  
 In sum, this section has discussed Barry‘s work in conjunction with class and its 
underlying Marxist foundations. His commitment to this type of analysis only goes so far 
as he recognizes that Marx and the critical tradition based on Marx‘s work do not 
sufficiently attend to a theory of rights, which has devastating implications for society 
and education. Barry does have common ground with this tradition in his related 
discussion and critique of meritocracy as he sees the concept as a political tool used to 
obscure the reasons for economic and class inequality.  
Conclusion 
 What Barry finds problematic about the continued reliance on Marxist 
perspectives on class is that there is not enough attention to rights. Omitting a discussion 
of them (because in a communist future, there would be no need to do so) ignores 
intermediate steps and gives sanctuary to those who would exploit this omission. It is 
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interesting to see that McLaren and Barry both think that the so-called postmodernists 
sold out inequality and class analysis and replaced it with a less active political attitude. 
Although McLaren and Barry arrive at very different positions from this common point, 
with McLaren seeing the overthrow of capital to be essential for societal and educational 
progress and Barry demanding that inequality be reduced to provide for a much greater 
egalitarian society, they both value the importance of relativities in class and wealth 
among populations as being essential to understanding present and future political 
structures.  
 In contrast to theorists such as Rawls who would assert that such differences 
should not matter as long there is a minimum standard or Nozick who would think that 
such inequalities are by-products of greater efforts of some more talented individuals, 
McLaren and Barry find such arguments unconvincing. Further, they find such 
inequalities to be unjust at their core and urge intervention in different ways. The 
implications of this debate for education are substantial as both Barry and the class based 
critical tradition see the importance of reforming educational structures and agendas to 
provide educational opportunities that give all students the chance to succeed. Further, 
these opportunities must be sincere and genuine and not just be provided as a veneering 
of inequality used to justify the faulty logic of meritocracy.
  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
CRITICAL APPROACHES TO INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION: 
APPEALS TO AUTONOMY 
 
 This chapter discusses a critical tradition in educational thought that appeals to the 
notion of inculcating autonomy in students as a means to reducing educational inequality. 
It begins with a brief description of how the scholars in this field compose a critical 
tradition. Then, it moves to a discussion of the intellectual history of the tradition and its 
entry into educational thought. The next section analyzes the writings of Eamonn Callan 
and Harry Brighouse before focusing on the work of Rob Reich. The final part discusses 
Barry, autonomy, and personal responsibility. 
 The first step is to define these liberal democratic theorists as a distinct critical 
tradition. Critical tradition is defined here as a body of related social and political thought 
that critiques existing structures and institutions of society as well as the outcomes they 
produce. The scholars who make up this tradition are often much less hyperbolic and not 
as antagonistic of the governmental apparatuses that maintain the status quo than the 
other traditions in this study. Further, these political liberals are much less radical than 
their critical theory (both class and identity focused) colleagues in that they are less prone 
to see the institutions of government as inherently corrupt and prejudiced. Instead of 
recommending that government agencies be scrapped entirely as McLaren might suggest, 
political liberals often urge that more modest reforms are needed to fix educational and 
societal problems, such as curricular changes or transfer payments like vouchers 
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(Brighouse, 2000; Callan, 1997; Levinson, 1999). Therefore, this tradition looks less 
critical by comparison to the other traditions that are identified in this study. 
Nevertheless, they remain critical of the present educational structures, policies, and 
agendas, and, consequently, they must be considered a critical tradition. 
 This critical tradition arose out of several historical trends in philosophy. 
Specifically, the intellectual heritage of these philosophers can be traced directly back to 
Immanuel Kant and his moral theory. The Kantian focus on the notion of autonomy is 
one of his most enduring and influential legacies for western political and social thought. 
Much closer to the present, this tradition is further inspired by John Rawls and his moral 
contract theory, which is thought to have been greatly influenced by Kant. There are also 
strong elements of the Anglo-American analytic philosophical traditions, including 
Bertrand Russell, within this critical tradition. In analytical philosophy of education, the 
work of Israel Scheffler (1960), R.S. Peters (1973), and Paul Hirst (1965) has had an 
influence on and continues to shape the discourse of this tradition. Building on all of 
these influences, the scholars of this critical tradition employ the concept of autonomy in 
attempting to remedy the inequalities of the educational apparatuses of the country.  
Autonomy and Critical Educational Scholarship 
 The keystone concept for this tradition is autonomy (Reich, 2002). Proponents of 
this tradition see the state as promoting and inculcating students into a mindset through 
education. The development of a self-critical attitude towards students‘ actions, beliefs, 
and values, as well as towards that of their parents and communities, is central to this 
critical tradition. The trend in this work is an attempt to achieve an educational 
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environment that provides all students with some level of ability to choose the ways in 
which individuals are able to live their lives.    
 The focus of this section is on the texts of several prominent scholars in this 
tradition. It discusses the work of Eamonn Callan‘s Creating Citizens (1997) and Harry 
Brighouse‘s On Education (2006).  However, the majority of the discussion and analysis 
centers on the work of political and educational theorist Rob Reich (2002), who promotes 
what he describes as a minimalist version of autonomy in his Bridging Liberalism and 
Multiculturalism in American Education. Reich‘s work merits an extended discussion as 
he can be seen as an exemplar of the recent advances in this tradition.   
 The first offering from this tradition begins with a hypothetical educational and 
political situation, which bears on autonomy. Callan in Creating Citizens (1997) 
describes how the task of educating students in virtue would be necessary to promote 
autonomy to prevent the world from devolving into a Brave New one, which ―differs 
from the free societies we now inhabit in that those ideals [such as democracy and civic 
engagement] continue to exert a substantial influence on our lives, even though their 
influence is powerfully opposed almost everywhere, and often defeated, by other cultural 
pressures‖ (p. 3).  Callan‘s worry is that the present slide in civic participation may only 
get worse rendering future societies nearly unrecognizable in today‘s terms.  
 He expresses this concern in this way: ―If the future in store for our children is not 
to be a Brave New World—or more likely something far worse—that can only be 
because many learn to accept and internalize those same ideals of character‖ ( p. 3).  The 
follow-on point is that the educational system would contribute to the development of 
virtue in citizens. This notion of developing virtuous citizens through active 
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governmental action is one of the first steps towards the cultivation of autonomy. The 
connection between the two concepts is the notion of individuals being able to make good 
choices after some period of reflection. This idea of reflection on one‘s possible choices 
is essential to an autonomous life. 
 A slightly different version and more direct exploration of autonomy as an aim of 
education in the critical tradition of political liberalism comes from Harry Brighouse in 
On Education (2006). For Brighouse, autonomy is a primary purpose of education, which 
is not sufficiently attended to at present: 
I shall argue that autonomy is important enough to justify a requirement that all 
children be subject to an education designed to facilitate it. But I am going to do 
so without claiming that autonomy is needed for a life to be worth living. So my 
argument for facilitating autonomy has to be grounded in a deeper principle that 
explains why it is so important. (Brighouse, 2006, p. 15) 
 
What is useful in Brighouse‘s understanding of the term is that autonomy is a stand-in for 
the concept of living a flourishing life. Under this approach, one‘s life must be 
flourishing to be truly autonomous. This notion will be touched on in the discussion of 
Reich‘s work as well, but Brighouse is important here because he spells out to a more 
explicit degree the elements of this type of life—more so than either Callan or Reich.   
 Brighouse moves beyond the procedures of autonomy as an educational aim to the 
substance and content of what life looks like through autonomous eyes. Brighouse (2006) 
speaks to this point in the following way: ―the idea that education should aim at enabling 
people to lead flourishing lives, and the argument that education should facilitate 
autonomy depends on the ideas that autonomy plays an important role in enabling people 
to live flourishing lives‖ (p. 15-16). Brighouse‘s autonomy presumes a level of choice in 
one‘s life options that may not exist for many people in the real world. However, he sees 
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this as not a fault of his theory but, instead, as one of the unjust circumstances of present 
society that inhibits achieving autonomy in one‘s life.   
  In support of this overall critique and in support of his view of autonomy, 
Brighouse (2006) contends that one must be consciously living and not just aimlessly 
wandering through life. He presents the complexity in the following manner: ―having 
objectively good things in one‘s life is not enough for a flourishing life. For somebody to 
actually flourish, they have to identify with the life they are leading. They have to live it 
from the inside, as it were‖ (p. 16). For Brighouse, this process of chosen actions is one 
that is encouraged through proper education.  
 The final move that Brighouse (2006) makes is more forceful in establishing that 
autonomy is just a value and aim of education to get to a flourishing life. He is acutely 
aware—more so it seems than Reich (or, at least, he articulates it more directly)—that 
there are other barriers to autonomy in one‘s life that cannot be affected immediately by 
education‘s positive influence on life outcomes and autonomy. He states, 
Suppose we inculcate in a child the skills and habits associated with autonomy. 
Does this guarantee to them the ability to live a flourishing life? Absolutely not. 
For that they need far more: they need to access material resources, and some 
control over their work life; they need to be able to adopt a way of life that is 
itself good; and they need an environment in which they can act on their 
judgments. (p. 25-26) 
 
Many critics, however, think that this caveat may just get one back to the start of the 
problem of a flourishing life as barriers to this fulfillment can be substantial. Further, 
these barriers exceed the scope and ability of educational structures to provide the type of 
assistance that would allow for autonomous choices to be made. Here, Barry would 
suggest a program of resource distribution would be required to allow individuals the true 
ability to make autonomous choices.  
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 Having briefly discussed Callan and Brighouse, the focus on autonomy now 
moves to the work of Rob Reich (2002) in Bridging Liberalism and Multiculturalism in 
American Education. Reich (2002) should receive credit at the outset for his calling 
attention to the ahistoricity of much of political philosophy. He states this in the 
introduction of his work: ―political theorists often ignore the historical context in which 
their theories are to be applied, and even more often they ignore the educational 
presuppositions and implications of their theories‖ (p. 4). Here, there is common ground 
between Reich and his critical tradition and Barry‘s work.   
 For Reich, education is particularly relevant, as is the point on thinking about the 
complications of individuals emerging into adulthood as autonomous persons when 
young people face barriers to their autonomous actions throughout childhood and 
adolescence. As he states, ―Contemporary theorists, generally speaking, seem to assume 
that the persons populating a given political territory are fully functioning, autonomous 
adults‖ (p. 4). This is an important consideration in understanding the growth of students 
into adulthood. After the introduction and rationale of the work, Reich (2002) defines 
what he means by autonomy as ―a person‘s ability to reflect independently and critically 
upon basic commitments, desires, and beliefs, be they chosen or unchosen, and to enjoy a 
range of meaningful life options from which to choose, upon which, and to act‖ (p. 46). 
 With Reich‘s understanding of autonomy clear, he describes a hypothetical 
example of how autonomy works. However, instead of using a child, he illustrates his 
view of autonomous action through an imaginary adult known as Ann, who has a midlife 
crisis and who is in the midst of making changes in her life. To do this, ―she steps outside 
herself, figuratively, and assesses the values her life embodies, the commitments she has 
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made, and the goals and projects she pursues‖ (p. 101). This example reemphasizes this 
key point of distance and independent critical judgment as criteria for autonomy. 
 Reich (2002) continues the example of Ann and her newfound sense of autonomy 
by introducing the metaphor of living according to one‘s own lights as well as why the 
mid-life crisis example is apt. He contends that the ―mid-life crisis reveals the sense in 
which people can evaluate important life commitments, desires, projects, beliefs, and so 
on, and on reflection, attempt to alter them or to reaffirm them on an autonomous basis‖ 
(p. 101). It is interesting that Reich relays that the details do not matter in Ann‘s 
autonomous crisis, because it foreshadows his priority of putting the process of 
autonomous decision making above the substance of choices one makes in one‘s life. So, 
Reich is concerned with Ann acting autonomously or not. On this point, Barry and Reich 
would differ substantially as Barry is vitally concerned with the outcomes and substance 
of such decisions. 
 Reich then shifts his position somewhat to say that the notion of autonomy as 
crisis in the example is only meant to dramatically illustrate the deeper principles at stake 
and that every autonomous decision does not have to be a crisis. He (2002) frames the 
crisis and everyday versions of the point of autonomy that do not require a mid-life crisis 
as ―moments of radical disorientation or because the exercise of autonomy demands we 
break with the course of our past lives… autonomous persons exercise their autonomy, 
though less dramatically, in everyday life‖ (p. 101). In Reich‘s sense, autonomy is using 
critical thought in decision making and not engaging in cycles of angst over every 
decision. Further, the use of the metaphor is intended to ―call attention not to their 
confusion but to their sense that they are in fact in control of their lives. It underscores the 
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deeply-seated notion that acting as pilot of one‘s course in life is important‖ (p. 101). 
This underscores the active way in which an autonomous life is to be lived. However, it 
could be argued, as Barry does, that strict autonomy as a value is in a very formal sense 
amoral as it specifically rejects conceptions of the good life for a life defined as making 
whatever decisions one wants as long as they are self-aware and critical ones.   
 Reich (2002) then explores the previously alluded to notion of process over 
substance in autonomy and misperceptions of the autonomous good life in the following 
section: ―What matters is the extent to which people subject their commitments, values, 
and beliefs to critical scrutiny, the extent to which people consent to and view their 
motivations as authentically their own, not the imposition of others‖ (p. 103). This 
element of authenticity is crucial as outside influences and control negate the 
characteristics of autonomy for Reich. It follows that the definition Reich provides for 
autonomy is similar to that of a general sense of critical thinking about the decisions one 
makes without criteria or further description of the process that should be used in making 
decisions. Critics could argue that there are no steps laid out and no agenda to use. Reich 
provides guidance in suggesting that one must subject one‘s values to reflection, but there 
is little additional insight into this metaphorical blackbox.  
 However, it is clear that Reich (2002) wants to eschew liberalism‘s past mistakes 
in attending to history, education, and diversity. In doing so, he refines the notion of 
general autonomy to his more measured concept of minimalist autonomy: 
I want to emphasize, again, however, that minimalist autonomy, even when 
construed as character ideal, accommodates the obvious fact that a great majority 
of our initial commitments, values, beliefs, and so on are initially unchosen. 
Minimalist autonomy does not describe an ideal of persons who create themselves 
out of whole cloth, individuals abstracted from the sinews of everyday life. Much, 
after all, in a person‘s life is initially unchosen; we are never unencumbered 
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selves. People are born in a specific place, at specific time, to a specific family, 
and in specific communities each with specific histories. We do not choose our 
family, our country, colour of our skin, initial religion or lack thereof, social 
milieu, language, or historical moment. Each of these factors unquestionably 
colors our lives in involuntary ways. (p. 104) 
 
What Reich is driving at in his conception of minimalist autonomy is that individuals 
have some opportunities to reflect and make choices in their lives. He is aware that there 
is much that one cannot choose; however, this does not close off the possibility of leading 
a flourishing life in his eyes or of making what decisions one can on the basis on the 
elements of minimalist autonomy. Reich is clear that the freedom inherent in minimalist 
autonomy is meant to support a diversity of lifestyles, and he does not hold one path or 
set of choices above another as long as the considerations of critical and sincere reflection 
have been completed. 
 Reich (2002) then returns to the bounding of his theory even in its minimalist 
construction. He acknowledges what seems like a possibly massive hole in the autonomy 
project: 
In addition to scrutinizing one‘s own ends, the exercise of minimalist autonomy 
requires that in making a decision about how to shape and order one‘s life a 
person has real options from which to choose. Independent and critical reflection 
on first-order commitments would be of little value if, after deciding that one‘s 
commitments no longer commanded one‘s allegiance, there were not others to 
adopt or pursue. . . . For self-determination to have value, persons must be able to 
make choices from an array of real possibilities. (p. 105) 
 
Here, Reich admits that autonomy is a nearly meaningless notion if one cannot choose 
anything different than one‘s present life. The concept of other real choices from which 
one can choose is vital to a sense of autonomy. Reich knows that no amount of self-
reflection can alter what one‘s existing choices are in one‘s life. Hence, he endorses 
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social policies that encourage the development of additional resources to allow 
individuals to have greater chances to exercise autonomous decision making.  
 The final point of Reich‘s argument on autonomy states what constraints there are 
upon government‘s ability to encourage autonomy. Reich (2002) states that ―The liberal 
state is limited in what it can do to promote minimalist autonomy . . . But the state can 
provide an education for all children, and it can set as a fundamental aim of education the 
development of autonomy‖ (p. 112). Reich acknowledges the constraints the state is 
under in being able to alter the circumstance that prevent autonomous decision making. 
Yet, he sees the greatest likelihood for success in the promotion of autonomy through 
educational efforts that support the development of the skills of critical self-reflection. 
 This section has discussed the work of a critical tradition that appeals to 
autonomy in seeking to reduce and eliminate educational inequality. The next section 
directly discusses Barry‘s view of autonomy and then connects the discussion to the 
related notion of personal responsibility.  
Barry on Autonomy and Personal Responsibility 
 This section describes Barry‘s discussion of autonomy as well as his related 
critique of personal responsibility. It is useful to first look at Barry‘s (1995) Justice as 
Impartiality to see how he presents autonomy as a notion of the good, as this would seem 
to be critical to a flourishing life in the parlance of Brighouse and Reich: 
Let us examine the conception of the good as autonomy a little more closely. 
According to this conception, then, what is of central importance in human life is 
that people should make up their own minds about how to live and what to think 
and that they should be able to express their beliefs freely and action on their 
conclusions about the best way to live, subject to rules assigning rights to speak 
and act that are designed to protect the ability of others to do likewise. (p. 129) 
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He then breaks down the concept further to flesh out his view that autonomy is a second 
order perspective on the good. He continues: 
This is a second-order conception of the good in that it does not specify what the 
good actually consists in. Anything could be regarded as good (in a second-order 
way) so long as the person who conceived it as good (in a first-order way) had 
arrived at this conception in a way that satisfied the requirements of autonomy. (p. 
129) 
 
The importance of identifying this as a second-order conception is vital to understanding 
the difference between autonomy and other suggestions for a good life. Barry sees 
autonomy here as a process as opposed to a conception of the good that spells out in 
greater detail of how one should live. 
 This view of autonomy is different from the one presented by Reich and his 
critical tradition. For them, autonomy is an end (in and of itself) and not a constituent part 
of another first order conception of how to live. Barry clarifies this further: ―We may thus 
contrast autonomy as a conception of the good with a substantive conception, for 
example a religiously based conception, of the good‖ (p. 129). This is a vital issue in the 
context of educational aims as Barry‘s view of autonomy would place it as an important 
part of educational theory. However, there would need to be some extension of what this 
critical tradition would assert as a set first order aims about the content of the good life 
for Barry to accept it. 
 Barry (1995) is also quite concerned about how advocates of autonomy sort out 
other sources of imposition upon individuals outside of state control. For him, ―The state 
is not...the only possible source of authority figures who tell people to shut up and 
conform. A state dedicated to the furtherance of autonomy might plausibly adopt policies 
designed to undermine would-be authorities of this repressive kind‖ (p. 130). This is a 
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critical issue of non-state autonomy opponents that Barry feels deserves attention, 
especially in sorting out how autonomy could be promoted in certain public venues and 
quashed in private ones. Further, for Barry, this conflict among authorities and autonomy 
inculcating and subordinating organizations is one that Reich and the critical tradition 
must address in a more substantial manner as their position that the state should promote 
autonomy through public education might result in more students attending private 
schools where autonomy would be stifled.  
 Barry continues by describing the awkward position that strong advocates for 
autonomy would be found in if they held to all of their commitments in the face of 
authorities that do not want to promote autonomy. He writes that ―these 
conditions…denied to children by schools that are dedicated to inculcating some 
religious belief which is also that of the parents (as is normally the case), so that the two 
forms of authoritarian socialization reinforce one another‖ (p. 130-131). Here, there 
would be no entry point for advocates of autonomy to have the state make its autonomy 
mark on students. Hence, this passage indicates that autonomy advocates would have a 
natural bias towards ways of life and education that encourage autonomy. Conversely, 
they would seem to reject forms of living and learning that do not promote self-critical 
autonomous attitudes. 
 Barry recognizes this problem and relays what he sees as a major complication of 
autonomy in life by advocates of it similar to the critical tradition. He contends: 
A conception of the good as autonomy does not imply that the pursuit of all 
substantive conceptions of the good is equally valuable. Only those conceptions 
that have the right origins—those that have come about in ways that meet the 
criteria for self-determined belief—can form a basis for activity that has value. It 
is therefore unlikely that the good as autonomy will be advanced by distrusting 
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resources in a way that takes not account of the autonomous or non-autonomous 
origins of people‘s substantive conceptions of the good. (p. 131-132) 
 
The point that Barry is making centers on the contradiction in asserting that autonomy is 
value neutral, except in its privileging of activities and actions that encourage autonomy. 
 Another important point is how this critical tradition, which seeks to promote 
autonomy, leaves how one lives or is educated up to individuals. This is in contrast to the 
first tradition, which describes a conception of the good by appealing to class but leaves 
out individual rights. In both cases, Barry acknowledges the insights of the tradition, but 
he remains critical towards accepting all the elements of the tradition that may hamper 
broader efforts at achieving egalitarianism. What Barry says about autonomy has 
implications for Reich and his critical tradition, because Reich‘s choice to not define the 
good life as anything but an autonomous one leaves him open to the attack.  
 The point on value neutrality is crucial, as it must be addressed again in the 
context of a second order aim. Barry (1995) states, ―Autonomy…does not lead to 
neutrality between conceptions of the good, precisely because value is attributed only to 
those conceptions with the right pedigree‖ (p. 133). The move suggested here by Barry is 
not one picked up in the critical tradition of Reich and his colleagues. If they did move to 
this view, their position would be strengthened as the bias towards autonomy and 
pedigree of how one‘s choices are made would be avoided. However, this would seem to 
be an unlikely move as they are fully committed to educational and derivative political 
and civic programs based on this conception of the good as an autonomous choice. 
 Reich actually responds to Barry at one point, calling one of Barry‘s comments 
sarcastic. Yet, Barry did not mean it in a sarcastic manner. In fact, he would argue that he 
was simply applying the criteria of autonomy to a hypothetical person and then 
113 
 
            
extrapolating the psychological consequences to their logical end. Barry‘s (2001) 
comment to which Reich took such exception was:  
People who exhibit a high degree of autonomy, as that is understood by Galston, 
Kymlicka, Gutmann, and other contemporary political theorists, might well be 
regarded as psychologically disturbed by the American Psychiatric Association. 
According to the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-
IV), ‗the symptoms of Identity Problem (313.82)‘ include ‗uncertainty about… 
long-term goals, career choice, friendship patterns, sexual orientation and 
behavior, moral values and group loyalties‘. (p. 357) 
 
Barry‘s point is that this autonomous process of self-reflection needs boundaries that are 
rarely given by Reich and his critical tradition—boundaries which are critically important 
to education. If philosophy is the playing out of ideas to their logical ends, then Barry is 
on target with his jab and Reich is defensive because his position is in need of thorough 
defending.  
 It is important here to relay the footnote, where Reich made his comments to 
Barry‘s statement on autonomy. Reich asserts: 
37. Brian Barry sarcastically suggests that people who display a high degree of 
autonomy would be considered psychologically disturbed and deviant by the 
American Psychiatric Association. Such potshots reflect an unfortunate tendency 
among skeptics to view autonomy as something that leads to incessant self-
questioning; see Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2001) 357n.65. But highly autonomous persons, in my view, do not 
necessarily engage in constant self-doubt. Highly autonomous persons are secure 
in their endorsement of their first-order beliefs, values, and commitments and feel 
confident that they could subject their lives to critical reflection in the future, 
revising or rejecting certain values and commitments should they no longer seem 
worthy. (p. 243) 
 
This note is valuable in attempting to understand the difference between Reich and this 
critical tradition and Barry‘s contrasting views. Reich believes that there are reasonable 
limits to self-reflection, but he fails to state what criteria stop the endless questioning that 
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autonomous decision making starts. Barry, conversely, takes Reich‘s logic regarding 
autonomy to its endpoint and argues that there must be a boundary to autonomy‘s logic. 
 Another point of comparison between Barry and Reich, which is indicative of 
their different perspectives on autonomy, extends to their contrasting views about what 
states should do to remedy educational inequality. Reich footnoted the following section 
from Barry (Number 69 on p. 219), which is important because it endorses a much more 
radical view of governmental intervention than Reich is normally willing to grant. 
Barry‘s asserts that, if equal opportunity were a priority, private schools would not be 
allowed to spend more on their students than public schools. Barry‘s suggestion and 
Reich‘s footnoting of it without further comment shows that Reich may have some 
sympathy towards the view Barry expresses. However, the radical nature of the idea 
would indicate that it is unlikely to play a substantial part in Reich‘s reform agenda. 
 At this stage, it is important to consider how Barry might approach the autonomy 
based critical tradition. Clearly, he would agree with Reich that education is a critical 
element and a tool in improving the opportunities of the young. However, until 
educational, as well as structural economic, inequalities are remedied, talk of autonomy, 
no matter how big or small, is just talk. Further, Barry would see this emphasis on 
autonomy as possibly being harmful to students in that they will continue to receive more 
than their share of blame for not being able to succeed in an educational system that has 
come to accept the logic and rhetoric of personal responsibility. A focus on autonomy 
could feed into this destructive notion. 
 For Barry, the problem with this critical tradition is not in its insistence on letting 
students and people have the choices to make decisions over their lives. It is the move to 
115 
 
            
promoting autonomy over other values when it is a second-order concern that is 
problematic to Barry. The rationale for why this is problematic has been given throughout 
this chapter, but, to reiterate in no uncertain terms, the promotion of autonomy does not 
get society to a better place, even if autonomy for all was possible. Further, the focus on 
processes in decision making over any significant discussions of outcomes does not rise 
to a sufficient sense of purpose for Barry. There are, of course, caveats in this tradition 
that at various time say the choices have to be real and good, but this hedging misses the 
point revealed late in Reich‘s work that education for autonomy only works if 
educational inequality is greatly reduced. It is unfortunate that more is not said on this 
point as it would be much more compatible with Barry‘s ideas and a broader call for 
social and political reform. 
 The value Reich places on education would be lauded by Barry. However, the 
ease with which he justifies limits of state action to education would not be supported. 
Barry would suggest that circumstance such as one‘s birth would not be such a 
determinant factor in life chances if inequality was reduced. Another difference is that 
Barry would not allow the state to abrogate its duty to support stronger prenatal health 
efforts to minimize mental and physical disabilities among marginalized populations. 
What Barry finds problematic about Reich‘s theory of minimalist autonomy is that it is 
too closely related to educational factors to the exclusion of greater social and political 
reform. Not to mention, Barry believes that Reich‘s theory is only a part of achieving the 
conditions to promote autonomy and realize autonomous decisions in people‘s lives. 
 A final point of critique from Barry (2001) comes in his leeriness of a 
commitment by the state to promote autonomy allegedly in the spirit of John Stuart Mill:  
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It has become routine among contemporary political philosophers to use the term 
‗Millian liberalism‘ to refer to the view that it is the job of the state to promote 
autonomy. Yet it is clearly a travesty of Mill‘s position to identify him with any 
such view of the role of the state. This is not to say, of course, that Mill saw no 
connection between the development of an autonomous personality and the 
presence of liberal institution (p. 120) 
 
What Barry thinks is interesting here is that there is such a misunderstanding about how 
to arrive at autonomy and what else must underlie its foundation for it to have any 
significant meaning. He continues suggesting that many liberals seem to be advancing 
two competing philosophical aims. He states: 
Like Mill, contemporary liberals can, and do, regard it as an argument for 
liberalism that a liberal society makes individual autonomy possible. But it in no 
way commits them to the proposition that states should engage in compulsory 
inculcation of autonomy—and expression whose strangeness calls attention to the 
peculiarity of the whole project. (p. 120) 
 
Of course, the entire argument Reich builds is for the state to actively promote and 
inculcate students in autonomy. What Barry accepts and allows for here is that 
individuals may choose to act in all sorts of ways, and the state should not necessarily 
play the role Reich desires to get autonomy inculcation into schools.  
 Barry (2001) is also more open to other attitudes and perspectives that are not 
arrived at autonomously than Reich and the critical tradition. Whereas Reich ideally 
would have everyone come to every decision of importance in their life by autonomous 
means, Barry is much more pragmatic and circumspect. He advances a view that 
―institutions provide the conditions under which autonomy can flourish but they do not 
do anything directly to bring about the ‗ideal of autonomy‘… people who do not wish to 
devote themselves to Socratic questioning are perfectly free to do so‖ (p. 121). Barry‘s 
reminder should be a crucial point for Reich and this critical tradition to remember that 
individuals may choose not to participate in these processes of self-reflection and may 
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seek a different conception of the good that is at odds with the value neutral version of 
autonomy. 
 With the differences between Barry and Reich‘s critical tradition established, it is 
important to connect this discussion of autonomy to the destructive political rhetoric 
concerning personal responsibility. Returning to it at this point is useful as it can be seen 
in greater detail how the concept of personal responsibility is furthered by this critical 
tradition and the discourse around autonomy. The focus on autonomy in education and 
political debate inhibits the reduction of inequality, because it places blame for the 
differences among individuals and groups on the individuals who are already 
disadvantaged or left behind. The reason that Barry thinks this political rhetoric is so 
harmful is because it serves to justify inequality based on the choices one makes in life 
without regard for the actual choices students are provided within their lives.  
 If we return to the opening epigraphs and think of the many young people like 
D‘Angelo and Richard, one should be disheartened any time this rhetoric of personal 
responsibility is raised. Certainly, making decisions to run with the wrong crowd and not 
to pay attention in school are bad choices. However, for Barry, the notion of personal 
responsibility should not apply in the same way to children as it does to adults as their 
actions do not have the same weight of experience. Yet, the actions of children are held to 
a higher standard, and actions that inhibit success in school as a child have many 
dramatic and lifelong consequences that are not calculable for a youth. This does not stop 
many conservative (and sometimes moderate) social and political commentators from 
urging students to accept personal responsibility for their actions.  
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 Barry sees the irony of this deleterious rhetoric as expressing that the same 
individuals who demand personal responsibility out of children rarely consider who 
should take responsibility for the social and economic circumstances of these same 
students. This hypocrisy is evident in a society, which elevates personal responsibility for 
the young while passing on any discussion of societal responsibility or discussion of the 
choices individuals actually have. For Barry, this paradox demonstrates the absurdity of 
the contemporary educational and political predicament. Consequently, this discourse of 
personal responsibility should be shunned as it only further blames those individuals who 
are already systematically punished for their existing social position. Concomitantly, 
those believers in this critical tradition must consider what the political consequences are 
of their advocacy of autonomy given a political climate of personal responsibility.  
Conclusion 
 Undoubtedly, this critical tradition and its scholars‘ goal of autonomy are 
beneficent. However, as Barry‘s critique suggests, the notion of autonomy is still too 
academic in its relationship to the real world of life chances, opportunities, and 
inequalities for the students in public schools. Their notion of autonomy, minimalist or 
expansive, could be applicable to a society in which inequality is compressed—as Barry 
(1989, 1999, 2005) argues for—to a degree where individuals stand a reasonable chance 
of attaining similar life outcomes. However, at present, the focus on autonomy misses the 
target as an aim of educational systems and educational theory—especially in terms of 
inequality.  It seems that those who seek autonomy inculcating education will always be 
disappointed with the results they seek because those students who are most marginalized 
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will always start with more barriers on the path towards autonomous choices and an 
autonomous life. 
 For Barry, the values that scholars in this tradition seek to appeal to are important, 
but the desire for autonomy often lacks the vital steps towards social change required to 
improve the lot of the students who are being discussed. Even when reforms towards 
equality are suggested such as Brighouse‘s (2000) ideas about school vouchers, the 
political consequences are not adequately calculated. As the first examples of this 
tradition show, there is a certain detachment from the present circumstances of education 
today. This is something that is not a problem with the ideas of either the class or identity 
scholars, but, in the liberals‘ case, there is some distance from the everyday that can be 
off-putting in terms of the passion for change. From a philosophical perspective, this 
distance exists because these are thought experiments that are to be discussed and refined. 
For liberals, the crisis of education is often more about the problems on the horizon than 
immediate circumstances.  
 For Barry, the persistent issue that deserves further attention is that a conception 
of the good seems to be lacking in Reich‘s theory. Where do moral and ethical values 
enter this education for autonomy? Autonomy seems not ethically robust enough to be a 
central educational aim above others. Therefore, the next question that comes to mind is 
this: what separates the value of neutrality from that of autonomy? This seems to be a key 
relationship as Reich sees a substantial break from the orthodox liberal tradition that may 
not be as large as he would want. Again, it is problematic if Reich is going to backpedal 
from Rawls to say that orthodox liberal neutrality towards what the good life is in a 
liberal democracy is not a sufficient public philosophy. How then does creating 
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autonomous students who grow into young citizens who have the skills of self-reflection 
and critical bearings to choose whatever way of life they want differ from the kinds of 
autonomous people that Reich thinks political theorists have erred in using for all these 
years? For Barry, it would seem that Reich has fallen victim to the same problem that 
others (Sandel, 2009; Geuss, 2008) have taken Rawls to task for, which is not having 
explicit ethical attitudes towards different types of ways of living.  
 To sum, this chapter has described the elements of a critical tradition in 
educational scholarship that appeals to autonomy in service of addressing educational 
inequality. Further, Barry‘s views on autonomy and personal responsibility were 
presented in contrast to this critical tradition‘s views and aims of education. The next 
chapter discusses the critical tradition that appeals to notions of identity in confronting 
educational inequality.
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
CRITICAL APPROACHES TO INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION: 
APPEALS TO IDENTITY 
 
 This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the origins of the critical tradition 
that appeals to identity in relationship to educational inequality. The next section then 
discusses several scholars‘ works that serve as exemplars of the tradition. The focus in 
this part is on student resistance to the discourse, authentic support for its goals, the 
complexity of negotiating multiple identities, and oppression. The following section 
examines Barry‘s work on identity and his critique of notions of equal opportunity. It 
concludes with an analysis of the implications of these ideas in the context of educational 
inequality. 
 The origins of this critical tradition grew out of a number of interrelated trends—
both academic and political. The political trends grew out of the 1960s, which saw 
increased diversity in higher education admissions and, eventually, in faculties. As 
faculties and student populations began to include perspectives from marginalized 
populations, the importance of identity became a focus of scholarship, starting in 
departments of African-American, Hispanic, and Women‘s studies. This increased focus 
on identity had an influence on educational scholarship, which began to reflect the 
diversity of student populations in schools and the challenges faced by minority 
populations.  
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 From the academic and theoretical side, a greater diversity of scholars‘ views 
began to be incorporated into scholarship, such as works by Franz Fanon and early 
feminist scholars, which changed the taken for granted assumptions about power, status, 
and identity in social relations. Additionally, college curriculums began to diversify their 
requirements to include non-western history, philosophy, and religion courses. Many 
critics, such as Allan Bloom (1987), decried these changes and claimed that the heritage 
of the west was being replaced with political correctness. However, these opponents did 
not dissuade this growing academic movement. Instead, this critical educational tradition 
incorporated many of the ideas of critical theory and began to adapt them for use in 
education with special attention given to the elements having to do with identity.  
Identity and Critical Educational Scholarship 
 Educational scholarship that works within this tradition draws heavily on the 
identity discourse—specifically in terms of how one thinks of oneself and how one is 
perceived by others as to group membership on numerous axes of difference.  Further, 
this concept of identity maps onto the related and interdependent fields of multicultural 
education and diversity. Group membership in either ―oppressed‖ or ―oppressor‖ social 
identities or in ―advantaged‖ versus ―targeted‖ status is crucial language in understanding 
this appeal to identity. This tradition of scholarship focuses on identity as being socially 
constructed (Hacking, 1999) often along the lines of one‘s gender, race, ethnic 
background, religious belief, or linguistic heritage (Adams, Bell, & Griffin, 2007; Banks, 
2007; Clabaugh, 2007; Glazer 1997; hooks, 1994; Macedo, 2000; Torres, 2009).   
 A recent exemplar of this tradition, which relays its philosophical and strategic 
aims, involves identity, multiculturalism, and social justice. The piece comes as an open 
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letter that appeared in Phi Delta Kappan, where Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009) expressed 
their frustration with colleagues who rhetorically support appeals to identity through 
social justice education, but who do not seem to see the gravity of such work and its 
importance to the discourse of inequality in education. The struggle they speak of is 
important as it indicates the difficulty that supporters of this tradition often face in 
advancing their work and the overall goals of social justice. Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009) 
relay their surprise in facing barriers from their colleagues who may lack knowledge of 
this critical tradition. Two factors are significant—that of student resistance as well as 
that of colleagues. Consequently, this critical tradition often must frame its work as 
meeting resistance from many sources. They believe that resistance is due to an 
individual or group‘s lack of understanding about issues of identity and social justice. A 
central part of the critical tradition is educating those who put up this resistance. 
 From this initial point, Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009) then describe their 
conception of social justice, their underlying commitment to identity, and the discourse of 
oppression. They state, ―Oppression describes policies, practices, norms, and traditions 
that systematically exploit one social group (the target group) by another (the dominant 
group) for the dominant group‘s benefit‖ (p. 345). This contention is evidenced by 
substantial empirical data. The tradition suggests that one would have to be willfully 
blind to the power of elites over others and to the stratification of societies in the United 
States and around the world to believe otherwise.  
 Next, they relay how the logic of the field gets broken down: ―Common shorthand 
within the discipline is: Prejudice + Power = Oppression‖ (Sensoy & DiAngelo, 2009, p. 
345). This statement is supplemented by their belief that prejudice, power, and 
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oppression do not exist in isolation. Further, they acknowledge that the elements of 
power implied in the equation are more complex standard accounts of top down power. 
 From this tack, Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009) then attempt to open another line of 
the discourse by describing how individuals can have multiple identities—some of which 
may be at odds in terms of power and status in society: 
 Individuals can belong simultaneously to both dominant and target groups, for 
 example, we (the authors) are both women and white. The disadvantages of being 
 women do not cancel out the advantages of being white, and a key project of 
 social justice education is to help untangle the complexity in ways in which these 
 locations work together to hold oppression in place. (p. 346) 
 
Their point is that the work of social justice must be a process of reflection upon one‘s 
position and must evaluate elements of identity, as well as how these characteristics have 
different meanings and values in different social settings. Further, this argument shows 
how this critical tradition attempts to demonstrate that students must work through 
multiple identities as a key part of their educational reform efforts. 
  It is now important to focus back on the barriers to social justice and appeals to 
identity that Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009) face in their own schools and departments. 
They rightly point out that many educational researchers and professors have a rhetorical 
and often shallow level of support for social justice and appeals to identity. For Sensoy 
and DiAngelo (2009), rhetorical support does not matter and faculty can halt ―every 
endeavor toward achieving social justice if it is inconvenient, uncomfortable, or impinges 
on resources or positions to which we feel entitled. It is not enough for faculty to be for 
social justice in theory without concrete and intentional practices‖ (p. 347). For these 
authors, what constitutes support of social justice and identity must be actions. Hence, 
they would require not just using a mission statement that encourages having a diverse 
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faculty, but actually hiring a diverse faculty. This critical tradition demands that action be 
taken if the commitments to the ideas are genuine. Otherwise, expressions of support are 
just meaningless platitudes at best and coy obstructionism at worst. The theme of 
supportive action over supportive words comes through in this selection. In fact, the 
follow-on point is that one should not be able to claim to be an advocate for social justice 
without taking action to support it. They want to remove the veneer of support for social 
justice from individuals and institutions that appear to be for it, but that are unwilling to 
stand up for the cause. 
 Next, they move from the disingenuous attitudes that are felt from their 
colleagues to the institutional voice through the mission of the school itself. Here, they 
are critical not of the hollow support of colleagues, but in the less than active missions of 
institutions. Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009) contend that ―Many schools of education list 
social justice as a programmatic value in their mission statements...Putting the term in 
your mission statement while having no specific goals, no system for measuring progress, 
or no accountability renders it meaningless‖ (p. 349). The point Sensoy and DiAngelo are 
trying to make is clear. They do not want something included about social justice unless 
it is going to be a priority and actions are taken to achieve it.  
 Next, it is crucial to turn to why there may be resistance to taking action on social 
justice in a school of education. Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009) explore an example from 
their own experience—in this case, the addition of a male faculty person to a committee. 
They write, ―Given the deeply embedded patterns based on our social locations, simply 
adding a member of the dominant group will not ensure inclusive and just practice. 
Dominant group members bring their patterns of privilege with them‖ (p. 350). They are 
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concerned with the addition of a male colleague appointed just for the appearance of 
diversity on the committee. The problem they see is that merely adding a member of the 
dominant group ignores the historical and continuing power dynamics of gender and 
oppression. Such efforts for diversity may have sincere aims, but they often show a lack 
of understanding of this critical tradition and its understanding of power relations. 
 Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009) address the theme of identity and group affiliation in 
understanding educational inequality with this passage: 
 Every single measure of disparity in education is tied to group position – target 
 vs. dominant. Special education and discipline referrals, math, science, and 
 reading literacies; graduation and dropout/push-out rates; test scores, all of what is 
 known as ―the  achievement gap‖ are tied to race, class, gender. This disparity is 
 real. And to ameliorate such disparities and offer meaningful leadership in 
 school contexts at all levels, we must attend to the real, to the concrete and 
 active dimensions—not simply slogans. (p. 350, emphasis in original)  
 
Again, though, the issues of how these circumstances can be changed and what rhetoric 
can be used to muster the political will needed to advance the dialogue are still struggling 
to be developed. This point is acknowledged by this critical tradition. The interventions 
that have been promoted to address persistent differences in achievement are still met 
with resistance and questions about their efficacy. In short, the rhetoric of dominant vs. 
target groups can have difficulty in building the broad coalitions that are needed to 
adequately transform the schools most in need of infusions of resources. 
 Near the end of the article, Sensoy and DiAngelo (2009) describe what the 
elements of social justice practice are and, in doing so, emphasize elements of identity. 
Their social justice has several key features that ―address the dynamics of oppression, 
privilege, and isms, recognizing that society is the product of historically rooted, 
institutionally sanctioned stratification along socially constructed group lines that include 
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race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and ability‖ (p. 350). They believe that these 
barriers must be challenged at every stage of the educational process. Further, they assert 
that, ―Working for social justice in education means guiding students in critical self-
reflection of their socialization into this matrix of unequal relationships and its 
implications, analysis of the mechanisms of oppression, and the ability to challenge these 
hierarchies‖ (p. 350). Again, the reflective nature of this discourse is demonstrated 
especially in its focus on teaching about the overt and hidden forms of oppression that 
operate in schools and the workplace. 
 It is important to now turn from the discussion of this exemplar that describes the 
appeal to identity to their colleagues to a text widely used in undergraduate and graduate 
courses. A well known text in this critical tradition is Teaching for Diversity and Social 
Justice (2007), which represents the main themes and trends in the appeal to identity. In 
it, Adams, Bell, and Griffin (2007) demonstrate the commonality of the tradition in the 
use of certain guiding concepts that are the foundations of the field, although they are 
quick to make sure that everyone knows that there is not one absolute definition or set of 
terms to use in describing social relations. The editors relay the tension in this discourse 
over the language that should be used. They state, ―We recognize that any terminology 
we use to describe human beings within the phenomenon of oppression will be 
problematic. The binary terms oppressor and oppressed, for example, may raise 
resistance from participants who cannot reconcile themselves as oppressors‖ (p. xx). As 
such, they struggle to find agreement among the contributors for a single set of terms. 
Another point of note here is the manner in which they are leery of using overly 
confrontational language in describing the groups that make up the system. This 
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alternation in using language they consider more invitational seems to be an effective 
strategy for attempting to build broader coalitions of support. Further, the terms are 
meant to be analytical ways of understanding how inequality comes to be and how it 
maintains its grip on people. The point of this effort would be to have the oppressors or 
advantaged individuals become enlightened and change their modes of prejudiced action. 
Therefore, this definitional exercise in the preface, which acknowledges the disagreement 
among social justice and identity educators, is important.  
 The editors then move to one of the most important contributions of the field and 
one to which there is less philosophical tension. Here, Adams, Bell, and Griffin (2007) 
describe an essential part of the identity gambit by relaying the importance of a group‘s 
ability to name itself and define its membership. They assert, ―We know that naming is a 
necessarily fluid and sometimes confusing process as people/groups insist on defining 
themselves rather than acquiesce to names imposed by others…the power to name 
oneself is an important aspect of group identity and resistance‖ (p. xxi). This statement 
demonstrates that respecting the self-determination and choice of terms to classify 
oneself as a member of a group is an empowering step for those individuals and groups 
who are constantly marginalized by others. Further, given the often derogatory terms 
used to describe marginalized populations, the reclamation of terms is thought to be a co-
opting of the normal power hierarchies and dynamics.  
In one of the volume‘s first chapters, Bell (2007) begins to flesh out the specifics 
of identity and, here, the educational implications begin to appear. They write that 
―neither individual identities nor social groups are homogenous or stable. Individuals are 
formed partly through group relations and affinities‖ (p.10). This point is important as the 
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notion of fluidity of identity is a substantial advance in understanding human relations in 
and among groups. This fluid and malleable nature of identity seems to get lost by some 
critics of the tradition as the discussion moves from specific characteristics to broad 
generalizations.  
 Bell (2007) continues by discussing the complications that members of certain 
groups may feel towards individuals who transcend their oppressive membership to be 
advocates for equal treatment. These include: 
Members of advantaged groups may also engage in horizontal hostility toward 
members of their own group who defy the status quo. For example, white people 
who openly name and critique racist practices may be labeled by other whites as 
troublemakers, extremists, or bleeding hearts. Pressure against rocking the boat or 
making trouble can discourage dominants from challenging inequality and 
discrimination and lead them block change. Ultimately, people from advantaged 
groups can perpetuate the status quo by simply doing nothing. (p. 12) 
 
This is a challenging prospect that connects back to the earlier discussion about 
authenticity and commitment to social justice. That is, members of dominant groups in 
this instance may not want to risk their own standing and social status to serves as allies 
and advocates of social justice, especially considering that the consequence for inaction is 
often more success. 
 The next relevant example of this critical tradition comes from Hardiman and 
Jackson (2007) in Teaching for Diversity and Social Justice. They explain how 
advantaged individuals can come to accept a version of social justice education that alters 
their world view: ―This is a dramatic paradigm shift from an ideology that blames the 
victims for their condition to an ideology that names one‘s own agent group as the source 
of oppression…Furthermore, agents begin investigating their own role in perpetuating 
oppression.‖ (p. 26). This process is undoubtedly a positive outcome and a crucial step 
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towards social justice. The authors are aware that this process is quite lengthy and often 
pedagogically challenging, but, in their view, the alternative of letting the status quo 
continue is unacceptable. 
 Hardiman and Jackson (2007) then discuss the differences in identity that change 
over one‘s life span based on events. They contend that people have competing ―social 
identities that are disadvantaged by some forms of oppression and privileged by others. 
Because our membership in oppressor or oppressed groups can change during our 
lifetime, our relative status in relationship to our multiple identities is not static‖ (p. 42). 
Yet, this step forward in understanding is complicated by the multiplicity of one‘s 
identity and how certain identities may understandably override individuals‘ perception 
of themselves and others. Griffin (1997), in the previous edition of the text, describes 
how this process of attaching to one targeted identity over a dominant one is a challenge 
in social justice education: ―Some participants have a difficult time thinking about 
themselves from the perspective of their agent identities. This is often true for students 
who are very much attuned to and angry about one or more of their targeted identities‖ 
(p. 293). This is a crucial point as an individual‘s membership in one group can further 
social and economic standing, but other memberships would be at odds with others‘ 
viewing the individual in the same way. Further, these memberships and conflicts also 
have a geographical component that changes the dynamics of privilege and oppression 
again.  
 It is now useful to turn to another volume for further exploration of this critical 
tradition.  Diane Goodman‘s (2001) Promoting Diversity and Social Justice: Educating 
People from Privileged Groups focuses on the importance of reaching out to privileged 
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individuals in teaching social justice. She speaks to why this is vital, claiming that 
―People from privileged groups who are allies can influence decision making, allocate 
funds, share needed skills and knowledge, and be role models for other dominant group 
members to support equity‖ (p. 2). Building these coalitions and connections through 
education is thought to be the most significant way of ensuring sustainability in this 
effort. 
 The final element of this work that is important to address and which connects 
back to the earlier discussion of resistance is the way in which resistance to social justice 
and identity ideas is dealt with in classrooms. The resistance is easy to identify in some 
students, but the frustration with it seems to indicate this does not happen on a regular 
basis in such courses—at least for Goodman (2001): ―Resistance can be one of the most 
difficult aspects of educating about diversity and social justice. Often we feel angry at 
resistant behavior and frustrated with the individuals…It becomes hard to like or connect 
with people who are being resistant‖ (p. 64). Here, the added aspect is the way in which 
instructors must come to terms with resistance. Goodman is concerned with how 
educators working for these goals must balance standing up to oppressive voices while at 
the same time working to tear down the barriers of prejudice that students have built. 
 This section has discussed the critical tradition in educational scholarship that 
appeals to notions of identity. It has described the challenges of student resistance to the 
discourse, authentic support for its goals, complexity of negotiating multiple identities, 
and educational strategies used to confront oppression from privileged groups. The 
underlying connections of identity and social justice were also explored. The following 
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section addresses Barry‘s ideas about identity and relates them to his discussion of equal 
opportunity. 
Barry on Identity and Equal Opportunity  
 
 This section presents Barry‘s work on the topic of identity as well as the allied 
concept of equal opportunity. He is particularly concerned that this latter notion is used to 
justify inequality and unfair treatment based on both individual and group identity. It 
concludes by relating each discussion back to the present educational circumstances. 
 A key concern for Barry (2001) in his discussion of identity and related 
multicultural efforts is that inequalities will grow unaddressed when group specific 
agendas are advanced. In particular, he raises a point on what can happen when dividing 
up identities leads to split interests and demands on the state. He asserts, ―The 
proliferation of special interests fostered by multiculturalism is, furthermore, conducive 
to a politics of ‗divide and rule‘ that can only benefit those who benefit most from the 
status quo‖ (p. 11). This strategy is employed on an almost constant basis by federal and 
state governments that require competitive lobbying for funds and resources. Barry 
continues this line of thought: ―There is no better way of heading off the nightmare of 
unified political action by the economically disadvantaged that might issue in common 
demands than to set different groups of the disadvantaged against one another‖ (p.11). 
Barry feels this has grave implications for education action as well. Although broad 
coalitions do often come into existence over educational achievement gaps and the 
quality of education provided in urban and rural areas, Barry‘s core point holds because 
the economic coalition needed for substantial economic change has yet to coalesce into a 
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vibrant political movement. This lack of a base of support for substantial economic 
change undercuts educational reform. 
 Barry (2001) is further convinced that more attention to collaborative efforts of 
empowerment in the public discourse on a broad based progressive social agenda is 
required over identity based group affiliations. He is aware of the often rancorous 
political debates that occur around identity based public campaigns and thinks that they 
can provide distractions from broader efforts towards progress on economic, political, 
and education fronts. His point is one of concreteness and universality. He asserts, 
―Diverting attention away from shared disadvantages such as employment, poverty, low-
quality housing and inadequate public services is an obvious long-term anti-egalitarian 
objective. If political effort is dissipated…it will not be available for mobilization on the 
basis of broader shared interests‖ (p. 11-12). Barry‘s (2001) worry is that the politics of 
identity, which can have benevolent aims in both gaining respect from dominant cultures 
and receiving a fair share of benefits from the state, can often weaken the politics of 
redistribution. That is, efforts to claim special privileges and allotments from the 
government undercut the broader economic and social struggles that cut across other 
markers of difference, making economic empowerment more difficult to achieve. Hence, 
Barry does not think this point of redistribution is sufficiently taken up by the critical 
educational tradition that appeals to identity.  
 From a slightly different perspective, Barry is also concerned with how cultural 
identity is attached to behavior and action. He is quite troubled by the all too easy slide 
from cultural affiliation to a sense of cultural determinism. This cultural determinism 
implies that all members of a culture have certain characteristics in their actions and 
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behaviors simply because they identify as members of a certain cultural or ethnic group. 
It is important here to draw back to Barry‘s (2001) critique of culture as simply being a 
genetic inheritance from the previous discussion as it bears on this question of identity: 
Cultural identity is, thus, attributed to people on the basis of descent…it denies 
what has always before been the core belief of the left (whether in its liberal or 
socialist forms), the idea that there is a common emancipatory project equally 
available to the whole of humanity and equally valuable for all. (p. 261) 
 
The point raised is that identity and social justice scholars have to balance the aim of 
celebrating the diversity of populations and their unique cultural traditions with 
advancing a platform of social progress that may conflict with some groups‘ cultural 
norms. This is a compelling point of view, which Barry acknowledges, but he believes 
that it provides too much space for inequality to grow among groups because dominant 
groups can marginalize many small groups easier than one diverse group based on 
solidarity. Further, Barry is also worried that the respect that the politics of identity can 
give to cultural traditions per se can allow for abuses by the leaders of the groups, which 
are often patriarchal. Here, he is concerned with the possible misogynistic actions against 
the full rights of women, the exploitation of children in service of the culture, or the 
entrenchment of social position due to rigid caste status of certain groups that could be 
protected under the banner of respecting a group‘s cultural tradition. 
 Barry (2001) continues developing this theme in the following statement relating 
his concern about identity via the discourse of multiculturalism. He explains, ―The error 
that I have in mind, which underlies the multiculturalist diagnosis and therefore 
invalidates its proposed cures, is the endemic tendency to assume that distinctive cultural 
attributes are the defining feature of all groups‖ (p. 305). It must be mentioned here that 
Barry is not discouraging group identity as a form of social and cultural support for 
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members who have been marginalized. Nor is he seeking to promote some form of 
cultural homogenization that would reduce diversity of cultural patterns. Quite to the 
contrary, Barry thinks that groups can pursue many of their self-developed goals with 
great effectiveness if they wage political battles for greater economic support through 
broader social movements. Again, he sees the overreliance on cultural identity as harming 
a group‘s long-term aims. Further, he thinks that these groups miss other causes of 
unequal outcomes because of the focus on group identity: ―The consequence of this 
‗culturalization‘ of group identities is the systematic neglect of alternative causes of 
group disadvantage‖ (p. 305). These causes of disadvantage are rooted in structural 
economic and political practices that are even more difficult to overturn. 
 Barry (2001) furthers this line of critique in even more straightforward terms 
regarding how culture has come to be seen as the primary marker of inequality. He 
asserts that ―‗culturalization‘ of groups inevitably leads to the conclusion that all 
disadvantage stems from the ‗misrecognition‘ of a group‘s culture. This way of thinking 
leads those who indulge in it to be blind to the most important causes of group 
disadvantage‖ (p. 308). Again, he sees these other causes as the systemic underfunding 
and resourcing of non-elite communities. He is conscious of the role played by race, 
ethnicity, and prejudice against marginalized groups, but he thinks that these elements 
only further support his point that a broader coalition is necessary to confront the 
inequalities that result from unequal treatment. 
 Barry‘s (2001) work is quite sensitive to the importance of understanding cultural 
difference and the power of individual and group identity. Yet, he (1995, 2001, 2005) is 
also aware of the political complications of appeals to identity in that dominant groups 
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often attempt to use such work and related political movements to further marginalize 
non-dominant groups with allegations that they are revising history, are unpatriotic, or are 
indoctrinating students in socialist ideology and not teaching content. Consequently, it is 
crucial here to move back to the underlying problem that Barry (2001) has with this 
appeal to identity through multiculturalism. It is that Barry cannot square the special 
claims groups make with the need for a broader social movement. He puts it this way: 
Pursuit of the multiculturalist agenda makes the achievement of broadly based 
egalitarian policies more difficult in two ways. At minimum, it diverts political 
effort away from universalistic goals. But a more serious problem is that 
multiculturalism may very well destroy the conditions for putting together a 
coalition in favour of across-the-board equalization of opportunities and 
resources. (p. 325) 
 
 Barry also sees this as a possible problem in the implementation of identity 
politics and multiculturalism that has been seen in the political debate around school and 
higher education curriculums. There have certainly been increases in the diversity of 
sources drawn upon in both settings to have curriculums better reflect the perspectives 
and interests of the entire populations of students which he supports. However, even with 
these expansions, the levels of inequality among groups have continued to exist and, in 
some cases, grow. As such, Barry sees a broader coalition as the most likely way to 
positively succeed in achieving a group‘s goals for educational advancement as well as in 
creating a more egalitarian society. 
 Barry (2005) also thinks that the splintering of coalitions for public services 
makes the base of support for public institutions smaller, resulting in less support for all 
marginalized populations. He states with relation specifically to schools,  
Cultural minorities might be non-competitive in getting publicly funded schools 
of their own or perhaps having other bits of public provision put under their 
control. But this kind of paternalistic focus will still tend to make cultural 
137 
 
            
minorities weak partners in endeavours to redistribute income from rich to poor 
across the board or to improve the quality of schools and other public services 
generally. (p. 325) 
 
 What Barry (2005) is most worried about is how all these identity based efforts 
for reform do not alter the systems that created the inequalities in the first place. He sees 
this as a flaw that only allows another sliver of the population to receive better treatment 
and some redistribution of resources. In contrast to this view, Barry wants a much more 
substantial change and relays his frustrations thusly: ―The point about group-based 
preferences can be generalized. At best, all they can ever do is achieve a minor 
reshuffling of the characteristics of individuals occupying different locations in an 
unchanged structure that creates grossly unequal incomes and opportunities‖ (p. 326). For 
Barry, without a fundamental restructuring of the unjust systems that continue to 
disadvantage and marginalize certain groups, identity based claims will only rearrange 
minimal opportunities.  
 Further, Barry thinks that there are additional consequences that are unaccounted 
for by members of this critical tradition. The main one is that conservatives are able to 
demonize such efforts and then question the success of individuals from marginalized 
groups as fulfilling a quota or giving in to political correctness. This conservative gambit 
is what Barry wants to avoid in his pursuit of reducing inequality to levels where equal 
opportunity would have some genuine relevance. He writes, ―Not only does it do nothing 
to change the structure of unequal opportunities and outcomes, it actually entrenches it by 
embroiling those in the lower reaches of the distribution in internecine warfare‖ (p. 326). 
In avoiding conflict and competition among groups, Barry believes the common causes 
of marginalized groups will be better served in politics and education. 
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 In summing up his work in this volume, Barry (2005) reiterates his passion of 
promoting equality. He is not against multiculturalism for any other reason than he does 
not think it will help those who are supposed to be served by its promotion. He sees it as 
fueling an unnecessary culture war that distracts from a broader social and economic 
struggle, which requires a fundamental structural change of the political system. Such 
change requires a much broader collation than claims to identity and multiculturalism are 
able to offer. He concludes: ―multiculturalism poses as many problems as it solves…it 
cannot in the nature of the case address the huge inequalities in opportunities and 
resources that disfigure—and increasingly dominate—societies such as those of Britain 
and the United States‖ (p. 328). For Barry, the appeal to identity underwrites the politics 
of multiculturalism. 
 It is crucial to now connect this discussion of identity to that of equal opportunity. 
Barry believes that equal opportunity is another concept that has been co-opted and now 
harms egalitarian interests similar to the previously discussed notions of meritocracy and 
personal responsibility. For him, the current levels of inequality in the United States and 
around the world cannot be thought to provide individuals from vastly different economic 
and educational backgrounds with equal opportunities for employment and future life 
chances. To think that individuals who attend Harbor City High and St. Paul‘s have equal 
opportunities is to discount a host of factors that provides massive cumulative advantages 
to the latter group over the former. Barry thinks the continued use of the concept masks 
deeper divisions in the resources that unfairly harm individuals and groups who are 
already disadvantaged.  
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 To remedy this, Barry (2005) is interested in educational and political efforts that 
might reduce this inequality to give the notion of equal opportunity some sense of 
relevance. He suggests a starting point: ―If I am correct in arguing the pathologies of 
inequality…are especially strongly driven by inequalities of wealth, it would surely be 
worth quite a lot to reduce the number and size of large fortunes‖ (p. 192). Beyond this 
effort to reduce the exponential wealth expansion, he believes it is necessary to make 
improvements on the bottom end as well. Here, it must be remembered that Barry is a 
strong advocate for compressing wealth inequalities and reminding observers that 
differences in wealth matter. He contends, ―Even if we were to give up on the possibility 
of promoting equalization by greatly reducing the amount of wealth at the top, we could 
still take measures to increase ownership at the bottom‖ (p. 193). This would be a good 
first step towards true equal opportunity. 
 Barry (2005) suggests that a simple wealth transfer from the richest to the poorest 
citizens would help to create a much more genuine sense of equal opportunity: 
A way of rescuing some elements of equal opportunity despite gross inequalities 
of wealth would be to provide each person with a capital grant at the age of (say) 
18 . . . [which] has the potential to make a big difference to the set of 
opportunities available. (p. 193) 
 
The notion of these small payments raising the level of resources of those at the lower 
end of the economic spectrum would accomplish the critical task of beginning to 
compress wealth inequality. In educational contexts, Barry suggests this would provide 
marginalized students with the needed assistance to pursue and complete higher 
education, given its increasing costs, and would relieve some of the burdens of working 
while in college or university. 
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 Additionally, Barry (2005) is not willing to let conservative critics off the hook 
for propagating the notion that unequal outcomes are directly tied to poor decisions by 
marginalized groups. Barry relays that there is a persistent discourse of blame in the 
discussion of poverty. He states that ―the ideology that underwrites unequal outcomes 
insists that poor people are poor simply because they make dumb choices from the 
opportunities open to them‖ (p. 193-194). This notion is something Barry seeks to rebut 
through innovative policy solutions that support greater egalitarianism. 
 The final element of Barry‘s ideas on identity and equal opportunity has to do 
with the state‘s responsibility to address systematic and cumulative disadvantages that are 
created by the present circumstances. As discussed previously, Barry and this critical 
tradition do not differ on the merits of this point; instead, they differ on how best to 
achieve the political capacity to ensure greater support of those groups and individuals 
who have been marginalized. He concludes with a call for greater state action to remedy 
the present inequality of circumstances: 
Qualifications for good jobs, in turn, should arise from equal opportunities to 
obtain them. We know that this condition does not hold, and could never hold 
fully because, even under the most favourable conditions, there would still be 
congenital handicaps, diseases and injuries that would hold some people back. 
Social justice demands compensation for these disadvantages. (p. 200) 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has discussed the work of a critical educational tradition that appeals 
to identity in attempting to address educational inequality. The remainder of the chapter 
discusses Barry‘s work on identity and his critique of equal opportunity. It is important to 
remember Barry‘s insistence that there seems to be a lack of awareness among identity 
advocates that, in many other places on campuses—not to mention corporate 
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boardrooms, conversations about cultural identity and social justice would be met with 
condescension and dismissiveness at the advocates‘ naïveté. The point here is that the 
least of this tradition‘s opponents are the colleagues at their schools and department 
meetings; rather, who should be considered most inimical to their values are the 
individuals and groups they do not know and who could care less if the social justice and 
identity based advocates exist at all. Barry‘s pessimism is not meant to attack the aims of 
social justice, but to simply illustrate the stakes of the battle, as well as how asymmetrical 
and successful it continues to be for the elites. 
 To conclude, as attention is diverted from a broad based struggle for greater 
equality, the same political forces that use notions of meritocracy and personal 
responsibility can use equal opportunity to marginalize each small claim for rights and 
resources of a special group. Elite interests can then proceed with business as usual by 
not addressing a broader based call for reform. Further, they can hide behind the rhetoric 
of equal opportunity and deny that identity has anything to do with inequality. Hence, 
they can state that everyone has an equal chance for success even though the conditions 
of educational attainment and employment remain geared to benefit those individuals 
who already have the most advantages. Without a move to reject this logic, the political 
conversation around equality will remain stuck between the bounds of these confined 
terms that only serve to propagate inequality. In light of this broken political 
conversation, the final chapter will directly return to the aims of Barry (1995, 2005, 
2008) and his ideas for educational progress and egalitarianism.
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
THE FUTURE OF CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 
 
 The final chapter has elements that rearticulate and sum up the aim of this 
dissertation, which has been to present three dominant critical traditions in educational 
scholarship (that appeal to class, autonomy, and identity) and discuss them in the context 
of Brian Barry‘s work on meritocracy, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity. To 
this end, the first part of the chapter considers the consequences for education and society 
if inequality continues to grow. The next section reiterates the commonalities of the 
critical traditions that have been discussed throughout the study and reflects on why 
Barry‘s critique of their underlying positions is beneficial to a common understanding of 
the importance of educational and political theory. The chapter concludes by turning back 
to Barry‘s ideas from his most recent works as paths for educational reform and social 
progress and by articulating why a new critical discourse in educational scholarship may 
be needed. 
Inequality Unabated 
 Inequalities, specifically educational inequalities, are on the rise (Heymann & 
Beem, 2005; Hytrek & Zentgraf, 2008). Without concrete and substantial steps to turn 
away from ―free market‖ solutions to educational and economic problems, neoliberalism 
threatens the future of this country and its claim to democratic government (Irvin, 2008; 
Jacobs, 2004). As inequality increases, the potential for social, political, and ecological 
catastrophe increases as well (Jacobs & Skocpol, 2005). The status quo is not holding, 
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but this does not mean a positive revolution is on the horizon. In fact, the most recent 
financial bust proves the point that, even with dire economic circumstances, there are few 
calls to radically change the economic and political systems, structures, and institutions 
that led to the crisis, which now threatens educational and social spending throughout the 
country (Karelis, 2007; Lindsey, 2009).  
 There are, of course, some limited calls for reform, but these are largely the 
efforts of politicians trying to cash in on the failures of previous incumbents (Sadurski, 
2008). Even with the economic collapse, it would be political suicide for most politicians 
to call for a substantial redistribution of wealth through changes in the federal tax code—
for example, a return to the levels of the 1950s or even before Reagan‘s Administration 
(Gratez & Shapiro, 2005; Royce, 2009; Shapiro, 2002). The greatest triumph of 
neoliberalism (and the most perverse legacy of the Reagan Revolution) is its ability to 
survive and thrive in the wake of its own destructive path (Lowndes, 2008; Shor, 1986). 
One would think that the failures of the political, economic, and educational systems 
based on a blind faith in ―free markets‖ would erode as social conditions of inequality 
increased, but this has not happened (Baker, 2007, 2009; Sieber, 2005; Thompson, 2007). 
The reasons for this resoluteness in adherence to the ideology of neoliberalism are 
unfortunately clear (American Political Science Association, 2004; Andrain & Smith, 
2006; Bartels, 2008; Herman & Chomsky, 2002). The media and educational systems are 
complicit in providing support to the dominance of ―free market‖ values as the public 
philosophy of the United States regardless of the consequences to the poor and ever fewer 
members of the middle-class (Ansolagbehere & Snyder, 2008; Arrow, Bowles, & 
Durlauf, 2000).  
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 The United States has never distributed wealth and political power in a just 
manner, but the gains of Roosevelt‘s New Deal and Johnson‘s Great Society showed the 
promise of using the machinery of government to ameliorate grotesque institutionalized 
inequality. Unfortunately, the creation and expansion of the modern welfare state 
spawned a heartless backlash from conservative politicians and supporting business 
interests (Lowndes, 2008). The conservative restoration resisted attempts at redistribution 
through increased educational funding of schools and higher education, as well as 
programs such as Head Start. Further, conservative voices sought to discredit these 
policies and the politicians who supported them with the epithet of liberalism. These 
efforts to dismantle public education and the welfare state were supported by a political 
strategy focused on convincing the public that economic and political inequalities are 
justifiable (Madrick, 2009; Philips, 2008). Perversely, the middle and working class are 
told that they are at risk of losing their ―freedom‖ and ―liberty‖ through taxation and 
―excessive‖ government spending on education for those who are less fortunate and live 
in other parts of town, when in fact such spending would often benefit them (Page & 
Simmons, 2000). The newest aspect of this agenda can accomplish contractions of public 
investment in education and related services, through financial exigency, when ―free 
market‖ economic crises require it. Without substantial alteration to the educational and 
political systems, the country risks reaching a point where the spaces for democratic 
discussion become strained and increasingly untenable (Hindman, 2009; Sandel, 1996; 
Skocpol, 2003; Sunstein, 2003, 2007). At this tipping point, the social spaces that allow 
for dissent, criticism of the powerful, and the means to communicate one‘s grievances 
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risk elimination altogether, rendering even the appearance of democracy unnecessary to 
satisfy the deadened political will of the masses of the nation.   
 Complete amelioration of inequality of every stripe—economic, political, and 
educational—is utopian fantasy, but compression in the scale and scope of these areas of 
inequality is vital to reforming educational institutions (Baker 2009a). Underlying this 
project is the point that the inequalities that exist in the United States are persistent 
because they are deeply embedded into all aspects of the culture, which include public 
institutions and private organizations (Baker, 2006; Ball, 2003; Brantlinger, 2003). The 
educational system is a paramount apparatus for the legitimization of inequality, and, as 
such, it requires a fundamental retooling in order to achieve the purported democratic 
aims of the institutions of education. Further, this educational restructuring is dependent 
upon political reform and a social movement focused on reducing inequality in out-of-
school factors (Beckert, 2008; Da Silva, 2007; Goldin & Katz, 2008).  
 There are several trends, which are substantially results of educational inequality 
and if which remain unabated will continue to have detrimental effects on students‘ long 
term life chances. The first is the dropout rate for low income and minority students being 
significantly higher than the corresponding rate for white and wealthy students (Sacks, 
2007). This trend severely affects individuals‘ abilities to attain higher paying 
employment as well as to contribute to the civic dialogue on improving the conditions of 
marginalized populations. 
 The second is the competition for access to higher education (Dicker-Conlin & 
Rubenstein, 2007). Here, again, those students with the most advantages prior to applying 
for college and university admission stand the greatest chance of acceptance and success 
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when they arrive on campus (Kronman, 2007). Conversely, those students who emerge 
from an under-funded and overcrowded high school will often be at a disadvantage 
compared to other students in their attempts to attain higher education (Golden, 2006; 
McDonogh, 1997; McPhereson & Schapiro, 2006).  
 The third trend is that poor and minority students are more likely to enter the 
military after high school because of limited job prospects and the rising cost of higher 
education (Tyson, 2005). Needless to say, these recruits enter at the bottom of the 
military chain of command and often face additional barriers to higher education and 
career success upon leaving the service.  
 The fourth trend is the growing number of young people who have been ill-served 
by their schools and communities and who end up entering the prison system (Macek, 
2006). For example, the growth of incarceration rates across America‘s population 
illustrate that youth from urban and rural communities are disproportionately imprisoned 
compared to the rest of the population. Additionally, many of the drug related offenses 
have seen sentences that reflect a bias in the law regarding the treatment of the type of 
drug one was convicted of possessing (RTTNews, 2009). 
 One cannot leave the discussion of educational inequality without discussing the 
uneven effects of the standards and accountability regime on students (Au, 2009). Here, 
again, one should not be surprised by the fact that students from impoverished 
circumstances are most harmed by testing regimes (Berliner & Biddle, 1995). The misuse 
of testing as the sole indicator of educational success and the only tool for school 
improvement is one of the most destructive elements of recent educational reform 
(Nichols & Berliner, 2007). This, unfortunately, reflects that although the aims of the 
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dominant efforts at school reform have a public rhetoric of equal opportunity, they, in 
reality, often further stratify students and set students and schools up for greater failure 
(Berliner, 2009; Cuban, 2009; Profriedt, 2008). 
 The last point to be mentioned in this section is that a major consequence of and 
contributing factor to the persistence of educational inequality is which groups have been 
advocating for the improvement of the most marginalized schools and districts. Here, one 
encounters the frightening prospect of a declining common interest in improving all 
schools, which could further limit space and the audience for discussion about the future 
of public schooling (Putnam, 2000; Rank, 2004; Royce, 2009). Gene Glass (2008) argues 
that educational reform over the last hundred years has had two major aims with various 
hidden elements in each. The two aims have been to reduce the cost of public education 
and to create almost private schools for the middle class and upwardly mobile (Glass, 
2008). This is a disturbing trend since different groups are coming to think that public 
education depends all too much on geography and the wealth of residents in those school 
communities (Reimers, 2000). These instances of inequality are just a few of the strong 
arguments and evidence for why schools cannot persist in being unequal in the future.  
 Each of the critical traditions analyzed in this study attempt to provide intellectual 
structures to prevent the preceding trends from continuing to expand. The following 
section discusses the common elements of these three traditions and then moves to 
establish a critique of them that links to the previous chapters. 
This project arose out of an organic process of investigation that brought the diverse 
elements of these discourses together. The study is a product of a process of 
philosophical analysis of these traditions that came about because of dissatisfaction with 
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the existing discourses of critical educational thought that have often relied too 
exclusively upon appeals to class, autonomy, and identity. As hopefully comes through in 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the insights of these traditions represented by significant works from 
each of them are of substantial value and importance to educational theory and efforts at 
reform. However, they share some common characteristics that blunt their effectiveness 
in contributing to the changes in education and society that they passionately argue for in 
their writing. In fact, criticism of these traditions is only offered because the values 
underlying their work are so vital to improving the conditions of life for young people 
across the country. The problem, as mentioned previously, is the philosophical 
inconsistency and political framing of their thought towards reform and the improvement 
of social relations. There is little disagreement with most of the empirical claims that are 
the basis for each of the theories‘ starting points. The conditions of schooling at present 
are not defensible, but the steps they take—singly and together—to stake out remedies 
and solutions are not sufficient to confront and defeat the forces that promote inequality. 
 Some of the commonalities in these concepts and the critical traditions are the 
proposed solutions to the present social, economic, and political environments that 
require a conversion to their way of thinking by students, teachers, and other educational 
stakeholders. They want students and teachers to see that class, autonomy, or identity is a 
key to the educational and social predicament. What they are less interested in discussing 
is that if they truly wanted their perspectives to take hold, then they would need 
something much more substantial to overcome the resistance to it. The open and inclusive 
pedagogy they endorse to confront structures and institutions of power will not 
necessarily allow for the revolutions in thinking they hope to occur. It would seem that if 
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one were to take this view to its logical end, then the only way to convert the most 
resistant individuals to this perspective would be some type of Clockwork Orange-
pedagogy that forces people to feel the suffering they cause in others in a physical way, 
which would consequently make them incapable of acting in accordance with their 
previous incorrect views. This suggestion, of course, would be an anathema to all three 
critical traditions. The hyperbole, here, is meant to showcase that the aims of these 
traditions and their methods are often at odds and can fail to see the difficulties in 
achieving their aims. None of them leaves open the possibility that anyone could have a 
belief system that conflicts with their own and still have it be considered a reasonable 
view. These critical traditions have all the answers; they act as if they have a vanguard 
status; and they assert, that if they were only implemented correctly, the projects‘ overall 
goals would be advanced with education and society benefiting tremendously. 
 Yet, each tradition is stifled when it comes to how schools work and how students 
live their lives. In contrast, this move to the everyday is an aspect that Barry 
systematically and repeatedly calls for in his work. There is something lacking in the 
direct and sustained attention in each tradition to the ways in which students get caught 
up in conspicuously consumptive behaviors that are at odds with the goals of each of 
these traditions. These status and position seeking moves vary among schools and 
communities, but they are constant problems for almost everyone in a school population 
in the country. There is very little discussion of how teachers are supposed to overcome 
students‘ interest in material goods and electronic distractions (like Twitter) and to get 
them focused on weighty underlying issues that make up their critical traditions such as 
class, autonomy, and identity. This is a substantial hole in the implementation of these 
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approaches as one often forgets that these are adult ideas laid upon the minds of young 
adults. Further, it must be remembered that students‘ priorities simply may be very 
different from adults of all philosophical commitments, and this generational aspect must 
not be forgotten. 
 Further, each tradition is substantially at risk of having their calls for reform or 
revolution reified by the educational discourse in ways that may do harm to their long-
term goals. For example, the work of Ruby Payne (2003, 2006, 2009) has been at the 
center of a substantial controversy about how to teach poverty issues to teachers in 
professional development settings, which is an element that cuts across each of the 
critical traditions. The problems around Payne‘s work received more scholarly attention 
(Bomer, Dworin, May, & Semingson, 2008; Gorski, 2006; Ng & Rury, 2006; Valencia, 
2009) as her popularity on the professional development circuit grew. When analyzed by 
education scholars, Payne‘s work shocked and disturbed these scholars, especially since 
it was influencing possibly millions of teachers (based on claimed book sales) with little 
more than lessons in cultural stereotypes presented as research on how children in 
poverty act. The problem for critical educational thought, here, is that instead of getting 
the nuanced views that the traditions hope for on issues of class, autonomy, and identity, 
teachers receive confirmation of stereotypes of how students from certain backgrounds 
and ethnicities will behave and why they act in those ways. This is certainly not the aim 
of the scholars of these traditions. The determinism Payne pushes and profits from is 
certainly not what McLaren (2005), Reich (2002), or Goodman (2001) may have wanted 
to contribute to, but, in the move from observation to theory to professional development 
program, this blunt (and offensive version) is an example of how the underlying values, 
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which are positive in these traditions, can come through to teachers and students in 
negative ways. The other glaring problem that is showcased in this example is that 
Payne‘s work is missing any expectation or call for substantial revolution or reform in 
education and society, which are critical components of each tradition discussed in this 
study. Hence, there is an essential element that can be lost in the translation of these 
critical traditions into policy and practice. 
 The last commonality, and the most important one, is that these critical traditions 
in educational thought are largely modernist constructions. The categories used and 
methods employed often have essentialist qualities and frame educational and political 
issues in ways that neglect the complexities and changes in the United States and the 
globe (see also Bauman, 2008, Davis & Monk, 2007; Levy, 2008; Jacoby, 2005; Zizek, 
2007, 2008). The old means and territory for debate are fading or have faded completely 
from the world of politics or have been usurped by conservative forces. For example, one 
might argue that the ―Tea Party protests,‖ which were framed as spontaneous grassroots 
confrontations, were actually centrally planned propaganda promoted by prominent right-
leaning corporations. With this argument, the right has taken over and incorporated one 
of the last remaining apparatuses towards social progress—the protest—and turned it into 
another part of their political machine. The point here is that all three traditions start at 
the same point and leave us at the same point—playing into the hands of forces that 
oppose the reduction of inequality.  
 Given these weaknesses of the established critical traditions in educational 
thought, it is important to return to Barry‘s work and what it suggests for the future of 
critical educational scholarship. 
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Barry and Critical Educational Thought 
 It is crucial at this point to specify what elements of Barry‘s (1995, 2005, 2008) 
work can be drawn from to confront educational inequality and how inequality can be 
reduced. A relevant place to start is a symposium in the journal Ethics in July of 2008 for 
Barry‘s Why Social Justice Matters (2005). Barry‘s responses to several papers in this 
issue merit attention for understanding possible paths that lead away from greater 
inequality and towards egalitarianism in education and public policy through sustained 
efforts of collaboration across differences and against common political challenges.  
 First, Barry thinks that the metaphor and discourse of choice in education, and 
more broadly in society, must be eliminated. The three concepts Barry dissects in his 
work—meritocracy, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity—all rely on this 
central symbol of choice being the determinant element in a young person‘s educational 
prospects and life outcomes. For Barry, it is not enough to simply assert that students 
have a choice to be successful or unsuccessful in schools, as Sowell suggested in Chapter 
Two. He sees the mitigating out-of-school factors mentioned by Berliner as providing 
challenges that society should work to overcome by providing similar resources to young 
people in their educational and community lives. Barry sees the use of choice as an 
extremely deleterious tool of political rhetoric that must be shown to the public for the 
fraud that it is. Barry (2008) explains that choice does not have the power that it is all too 
often given by politicians and mislead voters: ―individual choice is incapable of playing 
the role that it has to be assigned if it is to be used to justify many of the outcomes in 
connection with which it is invoked by politicians and pundits in contemporary societies‖ 
(p. 688).‖ 
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 Further, Barry notes that there is more going on in how one‘s life turns out that is 
beyond one‘s simple choices. He states: 
 What I hoped to do was to avoid falling back on the proposition that universal 
determinism is incompatible with individual responsibility while at the same time 
running the gamut of relevant academic disciplines to illustrate ways in which the 
web of causation either circumscribes the scope of choice or results in outcomes 
that cannot be explained in terms of choice at all but which arise directly from 
features of the social structure without the mediation of choice. (p. 688-689) 
 
The point here that Barry emphasizes is that choices are connected to a network of 
choices made by other people that have effects on individuals‘ lives in school and for 
years after. That more attention is not given to what choices are available to young people 
and to the choices of others that curtail their prospects is substantially unjust for Barry. 
He thinks that this renders the notion of choice to be no more than a political 
smokescreen used to obscure the growth of inequality in education and derivative life 
outcomes. 
 Barry believes that the discourse of choice must be superseded by a reclamation 
and promotion of the discourse of equality in its place. This renewed sense of equality via 
populism has the potential to appeal to an existing strain of American politics. There is no 
guarantee here that this will have any more salience in connecting with the detached and 
misinformed masses that have been misled through media outlets. Yet, for Barry some 
new political effort must push back against the discourse of choice if greater 
egalitarianism in education and society is to be achieved.  
 A second point is that there must be greater solidarity across the educational 
establishment in terms of teachers, administrators, university faculty, policymakers, and 
parents. This solidarity focused towards the goals of equality must move beyond the 
discourse of rights to a discussion of resources and opportunities in education. This is of 
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crucial importance as state school finance litigation has often shown that students have a 
right to some version of a basic education, but this is a remarkably low standard that does 
not provide an adequate leveling of the playing field between those students who attend 
St. Paul‘s and those who attend Harbor City High. For Barry (2008), this connection to 
solidarity is a crucial point that illustrates the complications of modern governance, its 
institutions, and his conception of social justice: 
liberal justice, which I take to be the primary sphere of rights, whereas I add to it 
social justice, which is more the sphere of opportunities and resources….I insist 
that social justice is not in conflict with liberal justice but rather complements and 
completes it. (p. 692) 
 
It is a universal positive that schools now no longer bar certain students from attending 
based exclusively on race, gender, or disability, but the resources allocated and 
opportunities afforded to students is by no means equal across and within public school 
districts or even within a single school. In Barry‘s opinion, this lack of focus on the 
amelioration of inequality in schools demonstrates that much progress remains to be 
achieved. 
 Barry‘s view of social justice as an extension of liberal justice provides a first 
order conception of the good that demands that government‘s purpose should be an 
attempt to give the DiAngelos and Richards of the population every chance possible to 
succeed and to improve their life outcomes relative to any other individuals, no matter 
where they went to school or how wealthy their parents were. Another example from 
Barry (2008) further expands this point on where the discussion of opportunities for life 
outcomes begins: 
Suppose that you lack the qualifications for becoming a surgeon, say. This is your 
responsibility if you can choose not to take a path that would have led to your 
becoming surgeon. But suppose that at no times in your life did you have a set of 
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realistic options open that included the possibility of making choices leading to a 
surgery as a career. I then wish to say that you lacked the opportunity….Judging 
by test scores and dropout rates, there are many schools both in Britain and the 
United States in which achieving minimal literacy is an achievement. Being a 
surgeon is so far off the map that it is hard to know what to make of a 
hypothetical question about choosing to become one if one could. If a student at 
one of these schools had instead been in a position to become a surgeon by 
making available choices, who knows whether he or she would have choices to 
make the effort or not? (p. 696-697) 
 
This is a vital point to understanding that social justice exceeds the bounds of liberal 
justice. Access to education is not enough if life outcomes are so tied to how well one 
does in school and what one is able to study. Further, the example of what decisions 
could realistically be made and achieved are important to recall in light of the discussion 
in the third chapter concerning the expansion of interest in students attending college. 
Unfortunately, this aspiration has not been supported through policies that would increase 
levels of college graduation. 
 The third element of Barry‘s work that must be reiterated is his direct attack on 
the growth and expansion of wealth inequality and its effect on education. Barry (2008) 
makes clear that he sees wealth inequality as the most significant form of inequality, and 
it has the most corrosive aspects on political agency and, derivatively, on educational 
funding: ―At the top end of the scale, extremes of wealth fray the social fabric by 
enabling the rich to detach themselves from the common lot, opting out of the public 
system of education‖ (p. 698). In Barry‘s view, this separation of groups based on 
relativities of wealth reduces the possibility of sustained public investments that benefit 
broad coalitions of the population of a state or nation. This distortion in incomes and the 
distribution of wealth in the country increasingly leads to more exiting from the public 
systems of education for private schools, neighborhood schools, and new suburbs. 
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Further, as students exit public schools, the base of support for them and for progressive 
efforts to reduce inequality become more difficult since the more powerful interests no 
longer are invested in the public schools.  
 The last element that must be asserted is that this discussion of inequality cannot 
in the end of the analysis be restricted to just the national boundaries of the United States. 
There is far too much at stake to limit this call for social justice to countries that can 
actually afford it. This is especially true in considering how reluctant even the wealthiest 
countries are in meeting the demands of social justice. In the international realm, the 
advancement of social justice goes from thoroughly difficult to infinitely more 
complicated. It remains to be seen how gross levels of inequality in well-off countries can 
be reconciled and tackled, as well how relations among states of varying wealth are to 
interact. For Barry (2008), social justice cannot be bound to just one country, and one 
must look deeply into the face of inequality across the globe to fight for its reduction: 
In general, though, I think it has to be said that social justice conceived of 
globally must involve international comparisons. If we say that infant mortality is 
very high by international standards in some poor country, we might be simply 
focusing on the country itself and pointing out the shortfall in relation to ―best 
practice‖ in rich countries. But it seems to me much more plausible to regard the 
inequality as itself representing an injustice. (p. 706) 
 
Barry continues pointing out that the simple solutions are the ones that rarely get the 
attention they deserve, even when they would have a negligible impact on the richest 
countries (see also Miller, 2007; Sachs, 2008, Singer, 2002, 2009). He suggests following 
the United Nations ―Millennium Development Goals….if these goals are adequate for 
justice, and if these funds will be sufficient to meet them, factoring in global justice will 
have only a peripheral effect on the analysis of domestic justice‖ (p. 707). This is a 
crucial point and one that seem to have lost focus since the beginning of the economic 
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crisis of 2008.  In Barry‘s view social justice demands sustained efforts at providing 
assistance before crises arise. 
 All these ideas require the political center of the country getting to a political 
mindset in which inequality is something to be warded off and not a taken-for-granted 
element of everyday life. It is acknowledged that this would require a sea change in the 
political atmosphere of the nation and elite interests that presently make it difficult to 
change the present political predicament. Barry (1995) is acutely aware of this limitation 
of his theorizing and provides insight into how the impulse to attack inequality often gets 
pushed off by political agendas. He contends, ―those who gain from inequality are also 
well placed to propagate beliefs tending to legitimize their advantages via control of 
society‘s cultural, religious, and educational institutions and its media of mass 
communication‖ (p. 198). Yet, Barry sees that it is not just the top end of the scale that 
determines how and why inequality persists. He thinks those individuals in marginalized 
positions can have difficulty in thinking of a path to a more equal future and, even if they 
can visualize it, they are unable to make any choices that would result in it coming to 
fruition. He writes, ―If they [marginalized individuals] regard collective action to 
improve their lot as unlikely to succeed, they can gain psychic ease by taking on board 
the belief that ‗there is no alternative‘ to the inequalities from which they suffer‖ (p. 198). 
This element of reticence towards taking action is the influence of the media‘s efforts to 
convince people that the world exists as it does and change is really not possible any 
more. 
 It is also clear that the worldview at play in democracies is often, if not always, at 
odds with those who benefit the least from government intervention and support. Again, 
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the theme of the justification of position based on merit, personal responsibility, and 
equal opportunity comes through and shows why they are present barriers to the 
reduction of inequality in education in Barry‘s work. He states: ―The superficial 
appearance of a consensus…provides support for the socioeconomic status quo by 
suggesting that successful individuals got where they are by their merits in a fair 
completion and that large economic rewards reflect large contributions to the economy‖ 
(p. 199). This view works for those who benefit from the system and further blames those 
who do not succeed as not having made the correct choices, thereby reinforcing the 
existing levels of inequality and opening up new spaces for its growth. 
 Barry (1995) further clarifies the complications of not having a legitimate 
alternative choice among the political parties and the depressing result, which is the 
degraded form of politics that is essentially non-political. This assertion defines the 
present historical age. Barry thinks he knows why there is not an ―articulation of counter-
ideology corresponding to the experience of those who do poorly out of the system‖ (p. 
199). He suggests that ―the answer is that trying to create an electoral base by changing 
beliefs is a long-term strategy which makes sense only if party leaders have a time 
horizon extending well beyond the next election‖ (p. 199). This long-term strategy 
becomes ever harder to achieve as news cycles increase to near non-stop campaign 
coverage. With these assertions and recommendations made, it is useful to now speculate 
on the future trajectory of critical educational scholarship. 
 One possible future trend that is in need of development is that new words, 
language, and discourse must be asserted to restart the critical discourse around education 
and society. At present, there seems to be an impasse between the existing critical 
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traditions in educational scholarship and the continuing centrist business-minded trends 
in educational reform. The means and methods of critique in the past no longer have the 
saliency and the potency that it was hoped they would have in achieving their goals. The 
optimism found in political and educational theory that reason would lead to a more just 
world in terms of rights and opportunities has failed to live up to its claim. As such, this 
study has provided a critique of these three traditions through the work of Brian Barry—
who is also subject to some of these modernist conventions. Yet, this internal critique of 
the discourse is only the first step of the much larger task of developing and evaluating 
the new critical discourse in education that learns from its past mistakes, is willing to 
abandon politically dead terms while staying true to underlying values, and is forceful in 
its demands on students, parents, teachers, university faculty, and policymakers.  
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